Imagine I give a test to the 37 students in my class. However, because of reasons uniquely relevant to many of the students, not all students are equally capable of passing the test.
I hope all would view this test to be a bit empty.
This post summarizes the OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report and Transparency International's Annual Progress Report of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
For reasons discussed below, these two report cards suffer from the same dynamic described in the above hypothetical.
In many OECD member countries there is no such thing as corporate criminal liability - or even if there is - such corporate liability can only be based on the actions of high-ranking executives or officers. This of course is materially different than in the U.S. where, under respondeat superior principles, a business organization can face legal liability (civil and criminal) based on the actions of any employee to the extent the employee was acting within the scope of his or her duties and to the extent the conduct was intended to benefit, at least in part, the organization.
In most OECD member countries prosecuting authorities have two choices - to prosecute or not to prosecute - there is no such thing as non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements (NPAs/DPAs). Not so in the U.S. where the majority of these alternative resolution vehicles are used to resolve FCPA enforcement actions. As the OECD itself stated in its Phase 3 Report of U.S. enforcement of the FCPA - "it seems quite clear that the use of these agreements is one of the reasons for the impressive FCPA enforcement record in the U.S." (See here for the prior post). Former DOJ FCPA enforcement chief Mark Mendelsohn was asked directly – if the DOJ “did not have the choice of deferred or non prosecution agreements, what would happen to the number of FCPA settlements every year,” and he stated as follows: “if the Department only had the option of bringing a criminal case or declining to bring a case, you would certainly bring fewer cases.”
In certain other OECD member countries, there is a compliance defense relevant to the prosecution of bribery and corruption offenses. (See here for the prior post).
Given these differing dynamics (among others), it is fairly obvious why OECD member countries have varying degrees of enforcement of bribery and corruption offenses.
With that in mind, on to the report cards.
Transparency International Progress Report 2011 - Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
On May 24th, Transparency International (TI) released (here) its seventh annual Progress Report on Enforcement of the OECD Convention.
The report "shows no improvement in the enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the past year and warns that this could signal a dangerous loss of momentum in the fight against corruption."
The report covers 37 countries and "shows that there are still only seven countries with active enforcement, nine with moderate enforcement, and 21 with little or no enforcement." Huguette Labelle, Chair of TI, stated that "the collective commitment to stamp out foreign bribery made by all OECD parties is undermined when a large number of countries have inadequate enforcement."
The introduction of the report includes the following statement.
"Continued lack of enforcement in 21 countries a decade after the Convention entered into force, notwithstanding repeated OECD reviews, clearly indicates lack of political commitment by their governments. And in some of those with moderate enforcement, the level of commitment is also uncertain. This is a danger signal because the OECD Convention depends on the collective commitment of all parties to ending foreign bribery."
The reports "major conclusions" include the following: "risk of loss of momentum" and "lack of political commitment."
As to the former, the report states as follows. "The Convention has not yet reached the point at which the prohibition of foreign bribery is consistently enforced. With little or no enforcement by half of the signatory governments, backsliding by enforcing governments is a serious threat. This concern is aggravated in a troubled global economy in which companies are scrambling for business. Business organisations have increasingly criticised anti-bribery enforcement as a competitive obstacle. The present position of the Convention is unstable, and unless forward momentum is recovered, the progress made in the past decade could unravel."
As to the "lack of political commitment", the report states as follows. "Reviews conducted by TI experts indicate that the principal cause of lagging enforcement is lack of political commitment by government leaders. In countries where there is committed political leadership, the OECD’s rigorous monitoring programme has helped improve laws and enforcement programmes. However, in the absence of political will, even repeated OECD reviews have little effect."
Once again, Canada received a public lashing from TI.
Under the heading "lack of progress in Canada," the report states as follows. "Canada is the only G7 country in the little or no enforcement category, and has been in this category since the first edition of this report in 2005. It is also the only OECD member that does not provide nationality jurisdiction, which presents a serious obstacle to enforcement. [...] TI welcomes that the government of Canada has publicly reported the number of investigations for the first time. It is promising that 23 foreign bribery investigations are under way. If these investigations lead to prosecutions, Canada may finally move out of the little or no enforcement category." (A future post will summarize the recent Canadian enforcement action against Niko Resources).
TI's 2010 report (see here for the prior post) included reference to many big picture enforcement issues such as the use of negotiated settlements (NPAs and DPAs), judicial scrutiny of enforcement actions, and the proper amount of fines and penalties. However, TI's 2011 report was silent as to many big picture issues.
OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report
On April 20th, the OECD Working Group on Bribery released its annual report (here). The release (here) states as follows. "Most governments are not meeting their international commitments to clamp down on bribery and corruption in international business, with only five signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention having sanctioned individuals or companies in the past year."
Showing posts with label Canada. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Canada. Show all posts
Thursday, June 30, 2011
Monday, February 14, 2011
Heating Up North of the Border
In its July 2010 Progress Report on the Enforcement of the OECD Convention (here), Transparency International ("TI") called Canada one of its "most disappointing" findings given "little or no enforcement" of Canada's FCPA like-statute, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act ("CFPOA")
Among other things, Canada was found to have an insufficient definition of a foreign bribery offense, jurisdictional limitations as to its statute, inadequacies in its enforcement system, and lack of awareness raising in the country as to foreign corruption issues.
The TI Report quoted Bruce Futterer (a TI Canada expert) as saying - “One is left with the impression that the enforcement of anti-bribery and foreign corruption legislation is not a high enough priority with the Canadian federal government and that more could be done both in terms of strengthening the existing legislation and allocating greater human and financial resources to the education and enforcement of the CFPOA.”
Against this backdrop, TI Canada's January 31st press release (here) caught my eye. Without providing a source, the release states as follows: "The recent revelation from the RCMP Sensitive Investigations and International Anti- Corruption Unit that 23 CFPOA investigations are underway means that, 'Canadian companies can no longer hide behind the world’s perception that business is done here in a completely ethical manner.'"
From little to no enforcement to 23 active investigations, that is big news north of the border.
For more see here.
Among other things, Canada was found to have an insufficient definition of a foreign bribery offense, jurisdictional limitations as to its statute, inadequacies in its enforcement system, and lack of awareness raising in the country as to foreign corruption issues.
The TI Report quoted Bruce Futterer (a TI Canada expert) as saying - “One is left with the impression that the enforcement of anti-bribery and foreign corruption legislation is not a high enough priority with the Canadian federal government and that more could be done both in terms of strengthening the existing legislation and allocating greater human and financial resources to the education and enforcement of the CFPOA.”
Against this backdrop, TI Canada's January 31st press release (here) caught my eye. Without providing a source, the release states as follows: "The recent revelation from the RCMP Sensitive Investigations and International Anti- Corruption Unit that 23 CFPOA investigations are underway means that, 'Canadian companies can no longer hide behind the world’s perception that business is done here in a completely ethical manner.'"
From little to no enforcement to 23 active investigations, that is big news north of the border.
For more see here.
Friday, October 29, 2010
Friday Roundup
It has been a few weeks since my last Friday Roundup.
As a result this is a souped-up edition.
Is paying an FCPA fine merely a cost of business, are FCPA internal investigations getting just a bit out-of-hand, have you heard that a new cottage industry of FCPA experts has emerged, quit picking on Canada, will Julian Messent (or others) be prosecuted for FCPA violations, Assistant Attorney General Breuer on the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, Proclamation 7750 news, and a son who wants to keep the New York condo ... it's all here in the Friday roundup.
Is Paying an FCPA Fine Merely a Cost of Business?
One may wonder, and legitimately so, whether getting caught for violating the FCPA is simply a cost of doing business whereby the company pays a fine and then continues to do business, including with, in many cases, the U.S. government. See here for my post on Siemens - The Year After, here for my post on BAE's recent $40 million contract with the FBI (note because of the facade of FCPA enforcement, BAE was not charged with violating the FCPA - see here).
Denis McInerney, Chief of the DOJ's Fraud Section, rejected such an assertion during an October 21st speech before the American Bar Association.
According to Inside U.S. Trade, McInerney "sought to rebut charges that FCPA enforcement relies too heavily on settlement agreements and that it is therefore like a licensing regime under which 'companies are allowed to bribe, but if caught they have to pay a fee.'" According to Inside U.S. Trade, McInerney said that in the past two years, DOJ has imposed fines of $59 million, $19 million, $365 million, $338 million, $400 million, $376 million, $579 million and $800 million and he "emphasized that the companies paying these penalties are subject to monitoring which can lead to criminal prosecution if new offenses occur." According to Inside U.S. Trade, McInerney said "I guarantee you that these firms do not view these are mere licensing fees."
Is This Getting a Bit Out of Hand?
Avon previously disclosed the existence of an internal investigation focused on potential FCPA issues (see here for the prior post).
Here is what the company said in its 10-Q filing (here) yesterday:
"As previously reported, we have engaged outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation and compliance reviews focused on compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and related U.S. and foreign laws in China and additional countries. The internal investigation, which is being conducted under the oversight of our Audit Committee, began in June 2008. As we reported in October 2008, we voluntarily contacted the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Department of Justice to advise both agencies of our internal investigation. We are continuing to cooperate with both agencies and inquiries by them, including but not limited to, signing tolling agreements, translating and producing documents and assisting with interviews.
As previously reported in July 2009, in connection with the internal investigation, we commenced compliance reviews regarding the FCPA and related U.S. and foreign laws in additional countries in order to evaluate our compliance efforts. We are conducting these compliance reviews in a number of other countries selected to represent each of the Company’s four other international geographic segments. The internal investigation and compliance reviews are focused on reviewing certain expenses and books and records processes, including, but not limited to, travel, entertainment, gifts, and payments to third−party agents and others, in connection with our business dealings, directly or indirectly, with foreign governments and their employees. The internal investigation and compliance reviews of these matters are ongoing, and we continue to cooperate with both agencies with respect to these matters. At this point we are unable to predict the duration, scope, developments in, results of, or consequences of the internal investigation and compliance reviews."
Here is what Avon had to say in the fling about its net global expenses:
"The increase in Net Global expenses for both the three and nine months ended September 30, 2010, was primarily attributable to significant professional and related fees associated with the FCPA investigation and compliance reviews described in Note 5 to the consolidated financial statements included herein of approximately $24 (up approximately $17 from the three months ended September 30, 2009) and approximately $72 (up approximately $49 from the nine months ended September 30, 2009), respectively. The increase in Net Global expenses for the nine months ended September 30, 2010 was also due to higher costs associated with global initiatives and costs associated with business acquisitions. Professional and related fees associated with the FCPA investigation and compliance reviews, while difficult to predict, are expected to continue during the course of this investigation."
Those figures are not mere dollars, but millions of dollars. And, as noted in the disclosure, the expenses are expected to increase.
On a much smaller (yet still meaningful) scale, on August 31st, Orthofix disclosed (here) the existence of an internal investigation relating to FCPA issues focused on its Mexican subsidiaries, an entity that accounts "for approximately one percent of the Company’s consolidated net sales and consolidated total assets."
Recently, Orthofix provided this update in an 8-K filing (here):
"Operating income in the third quarter of 2010 included the impact of $3.7 million in legal expenses associated with the DOJ investigation of the bone growth stimulation industry and the Company’s internal investigation into its compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in its subsidiary in Mexico."
Newsweek Notices FCPA Inc.
Newsweek recently carried a short blurb (here) titled "Going After Graft." Among other things, the piece states:
"With prosecutions likely to continue—the FBI has doubled the number of agents tasked to FCPA cases—business is responding in kind. Law firms are competing for top FCPA talent, banks financing international deals are insisting on anti-bribery stipulations in contracts, and a new cottage industry of experts has emerged, offering country-by-country advice on gifts and local laws. In the words of an FBI spokesperson, FCPA are 'four letters you need to be aware of if you’re doing business in the international marketplace.'"
Quit Picking On Canada
What if, in the U.S., there was no fallback FCPA books and records and internal control charges, there was no voluntary disclosure culture, there were no "overzealous prosecutions," and there were no prosecutions undertaken as "publicity stunts."
According to Cyndee Todgham Cherniak (here), FCPA enforcement would likely resemble the sparse enforcement of Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.
At least that is my take-away from her recent post (here) on the Trade Lawyers Blog.
For more on Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (see here and here).
Will Julian Messent (Or Others) Be Prosecuted For FCPA Violations?
Earlier this week, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (SFO) announced (here) that Julian Messent was sentenced to 21 months in prison "after admitting making or authorizing corrupt payments of almost US $2 million to Costan Rican officials in the state insurance company, Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) and the national electricity provider Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad."
Messent, a former director of London-based insurance business PWS International Ltd. (PWS), was the head of the Property (Americas) Divison at PWS in which role "he was responsible for securing and maintaining contracts for reinsurance in the Central and South America regions."
According to the SFO release, "Messent authorized 41 corrupt payments" "to be paid to Costa Rican officials, their wives and associated companies, as inducements or rewards for assisting in the appointment or retention of PWS as broker of the lucrative reinsurance policy for INS."
The SFO release also indicates that Messent was ordered to pay £100,000 in compensation to the Republic of Costa Rica. (In the U.S., FCPA fines flow solely into the U.S. Treasury).
Messent was charged under the U.K.'s Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (see here).
According to this report in the Guardian, "the SFO decided not to prosecute PWS because the firm, which has been sold, had a substantial deficit in its pension fund."
According to the Guardian, "the covert payments were routed through bank accounts in the names of the wives of the Costa Rican officials and through accounts in Panama and the US, and a travel agency in Florida."
Under the 78dd-3 prong of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, persons other than an issuer or domestic concern (i.e. in this case foreign nationals) can be subject to the FCPA if the improper payments have a U.S. nexus.
Will FCPA prosecutions of Messent (and perhaps others) follow?
Breuer on the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative
As highlighted in this prior post, in November 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder called asset recovery from corrupt officials a "global imperative" and he announced a "redoubled commitment on behalf of the United States Department of Justice to recover" funds obtained by foreign officials through bribery.
In July 2010, Holder announced (here) the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative "aimed at combating large-scale foreign official corruption and recovering public funds for their intended – and proper – use: for the people of our nations." Holder announced that the DOJ is "assembling a team of prosecutors who will focus exclusively on this work and build upon efforts already underway to deter corruption, hold offenders accountable, and protect public resources."
In a recent keynote address at the Money Laundering Enforcement Conference (here), Assistant Attoney General Lanny Breuer had this to say about the initaitive:
"This Initiative represents a concrete step toward fulfilling that commitment. The Kleptocracy Initiative will involve three key sections in the Criminal Division: the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, which will lead it, and the Office of International Affairs and the Fraud Section, which will provide critical support. Once fully implemented, this Initiative will allow the Department to recover assets on behalf of countries victimized by high-level corruption, building on the Justice Department’s already robust enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Through the Kleptocracy Initiative, the Department will ensure that corrupt leaders cannot seek safe haven in the United States for their stolen wealth. And, if we uncover such wealth, the Justice Department will forfeit and return this stolen money to its rightful owners – the people and governments from whom it was taken."
In his speech, Breuer also discussed (in a non-FCPA context) how the DOJ wants "companies that uncover illegal conduct to come forward voluntarily."
Proclamation 7750 News
In 2004, President Bush signed Proclamation 7750 "To Suspend Entry As Immigrants or Nonimmigrants of Persons Engaged In or Benefiting From Corruption" (see here).
Proclamation 7750 basically says the U.S. can suspend entry into the country "of certain persons who have committed, participated in, or are beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions where that corruption has serious adverse effects on international activity" subject to an exception where denying such entry would be "contrary to the interests" of the U.S.
Last year, the New York Times (here) ran an article quoting a former State Department official as saying the State Department(which is responsible for enforcing the proclamation) "seem[s] to lack the backbone to use this prohibition."
Earlier this month, David Johnson (Assistant Secretary, Bureau International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State) stated at the Third Committee of the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly (see here) as follows:
"The United States continues to broaden its efforts to deny entry into our own country of public officials who receive bribes as well as those who supply them. Corrupt officials are not welcome in the United States."
Joe Palazzolo (Wall Street Journal - Corruption Currents) followed up with Johnson and noted in a recent article that the "State Department is stepping up its game" in seeking to enforce Proclamation 7750. As Palazzolo reports, it is not hard to "step up the game" when "for a long time, one part-official [...] handled 7750 matters."
Palazzolo reports that the State Department recently hired two new employees and is "processing paperwork for two additional hires, who will focus the majority of their time on 7750 issues." The article quotes a State Department official as saying, "it is our hope and intention that the new hires will result in greater capacity."
Son Fights to Keep New York Condo
This prior post discussed the DOJ's civil forfeiture complaint filed in July against certain U.S. properties "that represent a portion of illegal bribes paid to the former president of Taiwan and his wife."
Joe Palazzolo (Wall Street Journal - Corruption Currents) recently reported that "the son of former Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian has quietly hired legal counsel to prevent a Manhattan condominium, which prosecutors say was purchased with bribes, from falling into the hands of the government."
According to Palazzolo, the son, Chen Chih-chung, has retained Jonathan Harris (see here) to defend against the forfeiture action and Harris is quoted as saying he will be filing a motion to dismiss "shortly."
*****
A good weekend to all.
As a result this is a souped-up edition.
Is paying an FCPA fine merely a cost of business, are FCPA internal investigations getting just a bit out-of-hand, have you heard that a new cottage industry of FCPA experts has emerged, quit picking on Canada, will Julian Messent (or others) be prosecuted for FCPA violations, Assistant Attorney General Breuer on the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, Proclamation 7750 news, and a son who wants to keep the New York condo ... it's all here in the Friday roundup.
Is Paying an FCPA Fine Merely a Cost of Business?
One may wonder, and legitimately so, whether getting caught for violating the FCPA is simply a cost of doing business whereby the company pays a fine and then continues to do business, including with, in many cases, the U.S. government. See here for my post on Siemens - The Year After, here for my post on BAE's recent $40 million contract with the FBI (note because of the facade of FCPA enforcement, BAE was not charged with violating the FCPA - see here).
Denis McInerney, Chief of the DOJ's Fraud Section, rejected such an assertion during an October 21st speech before the American Bar Association.
According to Inside U.S. Trade, McInerney "sought to rebut charges that FCPA enforcement relies too heavily on settlement agreements and that it is therefore like a licensing regime under which 'companies are allowed to bribe, but if caught they have to pay a fee.'" According to Inside U.S. Trade, McInerney said that in the past two years, DOJ has imposed fines of $59 million, $19 million, $365 million, $338 million, $400 million, $376 million, $579 million and $800 million and he "emphasized that the companies paying these penalties are subject to monitoring which can lead to criminal prosecution if new offenses occur." According to Inside U.S. Trade, McInerney said "I guarantee you that these firms do not view these are mere licensing fees."
Is This Getting a Bit Out of Hand?
Avon previously disclosed the existence of an internal investigation focused on potential FCPA issues (see here for the prior post).
Here is what the company said in its 10-Q filing (here) yesterday:
"As previously reported, we have engaged outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation and compliance reviews focused on compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and related U.S. and foreign laws in China and additional countries. The internal investigation, which is being conducted under the oversight of our Audit Committee, began in June 2008. As we reported in October 2008, we voluntarily contacted the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Department of Justice to advise both agencies of our internal investigation. We are continuing to cooperate with both agencies and inquiries by them, including but not limited to, signing tolling agreements, translating and producing documents and assisting with interviews.
As previously reported in July 2009, in connection with the internal investigation, we commenced compliance reviews regarding the FCPA and related U.S. and foreign laws in additional countries in order to evaluate our compliance efforts. We are conducting these compliance reviews in a number of other countries selected to represent each of the Company’s four other international geographic segments. The internal investigation and compliance reviews are focused on reviewing certain expenses and books and records processes, including, but not limited to, travel, entertainment, gifts, and payments to third−party agents and others, in connection with our business dealings, directly or indirectly, with foreign governments and their employees. The internal investigation and compliance reviews of these matters are ongoing, and we continue to cooperate with both agencies with respect to these matters. At this point we are unable to predict the duration, scope, developments in, results of, or consequences of the internal investigation and compliance reviews."
Here is what Avon had to say in the fling about its net global expenses:
"The increase in Net Global expenses for both the three and nine months ended September 30, 2010, was primarily attributable to significant professional and related fees associated with the FCPA investigation and compliance reviews described in Note 5 to the consolidated financial statements included herein of approximately $24 (up approximately $17 from the three months ended September 30, 2009) and approximately $72 (up approximately $49 from the nine months ended September 30, 2009), respectively. The increase in Net Global expenses for the nine months ended September 30, 2010 was also due to higher costs associated with global initiatives and costs associated with business acquisitions. Professional and related fees associated with the FCPA investigation and compliance reviews, while difficult to predict, are expected to continue during the course of this investigation."
Those figures are not mere dollars, but millions of dollars. And, as noted in the disclosure, the expenses are expected to increase.
On a much smaller (yet still meaningful) scale, on August 31st, Orthofix disclosed (here) the existence of an internal investigation relating to FCPA issues focused on its Mexican subsidiaries, an entity that accounts "for approximately one percent of the Company’s consolidated net sales and consolidated total assets."
Recently, Orthofix provided this update in an 8-K filing (here):
"Operating income in the third quarter of 2010 included the impact of $3.7 million in legal expenses associated with the DOJ investigation of the bone growth stimulation industry and the Company’s internal investigation into its compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in its subsidiary in Mexico."
Newsweek Notices FCPA Inc.
Newsweek recently carried a short blurb (here) titled "Going After Graft." Among other things, the piece states:
"With prosecutions likely to continue—the FBI has doubled the number of agents tasked to FCPA cases—business is responding in kind. Law firms are competing for top FCPA talent, banks financing international deals are insisting on anti-bribery stipulations in contracts, and a new cottage industry of experts has emerged, offering country-by-country advice on gifts and local laws. In the words of an FBI spokesperson, FCPA are 'four letters you need to be aware of if you’re doing business in the international marketplace.'"
Quit Picking On Canada
What if, in the U.S., there was no fallback FCPA books and records and internal control charges, there was no voluntary disclosure culture, there were no "overzealous prosecutions," and there were no prosecutions undertaken as "publicity stunts."
According to Cyndee Todgham Cherniak (here), FCPA enforcement would likely resemble the sparse enforcement of Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.
At least that is my take-away from her recent post (here) on the Trade Lawyers Blog.
For more on Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (see here and here).
Will Julian Messent (Or Others) Be Prosecuted For FCPA Violations?
Earlier this week, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (SFO) announced (here) that Julian Messent was sentenced to 21 months in prison "after admitting making or authorizing corrupt payments of almost US $2 million to Costan Rican officials in the state insurance company, Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) and the national electricity provider Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad."
Messent, a former director of London-based insurance business PWS International Ltd. (PWS), was the head of the Property (Americas) Divison at PWS in which role "he was responsible for securing and maintaining contracts for reinsurance in the Central and South America regions."
According to the SFO release, "Messent authorized 41 corrupt payments" "to be paid to Costa Rican officials, their wives and associated companies, as inducements or rewards for assisting in the appointment or retention of PWS as broker of the lucrative reinsurance policy for INS."
The SFO release also indicates that Messent was ordered to pay £100,000 in compensation to the Republic of Costa Rica. (In the U.S., FCPA fines flow solely into the U.S. Treasury).
Messent was charged under the U.K.'s Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (see here).
According to this report in the Guardian, "the SFO decided not to prosecute PWS because the firm, which has been sold, had a substantial deficit in its pension fund."
According to the Guardian, "the covert payments were routed through bank accounts in the names of the wives of the Costa Rican officials and through accounts in Panama and the US, and a travel agency in Florida."
Under the 78dd-3 prong of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, persons other than an issuer or domestic concern (i.e. in this case foreign nationals) can be subject to the FCPA if the improper payments have a U.S. nexus.
Will FCPA prosecutions of Messent (and perhaps others) follow?
Breuer on the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative
As highlighted in this prior post, in November 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder called asset recovery from corrupt officials a "global imperative" and he announced a "redoubled commitment on behalf of the United States Department of Justice to recover" funds obtained by foreign officials through bribery.
In July 2010, Holder announced (here) the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative "aimed at combating large-scale foreign official corruption and recovering public funds for their intended – and proper – use: for the people of our nations." Holder announced that the DOJ is "assembling a team of prosecutors who will focus exclusively on this work and build upon efforts already underway to deter corruption, hold offenders accountable, and protect public resources."
In a recent keynote address at the Money Laundering Enforcement Conference (here), Assistant Attoney General Lanny Breuer had this to say about the initaitive:
"This Initiative represents a concrete step toward fulfilling that commitment. The Kleptocracy Initiative will involve three key sections in the Criminal Division: the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, which will lead it, and the Office of International Affairs and the Fraud Section, which will provide critical support. Once fully implemented, this Initiative will allow the Department to recover assets on behalf of countries victimized by high-level corruption, building on the Justice Department’s already robust enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Through the Kleptocracy Initiative, the Department will ensure that corrupt leaders cannot seek safe haven in the United States for their stolen wealth. And, if we uncover such wealth, the Justice Department will forfeit and return this stolen money to its rightful owners – the people and governments from whom it was taken."
In his speech, Breuer also discussed (in a non-FCPA context) how the DOJ wants "companies that uncover illegal conduct to come forward voluntarily."
Proclamation 7750 News
In 2004, President Bush signed Proclamation 7750 "To Suspend Entry As Immigrants or Nonimmigrants of Persons Engaged In or Benefiting From Corruption" (see here).
Proclamation 7750 basically says the U.S. can suspend entry into the country "of certain persons who have committed, participated in, or are beneficiaries of corruption in the performance of public functions where that corruption has serious adverse effects on international activity" subject to an exception where denying such entry would be "contrary to the interests" of the U.S.
Last year, the New York Times (here) ran an article quoting a former State Department official as saying the State Department(which is responsible for enforcing the proclamation) "seem[s] to lack the backbone to use this prohibition."
Earlier this month, David Johnson (Assistant Secretary, Bureau International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State) stated at the Third Committee of the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly (see here) as follows:
"The United States continues to broaden its efforts to deny entry into our own country of public officials who receive bribes as well as those who supply them. Corrupt officials are not welcome in the United States."
Joe Palazzolo (Wall Street Journal - Corruption Currents) followed up with Johnson and noted in a recent article that the "State Department is stepping up its game" in seeking to enforce Proclamation 7750. As Palazzolo reports, it is not hard to "step up the game" when "for a long time, one part-official [...] handled 7750 matters."
Palazzolo reports that the State Department recently hired two new employees and is "processing paperwork for two additional hires, who will focus the majority of their time on 7750 issues." The article quotes a State Department official as saying, "it is our hope and intention that the new hires will result in greater capacity."
Son Fights to Keep New York Condo
This prior post discussed the DOJ's civil forfeiture complaint filed in July against certain U.S. properties "that represent a portion of illegal bribes paid to the former president of Taiwan and his wife."
Joe Palazzolo (Wall Street Journal - Corruption Currents) recently reported that "the son of former Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian has quietly hired legal counsel to prevent a Manhattan condominium, which prosecutors say was purchased with bribes, from falling into the hands of the government."
According to Palazzolo, the son, Chen Chih-chung, has retained Jonathan Harris (see here) to defend against the forfeiture action and Harris is quoted as saying he will be filing a motion to dismiss "shortly."
*****
A good weekend to all.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Report Cards
The start of school is just around the corner, but summer is report card time for various groups focused on reducing bribery and corruption.
This post highlights two such report cards: Transparency International's Annual Progress Report of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and The OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report.
Transparency International 2010 Progress Report of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
On July 28th, Transprancy International (TI) (see here) released its sixth annual Progress Report on Enforcement of the OECD Convention.
"The 2010 report covers 36 of the 38 parties to the Convention, all except Iceland and Luxembourg. It covers enforcement data for the period ending 2009 unless otherwise stated and includes reports on recent case developments through June 2010. Like prior reports, this report is based on information provided by TI experts in each reporting country selected by TI national chapters."
According to Appendix A of the report, the U.S. experts responding to the TI questionnaire were Lucinda Low (here) and Tom Best (here) of Steptoe & Johnson LLP.
In summary fashion, the report states:
"The increase in the number of countries with active enforcement from four to seven is a very positive development, because active enforcement is considered a substantial deterrent to foreign bribery. With the addition of Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom, which previously were in the moderate category, there is now active enforcement in countries representing about 30 per cent of world exports, 8 per cent more than in the prior year."
"The number of countries in the moderate category has changed from 11 to 9 countries, because three countries have moved up to the active category and one country, Argentina have moved up from the lowest category. The risk of prosecution in the nine countries with moderate enforcement – representing about 21 per cent of world exports – is considered an insufficient deterrent. Among this group are G8 members France and Japan."
"The most disappointing finding is that there are still 20 countries – including G8 member Canada – with little or no enforcement, representing about 15 per cent of world exports. That number has shown little change in the last five years. This is deeply disturbing because companies in these countries will feel little or no constraint about foreign bribery, and many are not even aware of the OECD Convention. Governments in these countries have failed to meet the Convention’s commitment for collective action against foreign bribery."
The report contains the following conclusions.
Current Levels of Enforcement are too Low to Enable the Convention to Succeed
"With active enforcement in only seven of the 38 parties to the Convention, the Convention’s goal of effectively curbing foreign bribery in international business transactions is still far from being achieved. The current situation is unstable because the Convention is predicated on the collective commitment of all the parties to end foreign bribery. Unless enforcement is sharply increased, existing support could well erode. Danger signals include efforts in some countries to limit the role of investigative magistrates, shorten statutes of limitations and extend immunities from prosecution. The risk of backsliding is particularly acute during a time of recession, when competition for limited orders is intense."
Cause of Lagging Enforcement: Lack of Political Will
"The principal cause of lagging enforcement is lack of political will. This can take a passive form, such as failure to provide adequate funding and staffing for enforcement. It can also take an active form, through political obstruction of investigations and prosecutions. The lack of political will must be forcefully confronted not only by the Working Group on Bribery but also by the active involvement of the OECD Secretary-General, as well as high-level pressure on the laggards from governments committed to enforcement."
Although the TI Report probably did not have the U.S. and U.K. in mind when making the above statement, many have questioned whether both the U.S. and U.K. governments lacked the political will to charge BAE, a large defense contractor to both governments, with bribery offenses. The U.S. enforcement action (see here) was not an FCPA enforcement action and the U.K. enforcement action (here) merely concerned a book keeping issue in Tanzania. And of course, TI's statement about lack of political will was made before the Giffen Gaffe (see here).
Positive developments noted in the TI Report include:
"During the last year prosecutors in the US, Germany and the UK announced a number of settlements of important foreign bribery cases in which the defendants agreed to pay fines amounting to many hundreds of millions of dollars. These settlements demonstrate the ability of prosecutors to resolve cases without interminable litigation. The settlement levels provide a sharp wake-up call to international business regarding the gravity of foreign bribery."
In seeming recognition of how aggresive enforcement of bribery laws can become a cash cow (see here for more) for the enforcing government, the report then states: "[The settlements] should also make clear to laggard governments that investing in adequate enforcement can have substantial returns."
Other snippets from the TI Report.
As to the U.K.'s delay of the Bribery Act (see here for more) the report states:
"... it is regrettable that the entry into force of the law has been delayed until April 2011. There should be no further delay. It is also important that the consultation on the publication of official government guidance on compliance will not result in weakening any provision of the law."
As to the use of alternative resolution vehicles such as non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements - a common way corporate FCPA enforcement actions are resolved (see here and here for more) and a model the U.K. SFO seeks to follow - the report contains this recommendation:
"The Working Group should undertake a study on the use of negotiated settlements to resolve foreign bribery cases. There are strong reasons for negotiated settlements, most importantly to avoid the high costs, long delays and unpredictable outcomes of litigation. However, there is concern that these settlements could be questionable deals between prosecutors and politically influential companies. Therefore, procedures should be adopted to make settlement terms public and subject to judicial approval. This should follow a public hearing where representatives of the country where the bribes were paid, competitors and other interested stakeholders such as public interest groups should be given an opportunity to present their views."
The report also states as follows:
"TI considers that all settlements should be submitted to judicial review independent from the Prosecutor’s Office. This review should include a public hearing with representatives of the country where the bribe was paid, competitiors and civil society organisations before the settlement becomes final and published detailed conclusions."
In a section of the report discussing current cases and trends, the report notes that some fines and penalties are based on the amount of the bribe while in other cases the fines and penalties are based on the amount of profit or gain from the transaction.
In apparent recognition that many FCPA fines and penalties (even eye-popping ones such as Siemens) still result in the company seemingly emerging from the prosecution with a net profit from the improper activity, the report states:
"TI considers that corporate fines should exceed the amount of profit from the wrongdoing."
Further, the TI report questions whether the increase in enforcement and the penalties imposed are actually making any difference as it states: "[w]hile the amounts paid by companies are rising steadily in some jurisdictions, the question remains whether there is adequate deterrence."
Continuing the dialogue on the question of "where should fines and penalties" go (see here and here for more) the report states:
"It would be desirable for the OECD Working Group on Bribery to conduct a study on corporate liability and penalties. TI considers that part of the fines paid or profits reimbursed should be made available for the benefit of the country that suffered from the offence."
In addition to Transparency International, the OECD itself issued a summer report card.
OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report
On June 15th, the OECD Working Group on Bribery issued its annual report (see here).
As stated in the report, "the OECD has been at the forefront of international efforts to combat corruption in business, taking a multi-disciplinary approach, via its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, as well as through its work in the areas of taxation, development aid, and governance."
The Anti-Bribery Convention (here) has been implemented by 38 countries (see here) and these countries comprise the OECD Working Group on Bribery.
Among recent achievements noted by OECD Secretary General Angel Gurría are:
"Israel—the Working Group’s newest member— [...] underwent a series of intense
evaluations and implemented significant anti-bribery legislative changes to the anti-bribery standards expected of candidates for membership of the OECD;" and
"Chile, which recently became a member of the OECD, also passed legislation that holds Chilean companies liable for bribing foreign public officials when doing business abroad;".
Secretary General Gurria also noted that "in 2009, Russia officially asked to join the Anti-Bribery Convention as part of its OECD membership drive" and that the OECD is also deepening relations on anti-bribery issues with China, India, Indonesia and Thailand, and hopes to bring other countries on board."
As the report notes, 2009 "marked the completion of ten years of monitoring Parties’ implementation and enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention."
This is the first year that official data on enforcement efforts by Parties
to the Anti-Bribery Convention is publicly available. The data (see here) is from "Decisions on Foreign Bribery Cases from 1999 to December 2009."
According to the report, "the data has been compiled and published by the OECD Secretariat on the basis of statistics, data and information provided by the Parties to Convention in order to provide a realistic picture of the level of enforcement in the jurisdiction of each of the Parties. However, the responsibility for the provision and accuracy of information rests solely with the individual Parties."
Further, in a seeming reference to U.S. enforcement of the FCPA and the frequency by which FCPA enforcement actions are resolved through non-prosecution agreements, the report notes that the data includes information "provided on a voluntary basis by certain countries concerning the number of foreign bribery cases that have been resolved through an agreement between the law enforcement authorities and the accused person or entity, with or without court approval."
Interested in how many individuals and business entities have been criminally sanctioned by OECD signatory nations for bribery? Curious as to how many investigations are currently pending by signatory nations? Want to compare Hungary to Iceland or the U.S. to Germany?
It is all possible with OECD data.
This post highlights two such report cards: Transparency International's Annual Progress Report of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and The OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report.
Transparency International 2010 Progress Report of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
On July 28th, Transprancy International (TI) (see here) released its sixth annual Progress Report on Enforcement of the OECD Convention.
"The 2010 report covers 36 of the 38 parties to the Convention, all except Iceland and Luxembourg. It covers enforcement data for the period ending 2009 unless otherwise stated and includes reports on recent case developments through June 2010. Like prior reports, this report is based on information provided by TI experts in each reporting country selected by TI national chapters."
According to Appendix A of the report, the U.S. experts responding to the TI questionnaire were Lucinda Low (here) and Tom Best (here) of Steptoe & Johnson LLP.
In summary fashion, the report states:
"The increase in the number of countries with active enforcement from four to seven is a very positive development, because active enforcement is considered a substantial deterrent to foreign bribery. With the addition of Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom, which previously were in the moderate category, there is now active enforcement in countries representing about 30 per cent of world exports, 8 per cent more than in the prior year."
"The number of countries in the moderate category has changed from 11 to 9 countries, because three countries have moved up to the active category and one country, Argentina have moved up from the lowest category. The risk of prosecution in the nine countries with moderate enforcement – representing about 21 per cent of world exports – is considered an insufficient deterrent. Among this group are G8 members France and Japan."
"The most disappointing finding is that there are still 20 countries – including G8 member Canada – with little or no enforcement, representing about 15 per cent of world exports. That number has shown little change in the last five years. This is deeply disturbing because companies in these countries will feel little or no constraint about foreign bribery, and many are not even aware of the OECD Convention. Governments in these countries have failed to meet the Convention’s commitment for collective action against foreign bribery."
The report contains the following conclusions.
Current Levels of Enforcement are too Low to Enable the Convention to Succeed
"With active enforcement in only seven of the 38 parties to the Convention, the Convention’s goal of effectively curbing foreign bribery in international business transactions is still far from being achieved. The current situation is unstable because the Convention is predicated on the collective commitment of all the parties to end foreign bribery. Unless enforcement is sharply increased, existing support could well erode. Danger signals include efforts in some countries to limit the role of investigative magistrates, shorten statutes of limitations and extend immunities from prosecution. The risk of backsliding is particularly acute during a time of recession, when competition for limited orders is intense."
Cause of Lagging Enforcement: Lack of Political Will
"The principal cause of lagging enforcement is lack of political will. This can take a passive form, such as failure to provide adequate funding and staffing for enforcement. It can also take an active form, through political obstruction of investigations and prosecutions. The lack of political will must be forcefully confronted not only by the Working Group on Bribery but also by the active involvement of the OECD Secretary-General, as well as high-level pressure on the laggards from governments committed to enforcement."
Although the TI Report probably did not have the U.S. and U.K. in mind when making the above statement, many have questioned whether both the U.S. and U.K. governments lacked the political will to charge BAE, a large defense contractor to both governments, with bribery offenses. The U.S. enforcement action (see here) was not an FCPA enforcement action and the U.K. enforcement action (here) merely concerned a book keeping issue in Tanzania. And of course, TI's statement about lack of political will was made before the Giffen Gaffe (see here).
Positive developments noted in the TI Report include:
"During the last year prosecutors in the US, Germany and the UK announced a number of settlements of important foreign bribery cases in which the defendants agreed to pay fines amounting to many hundreds of millions of dollars. These settlements demonstrate the ability of prosecutors to resolve cases without interminable litigation. The settlement levels provide a sharp wake-up call to international business regarding the gravity of foreign bribery."
In seeming recognition of how aggresive enforcement of bribery laws can become a cash cow (see here for more) for the enforcing government, the report then states: "[The settlements] should also make clear to laggard governments that investing in adequate enforcement can have substantial returns."
Other snippets from the TI Report.
As to the U.K.'s delay of the Bribery Act (see here for more) the report states:
"... it is regrettable that the entry into force of the law has been delayed until April 2011. There should be no further delay. It is also important that the consultation on the publication of official government guidance on compliance will not result in weakening any provision of the law."
As to the use of alternative resolution vehicles such as non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements - a common way corporate FCPA enforcement actions are resolved (see here and here for more) and a model the U.K. SFO seeks to follow - the report contains this recommendation:
"The Working Group should undertake a study on the use of negotiated settlements to resolve foreign bribery cases. There are strong reasons for negotiated settlements, most importantly to avoid the high costs, long delays and unpredictable outcomes of litigation. However, there is concern that these settlements could be questionable deals between prosecutors and politically influential companies. Therefore, procedures should be adopted to make settlement terms public and subject to judicial approval. This should follow a public hearing where representatives of the country where the bribes were paid, competitors and other interested stakeholders such as public interest groups should be given an opportunity to present their views."
The report also states as follows:
"TI considers that all settlements should be submitted to judicial review independent from the Prosecutor’s Office. This review should include a public hearing with representatives of the country where the bribe was paid, competitiors and civil society organisations before the settlement becomes final and published detailed conclusions."
In a section of the report discussing current cases and trends, the report notes that some fines and penalties are based on the amount of the bribe while in other cases the fines and penalties are based on the amount of profit or gain from the transaction.
In apparent recognition that many FCPA fines and penalties (even eye-popping ones such as Siemens) still result in the company seemingly emerging from the prosecution with a net profit from the improper activity, the report states:
"TI considers that corporate fines should exceed the amount of profit from the wrongdoing."
Further, the TI report questions whether the increase in enforcement and the penalties imposed are actually making any difference as it states: "[w]hile the amounts paid by companies are rising steadily in some jurisdictions, the question remains whether there is adequate deterrence."
Continuing the dialogue on the question of "where should fines and penalties" go (see here and here for more) the report states:
"It would be desirable for the OECD Working Group on Bribery to conduct a study on corporate liability and penalties. TI considers that part of the fines paid or profits reimbursed should be made available for the benefit of the country that suffered from the offence."
In addition to Transparency International, the OECD itself issued a summer report card.
OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report
On June 15th, the OECD Working Group on Bribery issued its annual report (see here).
As stated in the report, "the OECD has been at the forefront of international efforts to combat corruption in business, taking a multi-disciplinary approach, via its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, as well as through its work in the areas of taxation, development aid, and governance."
The Anti-Bribery Convention (here) has been implemented by 38 countries (see here) and these countries comprise the OECD Working Group on Bribery.
Among recent achievements noted by OECD Secretary General Angel Gurría are:
"Israel—the Working Group’s newest member— [...] underwent a series of intense
evaluations and implemented significant anti-bribery legislative changes to the anti-bribery standards expected of candidates for membership of the OECD;" and
"Chile, which recently became a member of the OECD, also passed legislation that holds Chilean companies liable for bribing foreign public officials when doing business abroad;".
Secretary General Gurria also noted that "in 2009, Russia officially asked to join the Anti-Bribery Convention as part of its OECD membership drive" and that the OECD is also deepening relations on anti-bribery issues with China, India, Indonesia and Thailand, and hopes to bring other countries on board."
As the report notes, 2009 "marked the completion of ten years of monitoring Parties’ implementation and enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention."
This is the first year that official data on enforcement efforts by Parties
to the Anti-Bribery Convention is publicly available. The data (see here) is from "Decisions on Foreign Bribery Cases from 1999 to December 2009."
According to the report, "the data has been compiled and published by the OECD Secretariat on the basis of statistics, data and information provided by the Parties to Convention in order to provide a realistic picture of the level of enforcement in the jurisdiction of each of the Parties. However, the responsibility for the provision and accuracy of information rests solely with the individual Parties."
Further, in a seeming reference to U.S. enforcement of the FCPA and the frequency by which FCPA enforcement actions are resolved through non-prosecution agreements, the report notes that the data includes information "provided on a voluntary basis by certain countries concerning the number of foreign bribery cases that have been resolved through an agreement between the law enforcement authorities and the accused person or entity, with or without court approval."
Interested in how many individuals and business entities have been criminally sanctioned by OECD signatory nations for bribery? Curious as to how many investigations are currently pending by signatory nations? Want to compare Hungary to Iceland or the U.S. to Germany?
It is all possible with OECD data.
Thursday, July 29, 2010
Mounties Lay Corruption Charges
The U.S. is not the only country with an anti-bribery law on its books.
In this guest post, Mark Morrison (here) and Michael Dixon (here) of Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP discuss a recent enforcement action brought under Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.
*****
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) recently announced that they have laid charges under the Canadian equivalent of the FCPA, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (“CFPOA”), against a former employee of an Ottawa based technology company in relation to alleged overseas bribery. Few details have been released at this time, but it appears that the charges relate to alleged bribes paid to a foreign government official in an effort to secure a multi-million dollar contract. At this point in time, no charges have been laid against the company or other individuals, but comments by the RCMP suggest that further charges may be pending.
This is the second charge laid to date under CFPOA. The first related to the conduct of a United States Immigration Officer who was hired as a consultant by a Canadian corporation. In 2005, that corporation pled guilty and was sentenced to a fine of $25,000. A number of other bribery cases in Canada have also dealt with the corruption of domestic officials, but these have proceeded under the provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code.
What is interesting about this case to those of us who practice in the area is that we have been expecting something of this nature for some time as Canada has been under significant pressure from the OECD to meet its international anti-corruption enforcement obligations. In response to this pressure, the RCMP has established a special unit solely dedicated to investigating international bribery. The unit, with divisions in Ottawa and Calgary, has been actively engaged in several investigations, however, this is the first charge they have laid. Further charges are anticipated as other investigations progress.
Another interesting point raised by this case is the extent to which the Canadian courts are willing to apply the CFPOA to the extraterritorial actions of Canadian citizens. While the Canadian government previously introduced a Bill to amend the CFPOA to clarify its application to Canadians acting outside Canada, this Bill was not passed into law. In the absence of this Bill, the Canadian test for jurisdiction, as determined by the case law, is different than that employed in the US. Historically, only cases with a “real and substantial” link to Canada will be considered as falling within the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts. Accordingly, the Canadian test requires that a portion of the illegal activity occur within Canada or a real connection to Canada. While we do not know to what extent the alleged corrupt activity occurred in Canada, this case appears to represent the first opportunity for the Canadian courts to clarify the reach of the CFPOA to Canadian citizens acting abroad.
In this guest post, Mark Morrison (here) and Michael Dixon (here) of Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP discuss a recent enforcement action brought under Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.
*****
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) recently announced that they have laid charges under the Canadian equivalent of the FCPA, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (“CFPOA”), against a former employee of an Ottawa based technology company in relation to alleged overseas bribery. Few details have been released at this time, but it appears that the charges relate to alleged bribes paid to a foreign government official in an effort to secure a multi-million dollar contract. At this point in time, no charges have been laid against the company or other individuals, but comments by the RCMP suggest that further charges may be pending.
This is the second charge laid to date under CFPOA. The first related to the conduct of a United States Immigration Officer who was hired as a consultant by a Canadian corporation. In 2005, that corporation pled guilty and was sentenced to a fine of $25,000. A number of other bribery cases in Canada have also dealt with the corruption of domestic officials, but these have proceeded under the provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code.
What is interesting about this case to those of us who practice in the area is that we have been expecting something of this nature for some time as Canada has been under significant pressure from the OECD to meet its international anti-corruption enforcement obligations. In response to this pressure, the RCMP has established a special unit solely dedicated to investigating international bribery. The unit, with divisions in Ottawa and Calgary, has been actively engaged in several investigations, however, this is the first charge they have laid. Further charges are anticipated as other investigations progress.
Another interesting point raised by this case is the extent to which the Canadian courts are willing to apply the CFPOA to the extraterritorial actions of Canadian citizens. While the Canadian government previously introduced a Bill to amend the CFPOA to clarify its application to Canadians acting outside Canada, this Bill was not passed into law. In the absence of this Bill, the Canadian test for jurisdiction, as determined by the case law, is different than that employed in the US. Historically, only cases with a “real and substantial” link to Canada will be considered as falling within the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts. Accordingly, the Canadian test requires that a portion of the illegal activity occur within Canada or a real connection to Canada. While we do not know to what extent the alleged corrupt activity occurred in Canada, this case appears to represent the first opportunity for the Canadian courts to clarify the reach of the CFPOA to Canadian citizens acting abroad.
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
A Canadian Corruption Scandal?
A coalition of NGOs recently requested that Blackfire Exploration, a privately owned Canadian exploration and mining company headquartered in Calgary (here), be investigated for potential violations of Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) based on alleged improper payments made to the Mayor of Chicomueselo in the State of Chiapas, Mexico.
For more on the NGOs claims, including its letter to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and documents the NGOs claim support its allegations, see here.
Among other things, the NGOs state in the letter that Blackfire "provided the mayor with [...] benefits including airline tickets for himself, his family and his associates. These payments and other benefits were apparently made in response to the Mayor’s demands for 'favours'". According to this report in The Calgary Herald, Blackfire "decided to stop the 'ridiculous propositions' after the mayor asked for Blackfire to set up a sexual affair with a Playboy model."
For more about the CFPOA, see here for a prior post.
For more on the NGOs claims, including its letter to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and documents the NGOs claim support its allegations, see here.
Among other things, the NGOs state in the letter that Blackfire "provided the mayor with [...] benefits including airline tickets for himself, his family and his associates. These payments and other benefits were apparently made in response to the Mayor’s demands for 'favours'". According to this report in The Calgary Herald, Blackfire "decided to stop the 'ridiculous propositions' after the mayor asked for Blackfire to set up a sexual affair with a Playboy model."
For more about the CFPOA, see here for a prior post.
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
North of the Border
We point the compass north in what has become "comparative law week" here at the blog and take a look at Canada's "FCPA-like" domestic statute - the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act ("CFPOA").
Saddle up, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police "have established a special unit dedicated to investigating international bribery and enforcing the CFPOA" according to a Canadian law firm which recently released a bulletin titled "Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act: What You Need to Know and Why" (see here).
The bulletin is an informative read and "provides an introduction to the CFPOA, contrasts it with the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, and provides a brief update on recent developments in Canada."
According to the bulletin, an amendment to CFPOA was recently introduced to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction much like 78dd-1(g) and 78dd-2(i) provide for U.S. issuers and domestic concerns.
The authors note that "[w]hile the CFPOA has been in force for a decade, it is only recently that it has been the subject of minimal enforcement efforts by Canadian authorities." However, the authors predict, "this is likely to change in the future."
Saddle up, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police "have established a special unit dedicated to investigating international bribery and enforcing the CFPOA" according to a Canadian law firm which recently released a bulletin titled "Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act: What You Need to Know and Why" (see here).
The bulletin is an informative read and "provides an introduction to the CFPOA, contrasts it with the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, and provides a brief update on recent developments in Canada."
According to the bulletin, an amendment to CFPOA was recently introduced to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction much like 78dd-1(g) and 78dd-2(i) provide for U.S. issuers and domestic concerns.
The authors note that "[w]hile the CFPOA has been in force for a decade, it is only recently that it has been the subject of minimal enforcement efforts by Canadian authorities." However, the authors predict, "this is likely to change in the future."
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