Mum's The Word As To Perez Sentence

On January 21st, the DOJ announced (here) that Antonio Perez was sentenced to 2 years in prison in connection with the Haiti Teleco case.

I did not cover the sentence as it happened because, as I hope readers recognize and appreciate, I like to analyze things a bit before posting.

Thus, when it comes to FCPA sentences, the actual sentence only tells part of the story; the complete story requires knowledge of the sentence the DOJ was actually requesting.

For instance, the DOJ sought a 37 month sentence as to Leo Winston Smith, but the judge sentenced him to six months (see here). The DOJ sought a 38 month sentence as to Bobby Elkins, but the judge sentenced him to probation (see here). The DOJ sought a 14-17 year sentence as to Nam Nguyen, but the judge sentenced to him to 16 months (see here).

Numerous other examples abound and I've previously noted that the DOJ may be charging more individuals with FCPA violations (although in 2010, 70% of corporate enforcement actions did not involve any related enforcement action against company employees), and those individuals may be pleading guilty (perhaps because of the "carrots" and "sticks" the DOJ possesses), but when it comes time to sentencing, judges are viewing FCPA cases much differently than the DOJ.

Back to Perez.

There is nothing in the publicly filed documents that indicate the sentence the DOJ was seeking in this case.

I contacted Perez's attorney, Michael Chavies (see here) and asked him - what sentence was the DOJ seeking - the answer - no comment.

I've exchanged e-mails with the Public Affairs Office at Justice Department and, after nearly three months, I've still yet to learn the answer to the rather simple question of what sentence the DOJ was seeking as to Perez.

Perhaps someday the answer will be known and a more thoughtful analysis of the Perez sentence will be possible.

For now, mum's the word.

So ... in case you had not heard, Antonio Perez was sentenced to two years in prison and ordered to serve two years of supervised release following his prison term, and to forfeit $36,375.

For numerous prior posts on the Haiti Teleco, please visit the Haiti tab on the right.

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A good weekend to all.

Another Top SFO Official To Depart

The U.K. Bribery Act is set to go live on July 1st.

But will anyone be left at the SFO to enforce the new law?

Of course there will be. As has been witnessed in the U.S., carrying the "enforcement stick" makes one a valuable target for law firm recruiters in this era of increased enforcement - as the firms are eager to provide clients with insight and advice from those who carried or shaped the "enforcement stick."

Coming on the heels of other recent high-level SFO departures (see here and here for the prior posts), yesterday it was reported (see here for the coverage from Legal Week) that Vivian Robinson (SFO - General Counsel) will soon leave the agency and join the London office of U.S. based law firm McGuireWoods LLP.

Over the past year, Robinson has been a very active speaker on behalf of the SFO on the Bribery Act. See here and here for prior posts as to certain of Robinson's speeches or commentary.

Commenting on his move, Robinson told Legal Week - "It has also been a privilege to take part in bringing to the attention of a wide national and international audience the importance of the new Bribery Act, its implications, and the essential role to be played by the SFO as principal enforcer of its provisions."

As has been previously reported, Richard Alderman (Director of the SFO) is also looking to soon retire from the SFO.

Does DOJ Expect FCPA Counsel To Roll Over And Play Dead?

Remember those "issue spotting" exams in law school?

Well, here is one.

A Japanese company (without shares traded on a U.S. exchange) participated in a joint venture operating in Nigeria. The joint venture operated through three Portuguese special purpose corporations. The joint venture hired a U.K. citizen who, along with his Gibraltar corporation, allegedly paid bribes to Nigerian government officials. The U.S. Department of Justice starts an investigation as to your Japanese company client. Consistent with your duty to zealously advocate on behalf of your client, discuss likely legal defenses your client may raise to a U.S. enforcement action based on the described conduct?

Got the answer?

Your answer includes jurisdictional issues does it not?

In fact, a lawyer representing the Japanese company would likely fall short of his/her professional duties without raising a jurisdictional defense.

Why am I even talking about this?

Because of this troubling sentence in the recent JGC Corporation of Japan deferred prosecution agreement (here p. 3) - "after initially declining to cooperate with the Department based on jurisdictional arguments, JGC began to cooperate, and has agreed to continue to cooperate, with the Department in its ongoing investigation of the conduct of JGC and its present and former employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, subsidiaries, and other relating to violations of the FCPA."

The above sentence - save for the portion in italics - is standard fare in DOJ resolution agreements.

However, the portion in italics is troubling.

For starters, what does it mean to decline "to cooperate with the Department based on jurisdictional arguments?"

The DOJ's Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations ("Principles") (here) talk about the "Value of Cooperation" (at 9-28.700), but the discussion focuses on issues such as "identifying potentially relevant actors and locating relevant evidence, among other things, and in doing so expeditiously." Further, 9-28.720 discusses cooperation as disclosing "relevant facts."

However, nothing in the Principles suggest that raising legal arguments obviously implicated by the DOJ's investigation is not cooperating.

Surely the DOJ carries a big stick and has juicy carrots at its disposal. Thus, cooperation - along the lines outlined in the Principles - may be warranted in certain cases.

However, is the message tucked in the JGC DPA that the DOJ now expects FCPA counsel to roll over and play dead and that the failure to do so will be adverse consequences for the client?

After all, JGC's total culpability score under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (a score that impacts the ultimate fine amount) was only reduced by -1 whereas the other joint venture partners that previously resolved enforcement actions (Technip, Snamprogetti, and KBR) all received a "better" -2 reduction.

A Focus on Russia

In this guest post, I am pleased to turn it over to Robert Wieck (a high school classmate - Elkhart Lake (WI) Class of '93 - Go Resorters!).

Robert is currently the Forensic Audit Senior Manager (Europe, Middle East and Africa) for Oracle Corporation and is based in Bucharest, Romania. He has thirteen years of experience in both “Big 4” and US listed multi-national companies. Twelve of these years have been focused on emerging markets including countries in the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, and the Balkan region.

Robert participated as a panelist at the “3rd Annual Anti-Corruption Summit for Russia & CIS” held on March 16-17th in Moscow. See here for the prior post regarding Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer's comments at the event.

Below is Robert's guest post and the opinions expressed below are his own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of his employer, Oracle Corporation.

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"I think it is clear to most people that the current business climate in Russia is troublesome for multi-national companies trying to do business legitimately. Presentations and discussions held at the conference seemed to confirm that companies are becoming increasingly concerned about being able to do business successfully in Russia and at the same time maintaining compliance with the FCPA.

One interesting point which I believe set the tone for the conference was that while the DoJ accepted the invitation for two senior officials (Mr. Breuer and Mr. Andres) to travel to Moscow to address the conference attendees, there were no Russian counterparts from the Russian Ministry of Justice present to advise on what they are doing to address the corruption problems on the ground in Russia.

While the transcript for Mr. Breuer’s speech is linked above, Mr. Andres’s comments are summarized below:

• Russia is clearly not the only place in the world where corruption is a problem. There have been a considerable number of prosecutions of US Citizens under the FCPA.

• There have been a record number of prosecutions under the FCPA in 2010, and more than 1 Billion USD in fines collected as a result. According to Mr. Andres, none of these cases involved a single, low level act of corruption or bribery, but systematic corruption involving hundreds of thousands of dollars, and involving dozens of people.

• While there were a record number of prosecutions in 2010, there were also a record number of cases that the DoJ declined to prosecute. Decisions to decline to prosecute a case were made based on a company’s ability to demonstrate that they have sound internal procedures and compliance programs. Andres believed this also highlights the benefits of companies self-reporting potential FCPA violations, and further mentioned that self-disclosure was an important factor in how many of those cases were resolved.

• There has been an uptick in the number of individuals being prosecuted under the FCPA, which totaled 50 for 2009 and 2010. This is up from 2 individuals prosecuted in 2004.

• In terms of FCPA trends for the future, Andres noted that it appears more companies are cooperating with the DoJ. More industry-wide prosecutions are being undertaken where they find that activities that violate the FCPA are not confined to one company within an industry, but represent an industry practice that multiple companies within the industry are all engaging in. The DoJ has noted increased cooperation with national law enforcement agencies and international organizations (including the OECD).

• Companies continue to criticize the DoJ for not providing enough guidance regarding their approach to FCPA prosecutions. However, Mr. Andres stated that the DoJ does a good job in maintaining the FCPA compliance website where a wealth of case information is published and available for review.

• Currently there is much debate ongoing about the definition of a public sector official, and the DOJ continues to see an increasing number of litigations surrounding the interpretation of who is a "foreign official" under the provisions of the FCPA.

• Andres believes the trend of increasing prosecutions under the FCPA will continue, and that the DoJ has added resources to address this trend.

Among the most interesting comments made by Mr. Andres, from my point of view, were his final comments in which he stated that the DoJ is demanding the same level of compliance with the FCPA from Russia as it does from other countries. He further stated that there would not be any “Russia-specific exception” when pursuing prosecutions under the FCPA.

One other interesting presentation was delivered by the General Director for Transparency International, Ms. Elena Panfilova. In what I consider a brutally honest way, she confirmed that based on research conducted by her team on the ground in Moscow, the fraud and corruptions problems in Russia are indeed getting worse, despite information that might suggest otherwise. The schemes used by these perpetrators are becoming more and more complex and they no longer appear to be shy about engaging in corruption. This has resulted in a diminished sense of public trust and led to a very cynical environment in Russia in regards to corruption. Ms. Panfilova believes that one of the barriers to reversing this trend is the lack of whistleblower protection for people reporting alleged cases of corruption. Whistleblowers currently have no guarantees of support from anyone when they raise concerns. And usually when people do report instances, whistleblowers become targets of unfounded prosecution. To demonstrate her point, she made reference to statistics which suggest that while corruption is on the rise, the number of whistleblowers making claims is decreasing. It is understood that the role of the whistleblower is critical in the fight against corruption. Thus, legal protection from prosecution (both civil and criminal), protection of property and labor rights (anti-retaliation legislation) is required in order to allow whistleblowers to come forward and voice their concerns regarding corrupt activities they might have witnessed or been a victim of.

My participation in the panel discussion covered best practices in conducting investigations in Russia. Over my twelve years of experience working in emerging markets in Europe (including Russia and CIS), I have noted common themes that should be considered while trying to conduct an audit or investigate potential misconduct in Russia (and any emerging market, for that matter). One aspect would be the high risk of document falsification in the Russian environment. In Russia, a “form over substance” approach is taking to maintain supporting documentation for transactions. Thus, in the context of an audit or investigation, the audit objectives should be managed carefully in order to ensure documentation is not “custom” prepared. Another aspect is the sometimes difficult task of getting complete/honest answers to questions or queries. It is common to receive conflicting stories and different versions of answers to the same question, sometimes for no apparent reason. A Russian celebrity summed it up in a Russian newspaper article I read recently by saying “For some reason, it's not the custom to tell the truth in our country, even when it is clear to everyone”. Lastly, I would say that securing full cooperation from auditees can be a tedious and exhausting process. It can only be recommended that companies use legal resources (both internal and external) when necessary, in order to ensure that they receive cooperation which might be required in the form of an employment agreement, internal code of conduct or other type of contract (in the case of third parties)."

UK Bribery Act - Sensible and Senseless

The U.K. Bribery Act, set to go live on July 1st after much delay, has been the focus of much prognostication and the foundation for many marketing initiatives.

In this post, I highlight two recent events - one sensible, the other senseless.

Sensible

Mark Miller (a partner at Baker Botts - see here) recently published "The U.K. Bribery Act 2010 - Enforcement is the Rest of the Story" in BNA's White Collar Crime Report. See here.

Miller sensibly notes as follows.

"Much of the commentary about the new U.K. Bribery Act 2010 has been filled with alarm that the new law will be even stricter—and therefore more dangerous—than the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Although there are ways in which the Bribery Act is stricter than the FCPA, that is not the whole story. The real measure of how dangerous the Bribery Act will be is not the provisions of the law itself but how that law will be enforced, and from indications so far, that is a big unknown."

Countering alarmist commentary of the Bribery Act - including that it represents a major change in law because facilitating payments are not allowed - Miller rightly points out "the predecessors to the Bribery Act (the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) did not have exceptions for facilitating payments either ...".

Indeed this same point was noted by the U.K. Ministry of Justice in its March 30th guidance (see here). Can anyone point to a prior U.K. enforcement action concerning facilitating payments?

Miller also notes as follows. "The other Bribery Act provision usually pointed to as being stricter than the FCPA is the new offense described in Section 7, failure of commercial organizations to prevent bribery." However, Miller again sensibly notes as follows. "This appears to create a strict liability standard for companies whose employees, officers, or agents engage in bribery on their behalf. Although the FCPA itself contains no analogous provision, the standard in U.S. law for attributing criminal liability to corporate entities is similar. The more important distinction between the Bribery Act and U.S. law is that the former contains a defense for when the corporation is able to "prove that [it] had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with [the corporation] from undertaking such conduct.'"

As to the Bribery Act's coverage of purely commercial bribery, Miller states as follows. "Another aspect of the Bribery Act has been pointed to as being broader than the FCPA: its prohibition against bribery of nongovernmental officials." Here again, Miller sensibly points out as follows. "True, the FCPA itself does not contain such a provision, but U.S. law does. The federal government routinely uses other statutes—such as the Travel Act and the mail and wire fraud statutes—to prosecute conduct that would not fall strictly within the FCPA’s prohibitions."

Miller then notes as follows. "The real story here is not the Bribery Act itself, because there is nothing truly revolutionary about it - except possibly the publicity it has generated. The real story is enforcement, and how the SFO will carry out its duties remains a big question mark." Miller then identifies several "reasons to believe that the SFO’s enforcement of the Bribery Act will turn out to be a less serious threat than U.S. enforcement."

All sensible observations and consistent with my own observations that "the Bribery Act may turn out to be more lenient than the FCPA" (see here) and that "enforcement of the U.K. Bribery Act will be disciplined and measured." (See here).

Senseless

The alarmist commentary Miller spoke of in the above article was on display last week as Deloitte issued a press release (here) stating that "few business professionals are familiar with UK Bribery Act taking effect July 1."

According to Deloitte's own survey results - results not actually released - 73% of "business professionals" participating in a Deloitte webcast "earlier this year" said "they are not familiar with provisions in the U.K. Bribery Act." The leader of Deloitte's FCPA "consulting services practice" is quoted as saying that "organizations should focus on expanding their anti-corruption programs beyond FCPA to fully address the new Bribery Act 2010 provisions.”

What Deloitte's release doesn't mention is that its own survey took place on January 18th (see here) - a time when it was uncertain if or when the Bribery Act would ever go live and a full two months before the U.K. Ministry of Justice released (here) extensive guidance and case studies on the Bribery Act.

Against this backdrop, it is surprising not that 73% of "business professionals" were not "familiar" with the Bribery Act, but that 27% of "business professionals" were familiar with the Bribery Act.

Is it often that the majority of "business professionals" are "familiar" with a foreign law months before the law is scheduled to go live?

Judge Matz Issues Narrow "Foreign Official" Decision / Calls DOJ Post-Hearing Request "Astounding"

As noted in an April 1st post (see here), United States District Judge Howard Matz (C.D. of California) issued an oral ruling denying the Lindsey defendants "foreign official" challenge. See here for a transcript of the hearing.

As noted in the hearing transcript, Judge Matz stated that the "foreign official" challenge "warrants and will receive a very considered written ruling."

Yesterday, Judge Matz issued his written decision. See here.

According to Judge Matz, "the question presented by the motion is whether an officer or employee of a state-owned corporation can be a 'foreign official' for purposes of FCPA liability." [In a footnote, Judge Matz noted, "[a]s discussed in the Addendum to this order, the Government never directly challenged that assumption until more than two weeks after the Court had issued its oral ruling denying Defendants' motion to dismiss and trial had commenced." (emphasis added)].

Judge Matz's holding is as follows. "The Court denies the motion to dismiss, because a state-owned corporation having the attributes of CFE may be an 'instrumentality' of a foreign government within the meaning of the FCPA, and officers of such a state-owned corporation, as Messrs. Nestor Moreno and Arturo Hernandez are alleged to be, may therefore be 'foreign officials' within the meaning of the FCPA."

As to the meaning of "instrumentality," Judge Matz stated as follows. "Instrumentality is a noun having an inherently broad scope, but it is unnecessary for this Court to choose a particularly elastic dictionary definition of that word. Instead, the Court will adopt the very definition that Defendants themselves proffer." Judge Matz then analyzed those definitions.

As to the FCPA's legislative history, Judge Matz stated as follows. "It is unnecessary to base this ruling upon the legislative history of the FCPA, given that the meaning of 'instrumentality' under Defendants' definition of the term clearly encompasses CFE. Nevertheless, because legislative history was so central to Defendants' motion, the Court will summarize the parties' contentions."

After providing such a summary, Judge Matz stated in dicta as follows.

"The Court finds that the legislative history of the FCPA is inconclusive. Although it does not demonstrate that Congress intended to include all state-owned corporations within the ambit of the FCPA, neither does it provide support for Defendants' insistence that Congress intended to exclude all such corporations from the ambit of the FCPA." (emphasis in original).

As discussed above, Judge Matz's decision contains an Addendum. It begins as follows.

"After the jury trial had been underway for more than two weeks, and just before this order was to be filed, the Government asked the Court to take judicial notice of what the Government claims is this fact. 'CFE was created by Mexico as a decentralized public entity with its own legal status and assets.' In a footnote the Government added, '... [U]nder Mexican law, CFE is a decentralized public entity, not a corporation.' This request is astounding."

Judge Matz then stated, among other things, that:

"throughout the hundreds of pages of argument and exhibits that were filed as part of motion practice, the Government never stated that CFE is not a corporation;"

"nor did it assert that view at the hearing on this motion;"

"in a lengthy footnote in its opposition papers the Government stressed that in more than a dozen FCPA prosecutions, 'guilty pleas were accepted by U.S. District Courts, involved bribery of officials of state-owned companies'" (emphasis added)

"the Government cited two cases in which state-owned companies were found to fall within the scope of the FCPA" and the Government "cited and attached jury instructions in yet two additional cases, to the effect that 'the definition of government instrumentality includes companies owned or controlled by the state;" (emphasis added)

"still later, the Government continued in this vein, purporting to refute the Defendants' legislative history analysis by stressing that the author of the declaration that the Defendants' cited 'is unable to find a single reference ... that Congress intended to exclude state-owned companies from the definition of instrumentality ...'"; (emphasis added)

"the Government concluded , "from the FCPA's inception, state-owned and state-controlled companies were within Congress's intended definition of instrumentalities of a foreign government.'" (emphasis added).

Judge Matz then ends the Addendum as follows.

"There is nothing in the Government's peculiar request for judicial notice which warrants a change in the foregoing ruling."

O'Shea "Foreign Official" Challenge Fully Briefed

Earlier this week, lawyers for John Joseph O'Shea filed a replly brief (here) in the "foreign official" challenge pending in the Southern District of Texas. The "foreign officials" at issue in the O'Shea matter are alleged to be officials of Comision Federal de Electricidad ("CFE"), a Mexican utility, the same entity at issue in the Lindsey matter currently in trial in the Central District of California. See here for the prior post.

O'Shea's argument begins as follows.

"The Government Relies on 'Prosecutorial Common Law' and Rulings from Cases That Did Not Consider or Inadequately Considered the Meaning of Foreign Official."

The reply brief then states as follows. "As long as FCPA defendants - both individuals and corporations - enter into non-prosecution agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, and plea agreements, the government will continue to build its arsenal of 'prosecutorial common law' to supports its aggressive and slanted interpretation of the FCPA. Yet court acceptance of plea agreements does not convert the government's pronunciations on the law into sources of legal authority. Indeed, the government's strategy of creating its own would-be common law threatens to strip the federal courts of their judicial power to interpret the FCPA."

See here for the prior post on O'Shea's motion to dismiss.

See here for the prior post on the DOJ's response brief.

Along with the reply brief, O'Shea's lawyers also filed (here) a motion to strike the Declaration of Clifton Johnson ((Assistant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Legal Adviser's Office of the United States Department of State). Johnson's declaration was ordered stricken in the Lindsey challenge (see here) and was also filed earlier this week in the Carson "foreign official" challenge pending in the Central District of California. (See here).

"FCPA Sanctions: Too Big To Debar?"

Debarment (or lack thereof) is a periodic topic on this site.

Previously, I covered "Siemens ... The Year After" (here), a post that highlighted in the year after resolution of the Siemens record-setting December 2008 FCPA matter, the U.S. government continued to do substantial business with the company it charged with engaging in a pattern of bribery “unprecedented in scale and geographic scope.”

In September 2010, I highlighted (here) the FBI's $40 million contract with BAE - months after the FBI participated in resolution of the $400 million FCPA related enforcement action against the company.

In my November 2010 testimony (here) before the U.S. Senate, I stated as follows. "In order for the DOJ’s deterrence message to be completely heard and understood egregious instances of corporate bribery that legitimately satisfy the elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation involving high-level executives and/or board participation should be followed with debarment proceedings against the offender."

This testimony prompted then Senator Arlen Specter (who chaired the hearing) to ask me several follow-up questions for the record relating to debarment. (See here for the Q&A's). Senator Christopher Coons (who also participated in the November 2010 hearing) also asked debarment follow-up questions of the DOJ.

As highlighted last week (here), the DOJ is opposed to a "mandatory, conduct-based, debarment remedy for companies that engage in egregious bribery." As noted in the prior post, the DOJ's responses seemed anchored in self-interest in that such a remedy would lessen its FCPA caseload, would make its job more difficult, and would take away it flexibility and leverage and resolving FCPA enforcement actions.

Enter Dru Stevenson (Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law - here and a past contributor to the site) and Nick Wagoner (a law student at South Texas College of Law).

Stevenson and Wagoner recently released a yet to be published article titled "FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?" (See here).

The authors (who can be reached at dstevenson@stcl.edu and nicholas.wagoner@gmail.com) provide this article summary.

"Despite the dramatic escalation in corporate fines and imprisonment imposed under the FCPA in recent years, a particularly lethal sanction for combating foreign corruption remains unused—suspension or debarment of prosecuted entities from future contracts with the U.S. Many of the firms caught bribing foreign officials have extensive contracts with a number of domestic federal agencies; meaning debarment may be a particularly devastating penalty both for the government contractor and the agency it transacts business with.

This begs the question: are certain private contractors too big to debar? As this Article demonstrates, it appears so. Certain federal agencies have become highly dependent on a handful of private firms responsible for satisfying the vast majority of government contracts. Because of the potential “collateral consequences” that may result from the collapse of a debarred contractor, these firms have enjoyed bailouts from agency officials who refuse to sanction corrupt practices through suspension or debarment. If ridding foreign markets of corruption truly is a top priority of the U.S., it seems both unfair and imprudent for federal agencies to continue awarding lucrative, multibillion-dollar contracts to firms recently prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining such contracts overseas.

This situation leads to the jaded viewpoint that paying fines when caught bribing foreign officials has “simply become a cost of doing business.” To help illuminate these concerns and lend support to the thesis, this Article examines the third largest FCPA-related enforcement actions to date: the BAE Systems case. On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems paid approximately $400 million in fines for its corrupt practices abroad. In the 365 days that followed however, BAE was awarded U.S. contracts in excess of $58 billion dollars. The U.S.’s refusal to debar BAE because of the risk of “collateral consequences” provides a case study of the benefits and drawbacks to deterring foreign corruption through suspension and debarment. This Article concludes that the U.S. must begin to diversify its portfolio of federal contractors so that prosecutors may leverage the legitimate threat of suspension and debarment to more effectively deter foreign corruption."

DOJ Files Opposition Brief in Carson "Foreign Official" Challenge

On February 21st, various defendants in the U.S. v. Carson case pending in the Central District of California filed a historic challenge to the DOJ's interpretation that employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises are “foreign officials” under the FCPA. (See here for the prior post).

Yesterday, the DOJ filed its opposition brief (see here).

The DOJ brief is supported by the same declaration from Clifton Johnson (Assistant Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Legal Adviser's Office of the United States Department of State) ordered stricken in the Lindsey "foreign official" challenge (see here and here) and also filed in the O'Shea "foreign official" challenge (see here).

The DOJ brief is also supported by a declaration from FBI Special Agent Brian Smith (here) as to "some facts related to certain of the entities involved" in the case and "information pertaining to state-owned enterprises in China" and "certain portions of legislative history related" to the FCPA.

Also yesterday, Nathaniel Edmonds (Assistant Chief, DOJ Fraud Section) filed a notice of appearance in the case.

Potpourri

AG Holder On Corruption

Last week Attorney General Eric Holder was in Slovenia to speak at The Balkans Justice Ministerial. In his speech (here) AG Holder focused on the "global fight against corruption."

Holder stated as follows.

"Corruption strikes hardest at the most vulnerable among us, siphoning scarce resources away from those most in need. It advances the selfish desires of a dishonest few over the best interests of those who work hard and obey the law. In countries rich and poor, large and small – corruption erodes trust in government and private institutions alike. It undermines confidence in the fairness of free and open markets. It stifles competition and repels foreign investment. It hinders progress, and it breeds contempt for the rule of law."

"And yet corruption continues to flourish."

Holder stressed that "all nations struggle against corruption" and that the U.S "is no exception."

Holder called on all nations "to ratify – and to fully implement – the UN Convention Against Corruption." (See here).

As to asset recovery, Holder repeated his call first made in Qatar (see here for the prior post) that asset recovery (i.e. ensuring that corrupt officials do not retain illicit proceeds) "isn’t just a global necessity – it’s a moral imperative."

U.K. Oil for Food Sentence

With its approximately twenty corporate enforcement actions connected to the U.N. Iraq Oil for Food Program, the U.S. is clearly the leader in collecting corporate fines connected to this scandal plagued, defunct program.

The U.K. however has clearly emerged as the leader in holding individuals (not just corporations) to account for illegal behavior in connection with the program.

Last week, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office announced (here) that Mark Jessop admitted to breaking U.N. sanctions during the Oil For Food Program by making illegal payments to Saddam Hussein's government. The release states that Jessop was sentenced to 24 weeks' imprisonment. According to the release, Jessop was ordered to pay £150,000 to the Development Fund for Iraq and pay prosecution costs of £25,000. Jessop sold medical goods to Iraq, initially as an employee of a British surgical instruments company, but later through his own companies - JJ Bureau Ltd and Opthalmedex Ltd, of which he was sole director.

For other recent U.K. Oil for Food sentences, see here for the prior post.

Resource Extraction Disclosures

Remember Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act? (See here for the prior post).

The Huffington Post reports (here) that the April 15th deadline for the SEC to issue final implementing regulations has passed. According to the SEC (see here) the new target date for final implementing rules is between August and December.

I guess this is what happens when an ill-conceived, poorly drafted law is inserted into a massive piece of legislation as a miscellaneous provision at the last moment without any meaningful debate or analysis.

World Bank News

Last week, the World Bank released (here) a "Declaration of Agreed Principles for Effective Global Enforcement to Counter Corruption." See here for the press release.

The release also notes that the World Bank's Integrity office's ("INT") FY10 results include "117 investigations in FY10, with 45 debarments of firms and individuals for engaging in wrongdoing." For INT's FY2010 Annual Report, see here.

"Foreign Official" Limbo - The Bar Has Been Lowered

It's Friday, so let's get this started with some music.

The previous "limbo low" for an otherwise commercial enterprise to be deemed an "instrumentality" of a foreign government, and thus employees of the enterprise to be deemed "foreign officials" by the DOJ and SEC was 43%. See this prior post regarding the Alcatel-Lucent enforcement action and Telekom Malaysia Berhad - a commercial enterprise with a shareholder base of approximately 35,000 institutional and private/retail shareholders.

The limbo bar apparently has been lowered.

The recent Comverse enforcement (here) focused on "individuals connected to" "Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. ["OTE"] - a telecommunications provider controlled and partially owned by the Greek Government" including "employees of OTE's subsidiaries Cosmote, Cosmofon, and Cosmorom, in order to obtain purchase orders from those companies."

According to the NPA, "the Greek Government was OTE's largest single shareholder and maintained an interest in over one-third of OTE's issued share capital."

Although the NPA only referenced knowing violations of the FCPA's books and records provisions (i.e. a "charge" that does not have a "foreign official" element) you can be sure that this enforcement action, notwithstanding the manner of resolution, was still very much about the "foreign officials" allegedly at issue. See, e.g., Miller & Chevalier FCPA Review Spring 2011 (here) ("Neither the SEC nor the DOJ identifies OTE as a government instrumentality, although the language used (identifying the Greek government as the largest single shareholder but not majority owner) suggests that they would have brought anti-bribery charges if there was evidence that CTI had knowledge of the payments or that Comverse Limited engaged in improper activity in the United States.").

The conduct at issue in the Comverse enforcement took place between 2003-2006.

Just what type of entity was OTE during this time period?

OTE's 2003 Annual Report (here) notes that the "Greek State" stake of total share capital was approximately 33.7%. The report notes that OTE's shares have traded on the New York Stock Exchange since 1998. The report states as follows. "The Greek State may no longer control OTE in a way different from that of any other Societe Anonyme company or telecom services provider. The Greek State may - only as a shareholder - monitor the operation and administration of the corporate affairs. The Greek State is represented by the Minister of Finance who is entitled to intervene according to the Articles of Association and the legal procedures as any other shareholder can do.

OTE's 2004 Annual Report (here) contains information similar to that noted above and states as follows. "The Greek State may no longer control OTE in a way different from that of any other Societe Anonyme and telecom services provider company. The Greek State may - only as a shareholder - monitor the operation and administration of the corporate affairs. The Greek State is represented by the Minister of Finance who is exercising its control through the established bodies as any other shareholder can do."

OTE's 2005 Annual Report (here) describes a shareholder structure as follows. International institutional shareholders 40%; Hellenic Republic 38.7%; Greek institutional shareholders 12.1%; Rest shareholders 9.2%.

OTE's 2006 Annual Report (here)describes a shareholder structure as follows. International institutional shareholders 45%; Hellenic Republic 38.7%; Greek institutional shareholders 9.5%; Rest shareholders 6.8%.

According to OTE's current website (here), it shares trade on the Athens Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange and OTE's ADRs trade on the OTC (over the counter) market in the U.S. and OTE continues to report to the SEC.

According to OTE's current website (here), its current shareholder base is as follows. Hellenic Republic: 20.0%; Deutsche Telekom: 30.0%; Greek Institutional Shareholders: 30.2%; International Institutional Shareholders: 9.7%; and Rest Shareholders: 10.1%.

Step aside 43%, the new limbo low is between 33% - 38%.

How long can it go?

*****

A good weekend to all.

No - The Consistent Answer In DOJ Responses to Senator Questions Regarding FCPA Reform

On November 30, 2010, the Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs (chaired by then Senator Arlen Specter) held a hearing titled "Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." (See here for the prior post).

Following the hearing, Senator Christopher Coons and Senator Amy Klobuchar submitted written questions to Greg Andres (DOJ) - one of the witnesses who testified at the hearing.

The DOJ responses are here.

As evident from the DOJ responses, certain of which are highlighted below, the consistent DOJ response to FCPA-related reform proposals is no.

Profiled below are DOJ's substantive responses to Senator questions regarding mandatory debarment for egregious FCPA violators; a potential FCPA compliance defense; a potential FCPA amnesty program; whether businesses face FCPA uncertainty; whether clarification of the "foreign official" element is needed; and whether the statute's corporate intent element needs revising.

Mandatory Debarment

Does the DOJ favor a "mandatory, conduct-based, debarment remedy for companies that engage in egregious bribery"?

No.

The DOJ says that such "mandatory debarment would likely be counterproductive, as it would reduce the number of voluntary disclosures and concomitantly limit corporate remediation and the implementation of enhanced compliance programs."

In a related question, the DOJ adds that "a mandatory conduct-based debarment for companies could well have a negative impact on the Government's ability to investigate and prosecute transnational corruption effectively." "Linking mandatory debarment to a criminal resolution would fundamentally alter the incentives of a contractor-company to reach an FCPA resolution because such a resolution would likely lead to the cessation of revenues for a government contractor - a virtual death knell for the contractor-company. Similarly, mandatory debarment would impinge negatively on prosecutorial discretion. If every criminal FCPA resolution were to carry with it mandatory debarment consequences, then prosecutors would lose the necessary flexibility to tailor an appropriate resolution given the facts and circumstances of each individual case."

Boiled down to one sentence, the DOJ's opposition to mandatory debarment for egregious FCPA violators seems to be this - it would lessen our FCPA caseload, it would make our jobs more difficult, and it would take away our flexibility and leverage.

This is hardly a convincing argument to the position I articulated at the Senate hearing (see here) that "egregious instances of corporate bribery that legitimately satisfy the elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation involving high-level executives and/or board participation should be followed with debarment proceedings against the offender."

As I noted in this previous post, H.R. 5366 (which passed the House in September 2010) is not the answer. However, the issue of mandatory debarment, in certain instances, remains a valid and legitimate issue notwithstanding the DOJ's responses.

Compliance Defense

Does the DOJ favor exploring a "formal compliance defense" to the FCPA?

No.

The DOJ "opposes the adoption of a formal compliance defense."

According to the DOJ, it "already considers a company's compliance efforts in making appropriate prosecutorial decisions, and the United States Sentencing Guidelines also appropriately credits a company's compliance efforts in any sentencing determination." "Among other things" the DOJ states, "the creation of such a defense would transform criminal FCPA trials into a battle of experts over whether the company had established a sufficient compliance mechanism." "Against this backdrop, companies may feel the need to implement a purely paper compliance program that could be defended by an 'expert,' even if the measures are not effective in stopping bribery." "If the FCPA were amended to permit companies to hide behind such programs, it would erect an additional hurdle for prosecutors in what are already difficult and complex cases to prove."

As readers likely know, the U.K. Bribery Act, set to go live on July 1st, contains a so-called adequate procedures defense and such a defense should be considered under the FCPA as well.

Amending the FCPA to include a compliance defense is not a new idea. In the mid-1980’s numerous FCPA reform bills included such a defense and provided that a company would not be held vicariously liable for a violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions by its employees or agents, who were not an officer or director, if the company established procedures reasonably designed to prevent and detect FCPA violations by employees and agents. In fact, an FCPA reform bill containing such a provision did pass the U.S. House.

A compliance defense is not about hiding behind "paper programs" as the DOJ asserts. Rather a so-called compliance defense, one that would be inapplicable in cases such as Siemens, it is about properly incentivizing corporate FCPA compliance and not putting a company at risk of FCPA scrutiny, costly FCPA internal investigations, and the growing collateral consequences of FCPA inquiries should a non-executive employee engage in conduct contrary to a company's pre-existing, published, and trained on FCPA compliance policies and procedures.

Amnesty Program

Is the DOJ in favor of a so-called "amnesty program" as recently advocated by some?

No.

The DOJ says it "does not support the idea of an FCPA amnesty program." Among other things, the DOJ says that "as the beneficiary of [several established sources of information such as voluntary disclosures] the Department does not presently face difficulty in identifying sources of information of FCPA criminal violations." "Consequently, an amnesty program would provide protection for corporations who violate the law without providing accompanying meaningful benefits to law enforcement." "Finally, consistent with the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the Department's Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, the Department already provides meaningful credit for voluntary self-disclosures, extraordinary cooperation, and substantial remediation by corporations where appropriate and deserved."

Uncertainty?

Does the DOJ believe that "well-meaning businesses are faced with significant uncertainty as to their potential exposure to civil and criminal penalties under the FCPA?"

No.

The DOJ says that "it provides clear guidance to companies with respect to FCPA enforcement through a variety of means." It lists the DOJ's Lay Person Guide to the FCPA, various charging documents, plea agreements, non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements [see here for a recent guest post on prosecutorial common law] and the DOJ's FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases.

The DOJ concludes its response by saying "in the end, a review of the Department's FCPA enforcement actions makes clear that companies have never been charged for minor or incidental issues." "By contrast, the Department's prosecutions involved extensive and often widespread corruption over significant periods of time."

As explored in this prior guest post, in the FCPA's 1988 amendments, Congress directed the DOJ to consider providing formal guidance. However, in 1990 the DOJ declined to issue guidelines and stated as follows. "After consideration of the comments received, and after consultation with the appropriate agencies, the Attorney General has determined that no guidelines are necessary…. [C]ompliance with the [anti-bribery provisions] would not be enhanced nor would the business community be assisted by further clarification of these provisions through the issuance of guidelines."

"Foreign Official"

Does the DOJ agree that statutory clarification of "foreign official" would help clarify to businesses which of their transactions could be subject to the FCPA?"

No.

The DOJ response begins as follows. "The term 'foreign official' has been defined in relevant case law and opinion releases. Some defense attorneys have attempted to argue that the definition of 'foreign official' does not extend to the employees of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises."

For the record, I am not a "defense attorney." See here for my declaration as to the legislative history on "foreign official."

In a related question, the DOJ further stated that it "has provided significant guidance regarding the definition of 'foreign official.'"

Intent

Should the FCPA be amended to "bring the intent standard for corporations in line with the current 'willfulness" standard that applies to individuals?"

No.

The DOJ responded that it "does not believe that it is necessary or appropriate to amend the FCPA's intent standard with respect to corporations." "The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations already governs the Department's decisions regarding whether to charge corporations for federal crimes, including under the FCPA." "Furthermore, the Department is not prosecuting FCPA matters where a corporation engaged in something less than willful criminal conduct."

JGC of Japan Formally Joins the Bonny Island Bribery Club

In an enforcement action anticipated for months (see here for the prior post), JGC Corporation on Japan last week became the fourth joint venture partner to resolve its FCPA exposure in connection with the Bonny Island, Nigeria project.
Other joint venture partners in the so-called TSKJ consortium to previously resolve Bonny Island bribery probes were KBR / Halliburton (see here), Technip (see here) and Snamprogetti (see here). In addition, M.W. Kellogg Ltd., the entity that originally formed the TSKJ consortium resolved a U.K. Serious Fraud Office enforcement action (see here). In terms of individual prosecutions, Albert Jack Stanley pleaded guilty and awaits sentencing (see here); Wojciech Chodan pleaded guilty and awaits sentencing (see here); and Jeffrey Tesler recently pleaded guilty and awaits sentencing (see here).

The JGC enforcement action involved only a DOJ component. Total settlement amount was $218.8 million and the criminal charges (see here for the information) were resolved via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement (here).

Criminal Information

The substance of the criminal allegations are the same as in the prior KBR, Technip, and Snamprogetti enforcement actions. That is, the TSKJ consortium, of which JGC was a member, was formed for purposes of bidding on and performing a series of engineering, procurement, and construction ("EPC") contracts to design and build a liquefied natural gas plant on Bonny Island, Nigeria.

Tesler was hired by TSKJ to "help it obtain business in Nigeria, including by offering to pay and paying bribes to high-level Nigerian government officials" and Tesler "was an agent of TSKJ and of each of the joint venture companies."

According to the information, TSKJ also hired "Consulting Company B" - a "global trading company headquartered in Tokyo" to help it "obtain business in Nigeria, including by offering to pay and paying bribes to Nigerian government officials" and "Consulting Company B was an agent of TSKJ and of each of the joint venture companies."

Most of the allegations in the information focus on the conduct of the JGC's alleged co-conspirators such as Stanley, Tesler, and Tesler's corporate entity, Tri-Star Investments Ltd. As to U.S. nexus, the information alleges money flowing through U.S. based accounts "to bribe Nigerian government officials" and co-conspirators faxing or e-mailing information into the U.S. in furtherance of the bribery scheme.

Based on the above conduct, the information charges conspiracy to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and aiding and abetting FCPA anti-bribery violations.

DPA

The DOJ's charges against JGC were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement.

Pursuant to the DPA, JGC admitted, accepted and acknowledged "that it is responsible for the acts of its employees, subsidiaries, and agents" as set forth above. As is typical in FCPA DPAs, JGC expressly agreed not to make any statements, directly or indirectly, "contradicting" the facts alleged.

The term of the DPA is two years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement based on the following factors.

"(a) after initially declining to cooperate with the Department based on jurisdictional arguments, JGC began to cooperate, and has agreed to continue to cooperate, with the Department in its ongoing investigation of the conduct of JGC and its present and former employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, subsidiaries, and others relating to violations of the FCPA;

(b) JGC has undertaken remedial measures, including evaluating and enhancing its compliance program, and has agreed to undertake further remedial measures as contemplated by this Agreement; and

(c) the impact of JGC, including collateral consequences, of a guilty plea or criminal conviction."

As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $312.6 million to $625.2 million. Pursuant to the DPA, JGC agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $218.8 million (30% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines). DPAs frequently then state why such a below-guidelines fine amount is "appropriate," however the JGC DPA is silent as to this issue. Interesting also is that the conduct at issue took place between 1995 and 2004. Yet, the 2010 sentencing guidelines were used in calculating the fine rather than the 2003 guidelines that were used in the prior KBR, Technip, and Snamprogetti enforcement actions.

Pursuant to the DPA, JGC agreed to "engage a corporate compliance consultant."

The DOJ release (here) states as follows. "With [the JGC] resolution, each of the four companies in the TSKJ joint venture, the former chairman of the U.S. joint venture partner, and several other individuals have now been held accountable for a massive conspiracy to bribe Nigerian government officials to obtain lucrative construction contracts." “The approximately $1.5 billion in criminal and civil penalties that have been imposed on the members of the joint venture far exceed their profits from the scheme. Foreign bribery is a serious crime, and as this case makes clear, we are investigating and prosecuting it vigorously.”

Manny Abascal (Latham & Watkins - see here - a former DOJ enforcement attorney) represented JGC.

This may not be the last we hear of Bonny Island bribery. Consulting Company B (based in Japan) was a key participant in the bribery scheme. Does anyone know anything about Consulting Company B and whether it might be next to resolve its Bonny Island exposure? If so, please share.

Comverse Technology ... Is It Really That Simple?

Question: "If you did not have the choice of deferred or non prosecution agreements, what would happen to the number of FCPA settlements every year.

Answer by Mark Mendelsohn, former FCPA chief DOJ: "If the Department only had the option of bringing a criminal charge or declining to bring a case, you would certainly bring fewer cases."

Mark Mendelsohn on the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, 24 Corporate Crime Reporter 35, September 10, 2010.

"... [T]he S.E.C.’s practice of permitting defendants to neither admit nor deny the charges against them remains pervasive, presumably for no better reason than that it makes the settling of cases easier."

U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.) in SEC v. Vitesse Semiconducter Corp., March 21, 2010.

****

A U.S. company has a subsidiary A.

Subsidiary A has a subsidiary - subsidiary B.

Subsidiary B engaged an agent who made improper payments partially facilitated by subsidiary's B's inflated commission payments to him.

There is no allegation that Subsidiary A knew about the payments.

There is no allegation that the U.S. company knew about the payments.

But subsidiary B's books, records and accounts are incorporated into the books, records and accounts of the U.S. company for purposes of financial reporting.

These are the essential facts from last week's FCPA enforcement action against Comverse Technology Inc. - "a world leader in multimedia telecommunications applications".

The enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was $2.8 million ($1.2 million criminal fine via a DOJ non prosecution agreement; $1.6 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest via a SEC settled complaint).

Is it really that simple?

Some have suggested that Comverse received "lenient" treatment (see here). Yet, it is questionable whether Comverse would have faced any criminal liability should the DOJ have been required to satisfy its high burden of proof in court.

Yet, FCPA enforcement actions like Comverse seem to be becoming norm.

DOJ

The DOJ enforcement action was resolved via a non-prosecution agreement, meaning there was not, and will never, be judiciary scrutiny of the DOJ's enforcement theory.

The NPA (here) begins as follows.

The DOJ "will not criminally prosecute Comverse Technology, Inc. ("CTI"), Comverse Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of CTI ("Comverse Inc."), and the subsidiaries of Comverse Inc., including Comverse Ltd. (collectively referred to as Comverse) for any crimes ... related to Comverse's knowing violation of the books and records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ... arising from and related to Comverse's failure accurately to record certain improper payments made by employees of Comverse Ltd. and certain subsidiaries of Comverse Ltd. and a third party agent from 2003 to 2006."

According to the NPA, Comverse Inc. was wholly-owned subsidiary of CTI and Comverse Ltd., an Israeli company based in Tel Aviv, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Comverse Inc.

The NPA has a term of two years and Comverse admitted, accepted, and acknowledged responsibility for the below described conduct. As is typical in FCPA NPAs or DPAs, Comverse agreed "not to make any public statement contradicting" the information below.

The conduct at issue focuses on monthly retainer fees paid by Comverse Ltd. to Agent G (an Israeli citizen engaged by Comverse Ltd. as an independent consultant with a particular focus on Greece) and commissions paid to Agent G on purchase orders. According to the NPA, "Agent G would keep 15% of the total commission, and the remaining 85% was used to make improper payments."

According to the NPA, "between 2003 and 2006, Comverse Ltd. made approximately $536,000 in cash payments to Corporation H [a Cyprus-based company created by Agent G at the direction of Comverse Ltd. employees to facilitate the payment of cash to representatives of certain Comverse Ltd. customers in exchange for securing purchase orders] with the intent that the money woudl be passed on to individuals connected to OTE, including employees of OTE's subsidiaries Cosmote, Cosmofon, and Cosmorom, in order to obtain purchase orders from those companies for Comverse Ltd. products and services, resulting in approximately $1.25 million in adjusted operating income."

OTE?

That would be the "Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. - a telecommunications provider controlled and partially owned by the Greek Government." According to the NPA, "the Greek Government was OTE's largest single shareholder and maintained an interest in over one-third of OTE's issued share capital."

The DOJ agreed to resolve the enforcement action via a NPA "based, in part, on the following factors: (a) Comverse's timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the facts" [described above]; (b) Comverse's full cooperation with the Department and the [SEC]; and (c) the remedial efforts already undertaken and to be undertaken by Comverse."

The DOJ release (here) states as follows. "The [NPA] recognizes the company’s thorough self-investigation and the results of its investigation, voluntary disclosure of the underlying conduct, and full cooperation with the department. CTI has also undertaken extensive remedial efforts and overhauled its overall compliance culture, including through the implementation of mandatory training programs focused on anti-corruption and the use of third-party agents and intermediaries, as well as more rigorous accounting controls for the approval of third-party payments. As a result of these mitigating factors, the department has agreed not to prosecute CTI or its subsidiaries for failing to maintain accurate books and records, provided that CTI satisfies its obligations under the agreement for a period of two years. Those obligations include ongoing cooperation, payment of the $1.2 million penalty, and the continued implementation of rigorous internal controls."

SEC

The SEC's civil complaint (here) is based on the same core conduct described above.

The complaint alleges, in summary fashion, as follows.

"Between 2003 and 2006, Comverse Technology, Inc. (“Comverse”) violated the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”) when its Israeli operating subsidiary, Comverse Limited (“Comverse Limited”), engaged in a scheme to make improper payments to obtain or retain business."

"In order to facilitate and conceal the payments, Comverse Limited employed a third-party agent (the “Agent”) to establish an offshore entity in Cyprus which, in turn, funneled the improper payments to Comverse Limited’s customers. Employees of Comverse Limited made payments to the Cyprus entity and, after taking 15% off the top of these payments, the Agent paid or facilitated the payment of the remaining 85% to Comverse Limited’s customers in the form of cash bribes."

"Comverse Limited did not accurately record these improper payments in its books and records, which, in turn, caused them to be improperly classified in Comverse’s consolidated financial statements. Comverse failed to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions at all levels of the organization were recorded properly."

Specifically, the SEC alleged as follows.

"Between 2003 and 2006, Comverse Limited made improper payments to employees connected to OTE in order to obtain or retain business with OTE. The scheme originated in Comverse Limited's EMEA (Europe, Middle East, and Africa) sales division and the improper payments were inaccurately recorded on Comverse Limited's books and records, which, in turn, were consolidated with Comverse's financial results."

"Between 2003 and 2006, Comverse Limited, using [Corporation H], made improper payments totaling approximately $536,000 to individuals connected to OTE, including employees of OTE's subsidiaries Cosmote, Cosmofon, and Cosmorom to obtain or retain OTE's business. The improper payments resulted in $1.2 million of improper benefit to Comverse Limited, which flowed through to Comverse."

As to internal controls, the SEC alleged as follows. "During the relevant time period, neither Comverse nor Comverse Limited had a process, formal or otherwise, for conducting due diligence of third-party agents or for the independent review of third-party agent contracts outside of the sales departments." The SEC further alleged as follows. "At the time of the conduct, while Comverse did have an omnibus anti-corruption policy that prohibited improper payments to government-affiliated third parties and others, Comverse did not widely circulate this policy and provided no training on it to any employees."

As to books and records, the SEC alleged as follows. "Comverse Limited falsified its books and records by characterizing and recording the bribes as legitimate sales commissions, thereby failing accurately to reflect the payments and their purpose. These improper expenses, in turn, were consolidated into Comverse's financial records."

Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Comverse with FCPA books and records and internal control violations.

As noted in the SEC release (here) without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, Comverse consented "to a conduct-based injunction that prohibits Comverse from having books and records that do not accurately reflect, or from having internal controls that do not prevent or detect, any illegal payments made to obtain or retain business." In addition, Comverse consented to pay $1,249,614 in disgorgement and $358,887 in prejudgment interest.

Daniel Horwitz (Lankler and Carragher - see here) represented Comverse.

The company's 8-K filing on April 7th stated as follows. " As originally disclosed by the Company on March 16, 2009, the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of the Company conducted its own internal investigation into such payments. The Audit Committee found that the conduct at issue did not involve the Company’s executive officers."

The company's 10-K filing on January 25, 2011 suggests that the company's internal investigation was prompted by a whistleblower complaint and the filing details the company's remedial actions in connection with the investigation. According to the filing "the Company recorded charges of $2.9 million associated with [the FCPA matter] during the fiscal year ended January 31, 2009." The company has not yet disclosed what its fees and expenses were during the fiscal year ended January 31, 2010.

*****

Another interesting item from Comverse's SEC filings. "For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2010, approximately one quarter of Verint's [Comverse's majority-owned publicly traded subsidiary] business was generated from contracts with various governments around the world, including federal, state, and local government agencies."

Johnson & Johnson Enforcement Action Focuses on Health Care Providers As "Foreign Officials"

That was quite the 72-hour period for FCPA enforcement last week. On Wednesday, it was JGC Corporation of Japan ($218.8 million in criminal fines). On Thursday, it was Comverse Technologies ($2.8 million in combined DOJ and SEC fines, penalties, and disgorgement). On Friday, it was Johnson & Johnson ($70 million in combined DOJ and SEC fines, penalties and disgorgement - plus approximately $7.9 million in a related U.K. Serious Fraud Office civil recovery).

This post analyzes the Johnson & Johnson enforcement action. Separate posts regarding the Comverse and JGC Corp. enforcement actions will follow later this week.

*****

Johnson & Johnson ("J&J), a global pharmaceutical, consumer product, and medical device company, resolved enforcement actions focused on business conduct in Greece, Poland, Romania. The enforcement actions also resolved an investigation of Johnson & Johnson subsidiary companies in the United Nations Oil for Food Program in Iraq.

The J&J enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was $70 million ($21.4 million criminal fine via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement; $48.6 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest via a SEC settled complaint).

This post summarizes the DOJ, SEC and SFO enforcement actions.

DOJ

The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against DePuy Inc. (a wholly-owned subsidiary of J&J and a global manufacturer and supplier of orthopedic medical devices) resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (here).

Criminal Information

The background section of the information begins as follows. "Greece has a national healthcare system wherein most Greek hospitals are publicly owned and operated. Health care providers who work at publicly-owned hospitals (“HCPs”) are government employees, providing health care services in their official capacities. Therefore, such HCPs in Greece are “foreign officials” as that term is defined in the FCPA."

The conduct at issue focuses on Depuy International. In 1998, J&J acquired DePuy, including its subsidiary Deputy International (a U.K. company).

According to the information, between 1998 through 2006, DePuy and others conspired to "secure lucrative business with hospitals in the Greek public health care system by making and promising to make corrupt payments of money and things of value to publicly-employed Greek HCPs."

The information alleges that "DePuy, its executives, employees, and subsidiaries agreed to sell products to Company X [an agent and distributor for DePuy and its subsidiaries in Greece until 2001 when it was acquired by DePuy and named DePuy Medec and later renamed DePuy Hellas] at a 35% discount, then paid 35% of sales by Company X to an off-shore account of Company Y [based in the Isle of Man and a consultant for DePuy International in Greece until 1999] in order to provide off-the-books funds to Agent A [a Greek national who was the beneficial owners of both Company X and Y] for the payment of cash incentives and other things of value to publicly-employed Greek HCPs to induce the purchase of DePuy products, while concealing the payments."

The information further alleges that "DePuy, its executives, employees, and subsidiaries agreed to pay Agent A and Agent B [a Greek national who acted as a consultant to DePuy International and DePuy Hellas] a percentage of the value of sales of DePuy products in Greece in order to provide funds to Agent A and Agent B for the payment of cash incentives and other things of value to publicly-employed Greek HCPs to induce the purchase of DePuy products, while concealing the payments."

The information further alleges that between 2002 and 2006 "approximately £500,000 was withdrawn by DePuy Hellas MD [a Greek National who was an employee of Company X until it was acquired by J&J when she became the Managing Director of DePuy Hellas] and others and used to cover payments owed to HCPs by the agents but not yet paid."

The information charges as follows. "In total, from 1998 to 2006, defendant DePuy, DePuy International, and their related subsidiaries and employees, authorized the payment, directly or indirectly, of approximately $16.4 million in cash incentives to publicly-employed Greek HCPs to induce the purchase of DePuy products. In order to conceal the payments, DePuy Hellas and DePuy International falsely recorded the payments in their books and records as “commissions.”"

As to a U.S. nexus, the information describes the following: certain phone calls made to Executive B (a U.S. citizen and officer and senior executive of DePuy) in Indiana to discuss the Company X acquisition and due diligence on Greek Agent A; e-mails sent to Executive B in Indiana regarding Agent A or Greek business in general; e-mails Executive A (a British citizen who was an officer and senior executive in charge of DePuy at the time it was purchased by J&J and who retained that position until 1999 when he became a senior executive at J&J retaining control of DePuy and its related operating companies) sent or received in New Jersey regarding Agent A.

Based on the above allegations, the information charges: (i) a conspiracy to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery and books and records provisions; and (ii) a substantive FCPA anti-bribery violation.

DPA

The DOJ's charges against DePuy were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement (dated January 14, 2011) between the DOJ and J&J, its subsidiaries, and its operating companies "relating to illegal conduct committed by certain J&J operating companies and subsidiaries." In addition to DePuy Inc., other operating companies named are Cilag AG International and Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V.

Pursuant to the DPA, J&J admitted, accepted and acknowledged "that it is responsible for the acts of its officers, employees, and agents, and wholly-owned subsidiaries and operating companies" as set forth in a Statement of Facts attached to the DPA.

The term of the DPA is three years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement based on the following factors.

(a) J&J voluntarily and timely disclosed the majority of the misconduct described in the Information and Statement of Facts [Note - the Iraq Oil for Food conduct was not voluntarily disclosed];

(b) J&J conducted a thorough internal investigation of that misconduct;

(c) J&J reported all of its findings to the Department;

(d) J&J cooperated fully with the Department’s investigation of this matter;

(e) J&J has undertaken substantial remedial measures as contemplated by [the DPA];

(f) J&J has agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in any investigation of the conduct of J&J and its directors, officers, employees, agents, consultants, subsidiaries, contractors, and subcontractors relating to violations of the FCPA and related statutes;

(g) J&J has cooperated and agreed to continue to cooperate with the SEC and, at the direction of the Department, foreign authorities investigating the conduct of J&J and its directors, officers, employees, agents, consultants, subsidiaries, contractors, and subcontractors relating to corrupt payments;

(h) J&J has cooperated and agreed to continue to cooperate with the
Department in the Department’s investigations of other companies and individuals in connection with business practices overseas in various markets;

"(i) J&J has also agreed to resolve related cases being investigated by the SEC and the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office (the “SFO”); and

(j) Were the Department to initiate a prosecution of J&J or one of its operating companies and obtain a conviction, instead of entering into this Agreement to defer prosecution, J&J could be subject to exclusion from participation in federal health care programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a).

With respect to the corporate compliance reporting obligations imposed on J&J by the DPA, the agreement states as follows.

(i) J&J has already engaged in significant remediation of the misconduct described in the Statement of Facts and reviewed and improved its compliance program and implementation thereof;

(ii) J&J conducted an extensive, global review of all of its operations to determine if there were problems elsewhere and has reported on any areas of concerns to the Department and the SEC;

(iii) J&J has and will undertake enhanced compliance obligations
described in [the DPA];

(iv) J&J’s cooperation during this investigation and its substantial assistance in investigations of others has been extraordinary; and

(v) J&J had a pre-existing compliance and ethics program that was effective and the majority of problematic operations globally resulted from insufficient implementation of the J&J compliance and ethics program in acquired companies."

As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above described conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $28.5 million to $57 million. Pursuant to the DPA, J&J agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $21.4 million (25% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines). The DPA states as follows. "J&J and the Department agree that this fine is appropriate given J&J’s voluntary and thorough disclosure of the misconduct at issue, the nature and extent of J&J’s cooperation in this matter, penalties related to the same conduct in the United Kingdom and Greece, J&J’s cooperation in the Department’s investigation of other companies, and J&J’s extraordinary remediation."

Pursuant to the DPA, J&J agreed to self-report to the DOJ "periodically, at no less than six-month intervals" during the term of the DPA "regarding remediation and implementation of the compliance measures" described in the DPA.

As is standard in FCPA DPAs, J&J agreed not to make any public statement "contradicting the acceptance of responsibility" by J&J as set forth in the DPA.

The Statement of Facts attached to the DPA include, in addition to the Greece conduct described above, conduct relating to Poland, Romania and in connection with the U.N. Oil for Food Program in Iraq.

Poland

As to Poland, the DPA states, in summary fashion as follows.

"Poland has a national healthcare system. Most Polish hospitals are owned and operated by the government and most Polish HCPs [health care providers] are government employees providing health care services in their official capacities. Therefore, most HCPs in Poland are “foreign officials” as defined by the FCPA."

"Polish hospitals purchase their medical products through a tender process, whereby suppliers of medical products compete for business by submitting bids to tender committees. Each tender committee may be associated with one or more hospitals."

"In general, the tender committees evaluate the competitive bids and select the winning supplier for each purchase. Because most Polish hospitals are government owned, the tender committees effectively determine, on behalf of the government, from whom the government will purchase medical products."

"J&J Poland [a wholly owned subsidiary of J&J] made payments and provided things of value to publicly-employed Polish HCPs, in the form of “civil contracts,” travel sponsorships, and donations of cash and equipment, to corruptly influence the decisions of HCPs on tender committees to purchase medical products from J&J Poland."

As to civil contracts, the DPA states as follows.

"J&J Poland engaged in professional services contracts with publicly-employed Polish HCPs, known as “civil contracts.” The contracts were purportedly for professional services including lecturing, leading workshops, and conducting clinical trials."

"J&J Poland did not require that its sales representatives provide proof that the work, for which payment had been made, was actually ever performed."

"From January 2000 until June 2006, J&J Poland awarded civil contracts to publicly-employed Polish HCPs to corruptly influence them, in their official capacities as members of tender committees, in order to induce those HCPs to select, or favorably influence the selection of, J&J Poland as the winning supplier in tender processes."

As to travel, the DPA states as follows.

"J&J Poland sponsored some publicly-employed Polish HCPs to attend conferences in order to corruptly influence them, in their official capacities as members of tender committees, in order to induce the HCPs to select, or favorably influence the selection of, J&J Poland as the winning supplier in tender processes."

As to "Total Improper Payments in Poland," the DPA states as follows.

"In total, from in or around 2000 to in or around 2007, J&J Poland and its employees authorized the payment, directly or indirectly, of approximately $775,000 in improper payments, including direct payments and travel, to publicly-employed Polish HCPs to induce the purchase of J&J products."

Romania

As to Romania, the DPA states as follows.

"The national healthcare system in Romania is almost entirely state-run. The healthcare system is funded by the National Health Care Insurance Fund (“CNAS”), to which employers and employees make mandatory contributions. Most Romanian hospitals are owned and operated by the government and most HCPs in Romania are government employees. Therefore, most HCPs in Romania are “foreign officials” as defined by the FCPA."

"From in or around 2005 through in or around 2008, J&J Romania [a wholly owned subsidary] employees made arrangements with J&J Romania distributors for the distributors, on behalf of J&J Romania, to provide cash payments and gifts to publicly-employed Romanian HCPs in exchange for prescribing certain pharmaceuticals manufactured by J&J subsidiaries and operating companies."

As to "Total Improper Payments in Romania," the DPA states as follows.

"In total, from in or around July 2005 to in or around mid-2008, J&J Romania and its employees authorized the payment, directly or indirectly, of approximately $140,000 in incentives to publicly-employed Romanian HCPs to induce the purchase of pharmaceuticals manufactured by J&J subsidiaries and operating companies."

Oil for Food Program

As to the U.N. Oil for Food Program, the DPA states as follows.

"Between in or around December 2000 and in or around March 2003, Janssen [a wholly-owned subsidiary of J&J headquarted in Belgium] and Cilag [a wholly-owned subsidiary of J&J headquartered in Switzerland] were awarded 18 contracts for the sale of pharmaceuticals to the Iraqi Ministry of Health State Company for Marketing Drugs and Medical Appliances (“Kimadia”) under the [Oil for Food Program], with a total contract value of approximately $9.9 million, which generated approximately $6.1 million in profits. Janssen and Cilag secured these contracts through the payment of approximately $857,387 in kickbacks to the government of Iraq."

"The kickbacks were paid to the government of Iraq through JC-Lebanon Agent [a Lebanese citizen who was an agent for both Janssen and Cilag in Iraq]. The kickbacks were concealed from the United Nations by inflating Janssen and Cilag’s contract prices by 10%."

The DPA concludes with a section titled "Books and Records" that states as follows.

"In order to conceal the payments to the Greek, Polish, and Romanian HCPs on the books and records of J&J and its subsidiaries, the payments were misrepresented as, among other things, “commissions,” “civil contracts,” “travel,” “donations,” and “discounts.”"

"In order to conceal the kickback payments made to the Iraqi government through JC-Lebanon Agent for contracts under the OFFP on the books and records of Janssen and Cilag, the payments were misrepresented as “commissions.”"

"At the end of J&J’s fiscal year from in or around 1998 to in or around 2007, the books and records of DePuy International, DePuy Hellas, J&J Poland, J&J Romania, Janssen, and Cilag, including those containing false characterizations of kickback and bribe payments given to the Iraqi government and Greek, Polish, and Romanian officials, were incorporated into the books and records of J&J for purposes of preparing J&J’s year-end financial statements, which were filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission."

The DOJ's release (here) states as follows.

"Johnson & Johnson has admitted that its subsidiaries, employees and agents paid bribes to publicly-employed health care providers in Greece, Poland and Romania, and that kickbacks were paid on behalf of Johnson & Johnson subsidiary companies to the former government of Iraq under the United Nations Oil for Food program. Johnson & Johnson, however, has also cooperated extensively with the government and, as a result, has played an important role in identifying improper practices in the life sciences industry. As [the DPA] reflects, we are committed to holding corporations accountable for bribing foreign officials while, at the same time, giving meaningful credit to companies that self-report and cooperate with our investigations." "The agreement recognizes J&J’s timely voluntary disclosure, and thorough and wide-reaching self-investigation of the underlying conduct; the extraordinary cooperation provided by the company to the department, the SEC and multiple foreign enforcement authorities, including significant assistance in the industry-wide investigation; and the extensive remedial efforts and compliance improvements undertaken by the company. In addition, J&J received a reduction in its criminal fine as a result of its cooperation in the ongoing investigation of other companies and individuals, as outlined in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. J&J’s fine was also reduced in light of its anticipated resolution in the United Kingdom. Due to J&J’s pre-existing compliance and ethics programs, extensive remediation, and improvement of its compliance systems and internal controls, as well as the enhanced compliance undertakings included in the agreement, J&J was not required to retain a corporate monitor, but it must report to the department on implementation of its remediation and enhanced compliance efforts every six months for the duration of the agreement."

SEC

The SEC's civil complaint (here) is based on the same core set of facts contained in the above DPA and alleges, in summary, as follows.

"This matter concerns violations of the Foreign Conupt Practices Act by J&J as a result of the acts of its subsidiaries to obtain business for J&J's medical device and pharmaceutical segments."

"Since at least 1998 and continuing to early 2006, J&J's subsidiaries, employees and agents paid bribes to public doctors in Greece who selected J&J surgical implants for their patients. Further, J&J's subsidiaries and agents paid bribes to doctors
and public hospital administrators in Poland who awarded tenders to J&J from 2000 to 2006. J&J's subsidiaries and agents also paid bribes to public doctors in Romania to prescribe J&J pharmaceutical products from 2002 to 2007. Finally, J&J's subsidiaries and agent paid kickbacks to Iraq in order to obtain contracts under the United Nations Oil for Food Program ("Program") from 2000 to 2003."

As to Greece, the SEC complaint alleges as follows.

"One of J&J's product lines is surgical implants such as artificial knees, hips and other products that surgeons implant into patients. Surgical implants are a lucrative, but competitive business. In many countries, orthopedic surgeons control which implants they use."

"In 1998, J&J acquired another medical device company, DePuy Inc., a NYSE company. A top DePuy executive then went on to become a top J&J executive in the United States in J&J's medical device and diagnostics business ("Executive A"). At the time of the acquisition, DePuy was engaged in a widespread bribery scheme in Greece to sell its implants. Executive A and DPI executives knowingly continued that scheme. From 1998 to 2006, J&J earned $24,258,072 in profits on sales obtained through bribery."

The SEC complaint alleges that "J&J's internal audit group discovered the payments to Greek doctors in early 2006 after receiving a whistleblower complaint." According to the complaint, "the issue of payments to surgeons had been previously raised in an anonymous 2003 letter to a different internal audit team concerning a related J&J subsidiary in Greece ... however, that team concentrated their investigation on allegations about a possible conflict ofinterest by local management and J&J did not fully investigate the alleged payments to doctors."

As to Poland, the SEC complaint alleges as follows.

"Employees of ... a J&J subsidiary, bribed publicly-employed doctors and hospital administrators to obtain business. [Subsidiary] executives running three business lines oversaw the creation of sham contracts and travel documents and also the creation of slush funds as a means to funnel bribe payments to doctors and
administrators. From 2000 to 2006, J&J earned $4,348,000 in profit from its sales through the bribery."

"The bribery appears to have stopped when Polish prosecutors began to investigate payments to doctors."

As to travel issues, the SEC complaint alleges as follows.

"[Subsidiary] also paid for public doctors and hospital administrators to travel to medical conventions in Poland and abroad in order to influence tender committee decisions in their favor. Sponsored doctors were taken on trips in exchange for influencing the doctors' decisions to purchase J&J's medical products or to award hospital tenders to J&J. Some of the trips were to the United States for conferences. Some of the trips were to tourists areas in Europe, and some included spouses and family members to what amounted to vacations."

As to Romania, the SEC complaint alleges as follows.

"Employees of ... a J&J subsidiary, bribed publicly-employed doctors and pharmacists to prescribe J&J products that the company was actively promoting. The employees worked with [the subsidiary's] local distributors to deliver cash to publicly-employed doctors who ordered J&J drugs for their patients. [The subsidiary] also provided travel to certain doctors who agreed to prescribe J&J products. From 2000 to 2007, J&J earned $3,515,500 in profit from its sales through the bribery."

As to Iraq Oil for Food conduct, the SEC complaint alleges as follows.

"J&J participated in the Program through two of its subsidiaries, Cilag AG International and Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. (collectively "Janssen-Cilag"). During the program, Janssen-Cilag sold pharmaceuticals to an arm of the Iraqi Ministry of Health known as Kimadia. Janssen-Cilag conducted business with Kimadia in Iraq through a Lebanese agent (the "Agent"). The Agent's primary contact with the J&J companies was an area director at Janssen-Cilag's office in Lebanon."

"In total, secret kickback payments of approximately $857,387 were made in connection with nineteen Oil for Food contracts. The payments were made through the Agent to Iraqi controlled accounts in order to avoid detection by the U.N. The fee was effectively a bribe paid to the Iraqi regime, which were disguised on J&J's books and records by mischaracterizing the bribes as legitimate commissions."

"In order to generate funds to pay the bribes and to conceal those payments, Janssen-Cilag and its agent inflated the price of the contracts by at least ten percent before submitting them to the U.N. for approval. J&J's total profits on the contracts were $6,106,255."

Under the heading "Anti-Bribery Violations" the complaint alleges as follows.

"J&J, through its subsidiaries and agents, knowingly allowed its employees and third parties to pay Greek and Polish public doctors and public hospital administrators for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business."

"Executive A, a U.S. resident and a senior executive at J&J, approved the arrangements with the Greek Agent in Greece. Executive A and DPI executives knew that the Greek Agent was bribing Greek doctors. In addition, Polish doctors were bribed to use J&J products in return for trips. Use of the mails and interstate commerce was also used to facilitate the bribery schemes in both Greece and Poland."

Under the hearing "Failure to Maintain Its Books and Records" the complaint alleges as follows.

"J&J's subsidiaries made numerous illicit payments for the purpose of obtaining contracts in Iraq, Romania, Greece, and Poland. J&J's books and records did not reflect the true nature of those payments. For example, they did not record that a portion of its payments to the Greek and Iraqi agents constituted reimbursements for bribes, and they did not record the true terms of the civil contract payments to Polish doctors. Efforts were made to obscure the purpose of trips to the United States and abroad. Certain J&J subsidiaries created false contracts, invoices, and other documents to conceal the true business arrangement it had with its consultants and distributors to pay bribes. False travel documents were created, and petty cash was used to pay bribes. United Nations contracts were also falsified."

Under the heading "Failure to Maintain Adequate Internal Controls," the complaint alleges as follows.

"J&J failed to implement internal controls to detect or prevent bribery. The conduct was widespread in various markets, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Iraq. The conduct involved employees and managers of all levels. False documents were routinely created to conceal the bribery in each country."

"Rather than cease the bribery that was happening at DePuy prior to J&J's acquisition, J&J through its subsidiaries, employees and agents allowed the bribery to continue. They created sham businesses and entered into contracts that were merely
conduits to allow the bribery to flourish. They failed to conduct due diligence on the Greek Distributor. The Company also paid its consultant outside of Greece to avoid detection of bribery. The Company had two different J&J corporate entities make
payments to the Greek Agent to conceal the amount of money that was being funneled to
doctors as bribes."

"[Polish subsidiary] entered into fake civil contracts with Polish doctors and J&J also created false travel arrangements in Poland and Romania to create slush funds."

"Cilag and Janssen paid bribes to Iraq despite the fact that trade sanctions were in place against doing business in Iraq. Cilag and Janssen falsified their contracts with the United Nations to conceal the kickbacks being paid to Iraq."

Based on the above allegations, the SEC charged J&J with FCPA anti-bribery violations and FCPA books and records and internal control violations.

Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, J&J agreed to an injunction prohibiting future FCPA violations and agreed to pay $38,227,826 in disgorgement and $10,438,490 in prejudgment interest.

The SEC's release (here) contains the following statement from Robert Kuzami (Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement): “The message in this and the SEC’s other FCPA cases is plain – any competitive advantage gained through corruption is a mirage. J&J chose profit margins over compliance with the law by acquiring a private company for the purpose of paying bribes, and using sham contracts, off-shore companies, and slush funds to cover its tracks.” In the release, Cheryl Scarboro (Chief of the SEC Enforcement Divisions FCPA Unit) stated as follows. “Bribes to public doctors can have a detrimental effect on the public health care systems that potentially pay more for products procured through greed and corruption.”

The SEC release states as follows.

"J&J voluntarily disclosed some of the violations by its employees and conducted a thorough internal investigation to determine the scope of the bribery and other violations, including proactive investigations in more than a dozen countries by both its internal auditors and outside counsel. J&J’s internal investigation and its ongoing compliance programs were essential in gathering facts regarding the full extent of J&J’s FCPA violations."

SFO

On the same day as the above U.S. enforcement actions, the U.K. SFO announced (here) a Civil Recovery Order against DePuy International Limited "in which DePuy International Limited will pay £4.829 million [approximately $7.9 million], plus prosecution costs, in recognition of unlawful conduct relating to the sale of orthopaedic products in Greece between 1998 and 2006."

According to the SFO release, the SFO "launched an investigation into the activities of DePuy International Limited in October 2007 following a referral from the DOJ." Richard Alderman, Director of the SFO, stated as follows. "When Johnson & Johnson reported the DePuy corruption, the DOJ informed the SFO of issues within our jurisdiction. We worked with the DOJ to find a solution that served both the interests of justice and the company's desire to put illegal activity behind it and move on. I believe the order approved [...] will illustrate to other companies how the SFO works closely with organisations across the world in enforcing the highest ethical standards, but is willing to engage and listen to companies that come to us with problems and help them find solutions."

The SFO release further states as follows. "On the facts of this case, criminal sanction of the Greek conduct has been achieved by the conclusion of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with DePuy International Limited's parent company and the DOJ. The Director of the Serious Fraud Office has concluded that a prosecution was therefore prevented in this jurisdiction by the principles of double jeopardy. The underlying purpose of the rule against double jeopardy is to stop a defendant from being prosecuted twice for the same offence in different jurisdictions. The DOJ Deferred Prosecution Agreement has the legal character of a formally concluded prosecution and punishes the same conduct in Greece that had formed the basis of the Serious Fraud Office investigation. [...] Consequently the Serious Fraud office is satisfied that the most appropriate sanction is a Civil Recovery Order, under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002."

As highlighted in this prior post, in April 2010, former DePuy executive Robert Dougall pleaded guilty to conspiring with others "to make corrupt payments and/or give other inducements" to "medical professionals within the Greek state health care system" contrary to Section 1 of the UK Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906.

*****

Eric Dubelier (Reed Smith - see here - a former DOJ enforcement attorney) represented J&J.

J&J's press release (here) notes as follows. "In 2007, Johnson & Johnson voluntarily disclosed to the DOJ and the SEC that subsidiaries outside the United States were believed to have made improper payments in connection with the sale of medical devices. In the course of comprehensive compliance efforts and reports into the Company, similar issues in additional markets and businesses were identified and brought to the attention of the agencies." William Weldon, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of J&J stated as follows. "More than four years ago, we went to the government to report improper payments and have taken full responsibility for these actions. We are deeply disappointed by the unacceptable conduct that led to these violations. We have undertaken significant changes since then to improve our compliance efforts, and we are committed to doing everything we can to ensure this does not occur again. I know that these actions are not representative of Johnson & Johnson employees around the world who do what is honest and right every day, in the conduct of our business and in service to patients and customers worldwide. We will continue to demonstrate that Johnson & Johnson is a company that embraces responsible corporate behavior."