Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) today chaired a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security titled "Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." (See here for the video).
This post provides a chronological overview of the hearing as well as observations.
Compared to the Senate's FCPA hearing in November 2010 (see here for the prior post) today's hearing (approximately two hours) was much more contentious. For instance, during the hearing Chairman Sensenbrenner noted that FCPA enforcement has become a "considerable windfall for the federal government" and he concluded the hearing by telling Greg Andres (DOJ) that it "would behoove the DOJ to realize that the statute needs updating" and that those on the Committee will be drafting a reform bill.
The hearing focused on a wide range of issues and in many ways was similar to FCPA reform hearings in the 1980's in that a common theme explored during the hearing was whether the current state of FCPA enforcement harms U.S. business.
There is clearly a push to introduce FCPA reform legislation and members of both parties appeared receptive (to at least certain) FCPA reform proposals most notably clarifying the FCPA's definition of "foreign official" / "instrumentality" and exploring an FCPA compliance defense. In fact, John Conyers (D-MI), who appeared most supportive of the current state of FCPA enforcement, stated he would support such reform proposals. The DOJ supports neither of these proposals.
Other issues explored in the hearing included prosecutorial discretion and DOJ declination decisions - including a request that the DOJ provide further information as to its declination decisions.
What happens next is a good question.
It seems like an FCPA reform bill will soon be introduced and hearings as to the specifics of such a bill may occur. Whether such a bill can get out of committee for full consideration by the House, and whether similar bills will be introduced in the Senate, is the open question. Politically, any FCPA reform efforts are likely, because of the topic at issue, to attract substantial opposition - including opposition that is less than informed as to the actual issues.
It bears noting that the last time Congress enacted significant FCPA amendments, the process took eight years and the statute was amended, not through a stand-alone bill, but through Title V, Subtitle A, Part I of the Omnibus Trade and Competiveness Act of 1988.
Opening Statement of Chairman Sensenbrenner
Sensenbrenner began by noting that when Congress passed the FCPA in 1977 the "world was a different place." In response to slush funds and secret payments to foreign governments that adversely affected U.S. foreign policy, Congress passed the FCPA and the law "sent a strong signal." (For an overview of the facts and circumstances motivating Congress to pass the FCPA - see here).
Sensenebrenner next observed that thirty-four years later, the world has turned upside down, China is a power, the nature of overseas business has changed, and many countries have some state-control over business.
Sensenbrenner noted that there has been a dramatic increase in FCPA prosecution and that last year approximately 1/2 of all DOJ criminal penalties were in FCPA cases (see here for the DOJ release) - a dynamic he called a "considerable windfall for the federal government."
In touching upon themes similar to when Congress held substantive FCPA hearings in the mid-1980's, Sensenbrenner placed the increase in FCPA enforcement in the context of the current economic downturn. Indeed a theme throughout the hearing was that the current state of FCPA enforcement may be harming U.S. business interests.
Sensenbrenner stated that "FCPA prosecutions should be effective and fair," but also "predictable" so that the "rules of the road are clear" so that "business can start moving again."
In closing his opening statement, Sensenbrenner stated that the Committee was well-suited to examine the impact of the FCPA and to ask hard questions - such as whether the FCPA was succeeding in its mission or hurting job creation.
Opening Statement of Ranking Member Scott
Robert Scott (D-VA) next made an opening statement. Scott summarized the reform proposals including providing greater clarity to the "foreign official" definition. As a potential compliance affirmative defense, Scott observed that companies are spending substantial sums - millions of dollars in some cases - on FCPA compliance - a result he indicated may often result in "overcompliance" because companies would rather be "safe than sorry." Scott stated that "punishing those companies and individuals who are operating in good faith runs counter to the basic tenets of fairness and justice." He also indicated that successor liability "runs counter" to a system of justice that should only punish the guilty party.
In closing, Scott said that effective enforcement of the FCPA is "crucial" and he applauded aggressive enforcement of the law. At the same time, Scott noted the necessity of periodically reviewing laws to make sure "they remain fair and just."
Opening Statement of John Conyers
John Conyers (D-MI) also made an opening statement. After a few sentences about unemployment figures and the Obama administration, Conyers asked the following question: will somebody explain to me how 140 cases in 10 years is "overly aggressive prosecution."
Conyers did indicate in his opening statement that he does support certain FCPA reform proposals. As to clarification of "foreign official," Conyers said he can "support this one" because it can create a problem when those subject to the FCPA do not have a clear understanding of who a "foreign official" is. Conyers also said that he can support the addition of a compliance defenses so that companies can fight imposition of criminal liability if individual employees and agents circumvent compliance measures. Conyers did not support other FCPA reform proposals - such as limiting successor liability, limiting parent company liability for acts of foreign subsidiaries, and adding a wilful mens rea requirement for corporations.
Statement by Greg Andres
Greg Andres (Deputy Assistant Attorney General) next delivered an opening statement. His prepared statement can be found here.
Among other things, Andres noted that DOJ's FCPA prosecutions involve "systemic long-standing bribery schemes" not the payment of single bribe payments of nominal sums.
Andres specifically cited the Daimler AG and Siemens FCPA prosecutions to support this point. However, the irony is that neither of these FCPA enforcement actions involved FCPA anti-bribery charges against the parent company or any related individual prosecutions.
As to a potential FCPA compliance defense, Andres stated that the DOJ already considers a company's pre-existing compliance policies and procedures pursuant to the Federal Principles of Prosecution of Business Organizations (see here).
As to providing guidance, Andres noted that the DOJ's goal "is not simply to prosecute FCPA cases" and that senior DOJ officials often speak publicly on the FCPA and highlight relevant considerations and practices companies should adopt. Andres also discussed the DOJ's FCPA Opinion Procedure program (see here for more).
In closing, Andres stated that DOJ is proud of its enforcement record and that it looks forward to working with Congress.
Statement by Michael Mukasey
Former Attorney General and current Debevoise & Plimpton partner Michael Mukasey next delivered an opening statement on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See here for his prepared statement.
Mukasey began by noting that no one favors bribery and that while the FCPA indeed does have merit, "more than 30 years of experience" with the law demonstrates that it can be improved.
His testimony focused on two of the Chamber's FCPA reform proposals: clarifying the definition of "foreign official" and "instrumentality" and amending the FCPA to include a compliance defense.
As to the later, Mukasey observed that statutory guidance can be found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act which provides for something akin to a compliance defense. Mukasey stated that "dozens, if not hundreds of cases are resolved under this compliance defense" and that the defense reduces discrimination by encouraging employers to have robust compliance systems.
As to "foreign official," Mukasey referenced the recent judicial opinions on this issue (see here and here for the prior posts), yet noted that the judges did very little to clarify the limits of the "foreign official" issue other than say that whether an employee of an alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprise could constitute a "foreign official" varied depending on the circumstances. Mukasey stated that leaving this issue in the hands of a jury in a criminal trial makes it "impossible" for companies to determine in advance who is a "foreign official" thereby increasing uncertainty and barriers to U.S. business. According to Mukasey, "majority ownership is the most plausible threshold" for whether a state-owned or state-controlled enterprise constitutes a foreign government "instrumentality."
Statement by George Terwilliger
George Terwilliger (White & Case) next delivered an opening statement. See here for his prepared statement.
Terwilliger opened by stating that he favors "fair enforcement of sensible corruption statutes" and that "leveling the playing field" is essential. He noted that the DOJ and SEC are "realizing their enforcement goal of driving companies into far greater compliance," but also noted the less desirable effects of stepped-up enforcement. He spoke of the "hidden effect" of foregone business opportunities because of FCPA enforcement concerns and noted that the current state of enforcement may hurt job creation.
According to Terwilliger, the "hidden costs" of FCPA enforcement are the result of uncertainty and that companies sometimes forego deals, take a pass on certain projects and withdraw from other projects - not because such companies are necessarily risk averse - but because of the risk-reward ratio in this current FCPA enforcement environment.
Terwilliger proposed a further FCPA reform proposal related to successor liability and that is a statutory safe harbor provision during which an acquiring company could be shielded from FCPA liability for a defined time period post-closing. During this post-closing period, the acquiring company would undertake a thorough review of the target's business operations and have the opportunity to self-disclose any FCPA issues to the enforcement authorities.
Statement by Shana-Tara Regon
Shana-Tara Regon (Director, White Collar Crime Policy, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers) next testified. See here for her prepared statement.
She observed that given the general lack of judicial scrutiny over FCPA enforcement, the FCPA says whatever essentially the DOJ says it means and that the FCPA has, in many instances, become a strict liability statute "in ways that those who created the FCPA could never have envisoned."
Regon stated that NACDL does not advocate bribery and similarly stated that advocating for reform is not akin to advocating for bribery. Her testimony was focused on two reform proposals - clarifying the definition of "foreign official" and strengthening the mens rea requirement for corporate offenses. She stated that the FCPA is "emblematic of the general problem of overcriminalization" and that FCPA enforcement has several "unintended consequences" including over-compliance.
During the hearing, Global Financial Integrity (see here for yesterday's post) tweeted as follos: " This group of witnesses is such a sham. All three non-DOJ witnesses spewing disingenuous pro-#bribery #AmChamb talking points #FCPAHearing." (See here).
Chairman Sensenbrenner reserved his questions for the end and next called on various Representatives present.
Q&A Session
Tom Marino (R-PA) asked Andres (DOJ) about the DOJ's top enforcement obstacle.
Andres stated that because FCPA violations focus on conduct abroad, the DOJ often needs to rely on MLAT requests which can take longer. He noted that the DOJ is in favor of extending the FCPA's statute of limitations given that it generally takes a long time to investigate FCPA cases. Andres further stated that while there is much discussion as to the increase in FCPA enforcement, this discussion often "fails to recognize the size and magnitude of the problem."
Robert Scott (D-VA) next asked Mukasey whether the compliance defense proposed was a total defense or an affirmative defense. Mukasey stated that the proposal was for an affirmative defense and that where there is a proved violation of the FCPA, the question should then become whether the company had a compliance mechanism in place reasonable designed to detect and prevent the conduct. Mukasey noted that this issue may be an "uphill climb" for a company, but that the FCPA ought to at least allow a company to pursue such a defense.
Scott next asked Mukasey about the mens rea reform proposal for corporate liability. Mukasey seemed to be advocating a corporate liability standard similar to the (soon to be old) U.K. standard and the current Canada law standard when he stated that a company should only be held liable if someone in a "policy making position" was involved in or condoned the improper activity.
Scott next asked Andres (DOJ) the general question of whether any de minimis cases have ever been brought by the DOJ. Andres stated "no," the DOJ has never prosecuted "cup of coffee, lunch, taxi-ride type of cases" and he further stated that because of the FCPA's corrupt intent element and the affirmative defense for reasonable and bona fide business expenditures, it is an open question as to whether such facts even violate the statute.
Even so, Andres stated that the DOJ is opposed to creating a de minimis exception to the FCPA because small, recurring payments can amount to significant bribery. He stated that the amount of the bribe is not the relevant consideration, rather the intent of the bribe is and that all bribery is inappropriate. Andres said that all the talk of taxi-ride payments and meals being in violation of the FCPA "is not reflected in our enforcement actions."
Taxi-cabs were a recurring issue throughout the hearing. Mukasey stated, in response to a question, that the taxi-cab example is real and that when "nervous counsel" found out that a company may have paid a "foreign official's" taxi-cab fare, the company disclosed the conduct to the DOJ and the DOJ requested that the company investigate its entire relationship with the "foreign official." Mukasey stated that this investigation cost the company approximately $200,000, no violation was found, and that the company could have used this money for something more beneficial than conducting in investigation as to these facts.
Louie Gohmert (R-TX) next stated that those subject to the FCPA "ought to have a clear enough line" so that people don't have to think "is it or isn't it a bribe" to make this payment. Gohmert said that Congress can define bribery so that companies "can have a clear line" so that a company does not have to spend $200,000 to figure out whehther paying for a cab is an FCPA violation. Gohmert then made an interesting observing that the FCPA allows a "young prosecutor" or an "FBI agent seeking to make a name for himself" the opportunity to pursue all sorts of enforcement actions and that enforcement then ends up being more aggressive than it should be.
Gohmert next asked Andres (DOJ) as follows: why should a company be prosecuted if a company has a compliance program set up according to the standards set forth in Chapter 8 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (see here). Gohmert stated that if a company has done everything it can do, it seems like a strict liability standard if the company is prosecuted because of the act of an employee acting contrary to the company's policy. Andres stated that the DOJ "does not prosecute companies based on the acts of a single, rogue employee."
Rather, Andres stated that the DOJ looks at how pervasive was the conduct or whether the conduct involved a high-ranking employee. Andres specifically stated that the DOJ opposes consideration of an FCPA compliance defense. He stated that DOJ already seriously considers compliance programs in its charging decisions, along with other factors such as cooperation and voluntary disclosure.
Andres called a potential compliance defense "novel" and one that is not "well-defined." He said that such a defense could lead to "paper compliance." He also referenced the U.K. Bribery Act (which does contain such a compliance defense) yet stated that this defense is not yet in effect and thus there is no precedent to analyze to see whether such a defense is effective.
Given that the DOJ frequently takes FCPA enforcement position that are "novel," are not "well-defined," and are not supported by precedent, Andres response on this issue was less than convincing.
In closing, Andres stated that an FCPA compliance defense could "create a loophole" and allow for some bribery to occur. He called such a potential defense "novel and risky" and said that the "time is not right to consider it."
The floor next returned to John Conyers (D-MI). He stated that ignorance of the law is no excuse and wondered why in the case of bribery does there need to be a de minimis rule. He stated that "corporations have more lawyers than anybody else" and "why do they need to know" how low the bribery threshold should be. He said that "they don't deserve to know that."
Conyers also conducted the most contentious Q&A exchange of the hearing with Regon. Conyers asked - "give me some examples of overcriminalization of the FCPA." He repeatedly interrupted Regon and asked "just give me some examples" "give me an instance of where one case was ever brought by the DOJ that would constitute overcriminalization." Conyers stated, "only 140 cases have been brought in 10 years -that averages 14 cases a year - is that overcriminalization to you?" Regon stated that overcriminlization occurs when a statute provides no reasonable limits and that she is concerned more about prosecutions that may occur in the future more so than prosecutions that have already occured.
Ted Poe (R-TX) next launched into a criticism of China. He said that "China, through its government, follows a systematic philosophy of corruption" and that China will "do anything in the world to get their way" including stealing from the U.S. and paying bribes. He suggested that "any means necessary" is the Chinese way to get business. "We on the other hand," Poe stated, "believe in the rule of law." Poe stated that the "Chinese are effective in their philosophy" and he observed that he just returned from Iraq where he learned that Chinese companies are going to rebuild Iraqi's oil system and that he suspected money changed hands in order to get this business.
Poe, a former prosecutor, next said that it "disturbs" him when we give DOJ prosecutors too much discretion. Poe said that he was not advocating loosening the standards, but he did prefer "absolute certainty" about what is a violation of the FCPA as "opposed to too much discretion" by the DOJ on what something means and whether it is a bribe.
Judy Chu (D-CA) next asked Andres a series of questions allowing him to further articulate how the DOJ takes into consideration a company's compliance program and how compliance expectations are stated in public documents such as Chapter 8 of the Sentencing Guidlines and the OECD Guidelines. (See here). Andres further stated that there are situations where the DOJ does not pursue an enforcement action because of a variety of factors, including a company's pre-existing compliance program, even if these instances are not made public because the DOJ does not issue a press release. Asked by Chu for reasons why FCPA enforcement has expanded, Andres stated that the "problem is as big as it has ever been" and that "at least one reason" for the increase in enforcement is the result of SOX whereby companies have an obligation to test its internal controls - tests that often uncover FCPA issues that are then often disclosed to the DOJ.
Hank Johnson (D-GA) next asked Regon about prosecutorial discretion and whether it is fair to say that the "looser the law the more prosecutorial discretion and the narrower the law the less prosecutorial discretion." Regon stated that if the DOJ means what it says (i.e. that it targets only explicit instances of bribery and that it does not prosecute based on the actions of rogue employees), then the DOJ should not mind less prosecutorial discretion. Johnson next launched into an unusual statement about illegal crime (blue-collar crime) and legal crime (white collar crime in the sense that prosecutions of white collar crime tend to be less vigorous). Johnson said he was bothered by the fact there has not been much prosecutorial activity as to white collar crime, he said this "seems kind of fishy" and that some "folks are getting off the hook for legal crime."
Sandra Adams (R-FL) next asked Andres whether the DOJ has a definition of "foreign official" or "instrumentality." Andres said, in addition to the statute, there are now several decisions by district courts that further "amplified" the definition of foreign official. Andres stated that DOJ does not support a change to the definition of "foreign official" or "instrumentality."
Adams next Andres several pointed questions about DOJ declination decisions and whether such decisions are published or transparent. Andres stated that this is a difficult area for the government because the DOJ does not want to "penalize a company or individual investigated by not prosecuted."
I've argued before (see here for the prior post) that the DOJ should publish its declination decisions in a manner similar to its FCPA Opinion Procedure decisions. Given that most declination decisions would seem to follow disclosure by a company of FCPA scrutiny (in its SEC filings), Andres's rationale for not making declination decisions public is less than convincing.
Adams asked - in the last year, how many instances of FCPA conduct have been disclosed to the DOJ where no enforcement action resulted. Andres did not offer any specific number, but retreated to the FCPA Opinion Procedure and noted that if a company ever has a question about the FCPA, it has the ability to ask the DOJ and the DOJ is obligated to give an opinion.
Adams next asked Andres whether the DOJ is defining what the law means. Andres said that "everyone of these cases is negotiated with experienced defense counsel" and that counsel has "ample opportunity" to address any issues concerning the DOJ's enforcement.
Mukasey then answered that while resolved FCPA enforcement actions make for interesting case studies, such resolutions are not binding in other cases.
Before her time expired, Adams requested that the DOJ provide the Committee with more detail as to its declination decisions, including the DOJ's reasons and rationale for why enforcement actions did not result. Chairman Sensenbrenner then followed up and said DOJ's responses will be made part of hearing record.
Shelia Jackson Lee (D-TX) next asked Andres how many attorneys and staff are assigned to FCPA enforcement. He stated that the DOJ's FCPA unit, includes a core unit in D.C. of 15 to 20 enforcement attorneys and that assistance in trials is given by local prosecutors. Jackson Lee asked "is this an excessive amount" and Andres said "certaintly not in light of the size and magnitude of the bribery problem ... it is significant." Jackson Lee next received a tutorial from Andres as to the FCPA's jurisdiction over foreign companies.
Ben Quayle (R-AZ) next asked a question very much based on current events and that is the scrutiny of the Macau gaming industry. [Las Vegas Sands recently disclosed that it received subpoenas concerning its conduct in Macau]. Andres stated that it was not appropriate for him to comment on any ongoing investigations.
Quayle next asked Andres whethr General Motors would be considered a U.S. government "instrumentality." Andres said that in addressing this issue, the DOJ considers government ownership or investment as only one factor. Other factors include characterization of the entity under foreign law, the purpose of the entity, and that under these factors General Motors would likely not qualify as a U.S. government "instrumentality." Quayle next asked whether it is relevant if the government has communications with the company's board and the government has the ability to control or influence the entity (a presumed reference to GM's relationship with the U.S. government). Andres again stated that control and ownership is but one factor and he specifically referenced the recent Lindsey prosecution where the Mexican entity at issue was specifically addressed in the country's constitution.
Quayle next asked Terwilliger whether he has any knowledge of companies conceding markets to foreign competitors because of the FCPA. Terwilliger stated that "conceding markets" may be a bit strong, but that American companies have become much more circumspect in dealing with foreign business opportunities because of FCPA enforcement. In particular, Terwilliger said that companies may bypass "smaller opportunities" (that might become bigger opportunities) because of the FCPA in that the cost-benefit analysis and FCPA compliance are too much to worry about.
Chairman Sensenbrenner was the last person to ask questions and he began his time by stating as follows. There is "no question in my mind that we have to bring this law up to date." "No one is in favor of bribery, but there has to be more certainty." Sensenbrenner said he was "a bit befuddled" by Conyer's statement that corporations don't deserve to know what bribery is and he stated that "everyone has a right to know what is illegal."
Sensenbrenner's only question (a long one at that as he basically summarized the Chamber's FCPA reform proposals) was directed to Regon and Andres. Regon focused mostly on the corporate mens rea issue and stated that her organization is supportive of "anything Congress does" to clarify the FCPA. Tara Regon failed to see the rationale for not providing greater clarity as to the FCPA and noted that "we have many bribery statutes on the books, and some of those are written tightly and work well."
Sensenbrenner then asked Andres - which of Regon's suggestions do you agree with and Andres said "I don't agree with any of them." For instance, Andres said with the definition of "foreign official" that "one thing you need to take into consideration is that the statute covers the whole world" and that what might constitute a "foreign official" in China may be different than what constitutes a "foreign official" in Brazil or France.
Sensenbrenner grasped onto this issue and noted that this part of the uncertainty that people are complaining about.
Andres followed with two points. First, that if there is concern, companies subject to the FCPA can ask for a DOJ opinion. This only seemed to enrange Sensenbrenner further as he stated "come on, China is a communist country - they are not going to tell you what the government involvement is" in a company "they don't have the type of disclosure we have."
Andres second point was that the FCPA makes illegal paying a bribe and that if companies aren't paying bribes they have nothing to fear.
Sensenbrenner then seemed to pose a question at the end of the hearing as to whether the DOJ would support an FCPA amendment that simply makee bribery (all bribery) illegal (perhaps akin to the UK Bribery Act). Sensenbrenner did not pause for Andres to respond and he (Sensenbrenner) concluded the hearing by saying "it would behoove the DOJ to realize that the statute needs updating." Andres said that the DOJ is "more than willing to work with Congress" to which Sensenbrenner said "see you later we will be drafting a bill."
Sensenbrenner then commented that if Andres were the general counsel of a corporation advising the CEO and everyone else, he would likely be advising the company in the "most narrow way" and "exercising the greatest amount of caution." "As a result," Sensenbrenner stated, legitimate business activity is not pursued and U.S. companies are put in a significant disadvantage compared to foreign companies.
Sensenbrenner then told Andres - "get the message sir and tell that to the AG."
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
How Do Your Goods Get Out Of China?
A few years ago, I would have read this recent New York Times article "Weak Link in an Export Chain" and not thought much of it.
But then in November 2010 there was a $236 million joint DOJ/SEC enforcement action involving numerous companies (one I have called CustomsGate). See here for a prior post of all the enforcement actions. The enforcement actions were mostly about use of freight forwarding and logistics services, expediting delivery of goods and equipment into a country, local processing fees, express courier services, and the like.
The New York Times article is about the trucking industry in China that takes goods from the factory floor to China's seaports. The article depicts a highly disorganized, inefficient ... and yes corrupt ... industry. According to the article, logistics firms usually hire small Chinese trucking companies and these companies routinely "pay bribes to ward off highway inspectors" and to "avoid heavy fines and transportation restrictions."
The article states as follows. "Corruption is also a major problem. Chinese truck drivers say highway and port inspectors routinely demand payoffs or bribes."
What does this have to do with "obtain or retain business?"
Point taken, yet this is the same question raised in connection with the CustomsGate enforcement actions as well. See here.
So the question remains - how do your goods get out China?
But then in November 2010 there was a $236 million joint DOJ/SEC enforcement action involving numerous companies (one I have called CustomsGate). See here for a prior post of all the enforcement actions. The enforcement actions were mostly about use of freight forwarding and logistics services, expediting delivery of goods and equipment into a country, local processing fees, express courier services, and the like.
The New York Times article is about the trucking industry in China that takes goods from the factory floor to China's seaports. The article depicts a highly disorganized, inefficient ... and yes corrupt ... industry. According to the article, logistics firms usually hire small Chinese trucking companies and these companies routinely "pay bribes to ward off highway inspectors" and to "avoid heavy fines and transportation restrictions."
The article states as follows. "Corruption is also a major problem. Chinese truck drivers say highway and port inspectors routinely demand payoffs or bribes."
What does this have to do with "obtain or retain business?"
Point taken, yet this is the same question raised in connection with the CustomsGate enforcement actions as well. See here.
So the question remains - how do your goods get out China?
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Rockwell Automation Resolves SEC Action
[Note - because of my involvement in the below Rockwell matter while in private practice, this post is devoid of my customary commentary and analysis as to the enforcement action]
Yesterday, the SEC announced (here) a cease and desist proceeding and imposition of a cease and desist order as to Rockwell Automation, Inc.
As stated in the SEC's order, the matter involved "violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") by Rockwell, through one of its former subsidiaries in China, Rockwell Automation Power Systems (Shanghai) Ltd. ("RAPS-China"), which was divested by Rockwell in January, 2007."
In summary fashion, the SEC found as follows.
"From 2003 to 2006, certain employees of RAPS-China paid approximately $615,000 to Design Institutes, which were typically state-owned enterprises that provided design engineering and technical integration services that can influence contract awards by end-user state-owned customers. The payments were made through third-party intermediaries at the request of Design Institute employees and at the direction of RAPS-China’s Marketing and Sales Director. RAPS-China’s Marketing and Sales Director intended that these funds be paid directly to the Design Institute employees, with the expectation that they would influence the ultimate state-owned customers to purchase RAPS products. While the Design Institutes did provide some bona fide engineering and other services in connection with RAPS-China’s end-user contracts, RAPS-China could not substantiate the specific services rendered or the value of those services. Also during the same period, employees of RAPS-China paid approximately $450,000 to fund sightseeing and other non-business trips for employees of Design Institutes and other state-owned companies."
"Rockwell realized approximately $1.7 million in net profits on sales contracts with end-user Chinese government-owned companies that were associated with payments to the Design Institutes."
"Rockwell failed to accurately record the payments in its books and records, and failed to implement or maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to prevent and detect the payments."
Under the heading, "Discovery, Self-Reporting and Remediation" the SEC order states as follows.
"Rockwell discovered the DI Payments and the third-party payment mechanism in 2006 through its normal financial review process. This process was part of Rockwell’s global corporate compliance/internal controls program, which had targeted China for enhanced FCPA training and scrutiny starting in 2004. Upon discovery of the issue, Rockwell hired counsel and investigated the DI Payments with the oversight of its Board of Directors. It voluntarily self-reported the DI Payments to the Commission and voluntarily provided the Commission Staff with all relevant facts found in the investigation, and otherwise cooperated with the Commission. As a result of the discovery of this matter, Rockwell undertook numerous remedial measures, including employee termination and disciplinary actions, enhancements to its internal controls and compliance program and conducted a broad, global review of its other operations."
The SEC order further states as follows.
"In connection with the payments described above, Rockwell failed to make and keep accurate books, records and accounts as required by Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act."
"Further, as evidenced by the DI Payments (as described above) and leisure travel payments, Rockwell failed to devise or maintain sufficient internal controls as required by Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act."
As noted in the SEC order, Rockwell, without admitting or denying the SEC's findings, agreed to "pay disgorgement of $1,771,000, prejudgment interest of $590,091and a civil money penalty of $400,000."
The SEC order concludes by noting that "the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty in excess of $400,000 based upon [Rockwell's] cooperation" in the investigation.
See here for Rockwell's press release.
David Simon (Foley & Lardner - here) and Greg Bruch (Willkie Farr & Gallagher - here) represented Rockwell.
*****
The Rockwell matter represents the second time in the past month (approximately) that the SEC has resolved an FCPA inquiry via the administrative cease and desist route. See here for the prior post regarding Ball Corporation.
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Other FCPA enforcement actions focused on alleged improper travel and entertainment benefits to employees of Chinese state-owned enterprises include: Lucent Technologies (see here) and UTStarcom Inc. (see here).
*****
Other FCPA enforcement actions focused (in whole or in part) on allegedly improper payments to employees of so-called Chinese "Design Institutes" include: ITT Corp. (see here); and Avery Dennison (see here).
Yesterday, the SEC announced (here) a cease and desist proceeding and imposition of a cease and desist order as to Rockwell Automation, Inc.
As stated in the SEC's order, the matter involved "violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") by Rockwell, through one of its former subsidiaries in China, Rockwell Automation Power Systems (Shanghai) Ltd. ("RAPS-China"), which was divested by Rockwell in January, 2007."
In summary fashion, the SEC found as follows.
"From 2003 to 2006, certain employees of RAPS-China paid approximately $615,000 to Design Institutes, which were typically state-owned enterprises that provided design engineering and technical integration services that can influence contract awards by end-user state-owned customers. The payments were made through third-party intermediaries at the request of Design Institute employees and at the direction of RAPS-China’s Marketing and Sales Director. RAPS-China’s Marketing and Sales Director intended that these funds be paid directly to the Design Institute employees, with the expectation that they would influence the ultimate state-owned customers to purchase RAPS products. While the Design Institutes did provide some bona fide engineering and other services in connection with RAPS-China’s end-user contracts, RAPS-China could not substantiate the specific services rendered or the value of those services. Also during the same period, employees of RAPS-China paid approximately $450,000 to fund sightseeing and other non-business trips for employees of Design Institutes and other state-owned companies."
"Rockwell realized approximately $1.7 million in net profits on sales contracts with end-user Chinese government-owned companies that were associated with payments to the Design Institutes."
"Rockwell failed to accurately record the payments in its books and records, and failed to implement or maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to prevent and detect the payments."
Under the heading, "Discovery, Self-Reporting and Remediation" the SEC order states as follows.
"Rockwell discovered the DI Payments and the third-party payment mechanism in 2006 through its normal financial review process. This process was part of Rockwell’s global corporate compliance/internal controls program, which had targeted China for enhanced FCPA training and scrutiny starting in 2004. Upon discovery of the issue, Rockwell hired counsel and investigated the DI Payments with the oversight of its Board of Directors. It voluntarily self-reported the DI Payments to the Commission and voluntarily provided the Commission Staff with all relevant facts found in the investigation, and otherwise cooperated with the Commission. As a result of the discovery of this matter, Rockwell undertook numerous remedial measures, including employee termination and disciplinary actions, enhancements to its internal controls and compliance program and conducted a broad, global review of its other operations."
The SEC order further states as follows.
"In connection with the payments described above, Rockwell failed to make and keep accurate books, records and accounts as required by Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act."
"Further, as evidenced by the DI Payments (as described above) and leisure travel payments, Rockwell failed to devise or maintain sufficient internal controls as required by Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act."
As noted in the SEC order, Rockwell, without admitting or denying the SEC's findings, agreed to "pay disgorgement of $1,771,000, prejudgment interest of $590,091and a civil money penalty of $400,000."
The SEC order concludes by noting that "the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty in excess of $400,000 based upon [Rockwell's] cooperation" in the investigation.
See here for Rockwell's press release.
David Simon (Foley & Lardner - here) and Greg Bruch (Willkie Farr & Gallagher - here) represented Rockwell.
*****
The Rockwell matter represents the second time in the past month (approximately) that the SEC has resolved an FCPA inquiry via the administrative cease and desist route. See here for the prior post regarding Ball Corporation.
*****
Other FCPA enforcement actions focused on alleged improper travel and entertainment benefits to employees of Chinese state-owned enterprises include: Lucent Technologies (see here) and UTStarcom Inc. (see here).
*****
Other FCPA enforcement actions focused (in whole or in part) on allegedly improper payments to employees of so-called Chinese "Design Institutes" include: ITT Corp. (see here); and Avery Dennison (see here).
Thursday, March 3, 2011
Significant China Law Development
The June 2010 OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report (here) notes that China's "Ministry of Supervision informed the [OECD] Secretariat that China had begun considering how it would establish an offence of bribing a foreign public official, but was not yet at the stage of drafting legislation."
As this recent Covington & Burling alert highlights: "on February 25, 2011, the legislature of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), the National People’s Congress, passed a slate of 49 amendments to the Criminal Law, one of which is a provision that criminalizes paying bribes to non-PRC government officials and to officials of international public organizations (“the Amendment”)." The alert explain that "this Amendment represents the first instance in which PRC law has prohibited PRC nationals and PRC companies from paying bribes to non-PRC government officials."
Eric Carlson (here), an attorney based in Covington's Beijing office who specializes in anti-corruption compliance with a particular focus on China and other regions of Asia and one of the authors of the alert, answered the following questions.
Is this China’s version of the FCPA?
At one level, the Amendment’s aim appears to be similar to the FCPA’s -- prevent citizens and companies based in the country from bribing government officials outside the country. This is China’s first foray into this area, however, and the provisions are not as detailed or developed as in certain other countries’ anti-bribery laws. The PRC Amendment is a rather high-level law, whereas the text of the FCPA includes considerably more detail, even if the interpretation of those details is being actively debated and litigated. The absence of clear definitions, exceptions, and affirmative defenses also would appear to require PRC prosecutors to exercise somewhat more discretion in interpreting and enforcing the law.
Is China really going to enforce this law against its own companies operating outside of China?
Unclear. China’s enforcement of its domestic bribery laws historically has been somewhat uneven and focused mainly on the demand side (i.e., prosecuting officials who take bribes). Recently, however, the government has shown an increasing willingness to target bribe-payers as well, as corruption remains a primary concern of the general population and thus a concern for the government and ruling Communist Party, which is at its core focused on social stability. It remains to be seen whether the Amendment will actually be enforced in a way that deters bribe-paying by PRC companies and citizens. (To be fair, a goodly number of countries have strict laws criminalizing bribery of foreign officials outside their countries but have done little to enforce these laws.)
How will this new law affect multinationals operating in China?
The impact will obviously depend on how a multinational structures its operations in China. The Amendment (like the underlying Criminal Law) applies to all PRC citizens, wherever located, all natural persons of any nationality within China, and all companies, enterprises, and institutions organized under PRC law, which generally includes, in addition to PRC domestic companies, Sino-foreign joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs), and representative offices. Under the Amendment, a joint venture between a PRC company and a non-PRC company organized under PRC law, or a WFOE, could be prosecuted for paying bribes to non-PRC government officials. (Paying bribes to Chinese government officials is of course already illegal under pre-existing law.)
For most multinationals whose China operations don’t do any business outside of China, the larger risk may be China’s existing criminal and commercial bribery laws. (Many multinationals operating in China are not aware of local commercial bribery laws, which prohibit both public- and private-sector bribery.)
*****
As suggested above, having a law on the books and enforcing a law can sometimes be two different things. However, based on numerous media reports (see here for instance) there would seem to be plenty of enforcement opportunities when China's law comes into force.
As this recent Covington & Burling alert highlights: "on February 25, 2011, the legislature of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), the National People’s Congress, passed a slate of 49 amendments to the Criminal Law, one of which is a provision that criminalizes paying bribes to non-PRC government officials and to officials of international public organizations (“the Amendment”)." The alert explain that "this Amendment represents the first instance in which PRC law has prohibited PRC nationals and PRC companies from paying bribes to non-PRC government officials."
Eric Carlson (here), an attorney based in Covington's Beijing office who specializes in anti-corruption compliance with a particular focus on China and other regions of Asia and one of the authors of the alert, answered the following questions.
Is this China’s version of the FCPA?
At one level, the Amendment’s aim appears to be similar to the FCPA’s -- prevent citizens and companies based in the country from bribing government officials outside the country. This is China’s first foray into this area, however, and the provisions are not as detailed or developed as in certain other countries’ anti-bribery laws. The PRC Amendment is a rather high-level law, whereas the text of the FCPA includes considerably more detail, even if the interpretation of those details is being actively debated and litigated. The absence of clear definitions, exceptions, and affirmative defenses also would appear to require PRC prosecutors to exercise somewhat more discretion in interpreting and enforcing the law.
Is China really going to enforce this law against its own companies operating outside of China?
Unclear. China’s enforcement of its domestic bribery laws historically has been somewhat uneven and focused mainly on the demand side (i.e., prosecuting officials who take bribes). Recently, however, the government has shown an increasing willingness to target bribe-payers as well, as corruption remains a primary concern of the general population and thus a concern for the government and ruling Communist Party, which is at its core focused on social stability. It remains to be seen whether the Amendment will actually be enforced in a way that deters bribe-paying by PRC companies and citizens. (To be fair, a goodly number of countries have strict laws criminalizing bribery of foreign officials outside their countries but have done little to enforce these laws.)
How will this new law affect multinationals operating in China?
The impact will obviously depend on how a multinational structures its operations in China. The Amendment (like the underlying Criminal Law) applies to all PRC citizens, wherever located, all natural persons of any nationality within China, and all companies, enterprises, and institutions organized under PRC law, which generally includes, in addition to PRC domestic companies, Sino-foreign joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs), and representative offices. Under the Amendment, a joint venture between a PRC company and a non-PRC company organized under PRC law, or a WFOE, could be prosecuted for paying bribes to non-PRC government officials. (Paying bribes to Chinese government officials is of course already illegal under pre-existing law.)
For most multinationals whose China operations don’t do any business outside of China, the larger risk may be China’s existing criminal and commercial bribery laws. (Many multinationals operating in China are not aware of local commercial bribery laws, which prohibit both public- and private-sector bribery.)
*****
As suggested above, having a law on the books and enforcing a law can sometimes be two different things. However, based on numerous media reports (see here for instance) there would seem to be plenty of enforcement opportunities when China's law comes into force.
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
Maxwell Technologies is the First Corporate Enforcement Action of 2011
In early January, Maxwell Technologies Inc. ("Maxwell"), announced that the U.S. Department of Defense awarded the company a $1.7 million contract (here), "for the initial phase of a multi-phase program to develop a lighter, longer-lasting, energy source for field radios and other portable electronic equipment carried by military personnel."
On January 31st, Maxwell became the first company in 2011 to settle an FCPA enforcement action.
The Maxwell enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was approximately $14.4 million ($8 million criminal fine via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement; $6.4 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest via a SEC settled complaint).
Maxwell previously disclosed (see here) that "discussions with the SEC and DOJ have resulted in an estimate of potential settlement of up to $20.0 million – representing the combined first offer of settlement put forth by the SEC and DOJ." Presumably, the company's disclosure of the government's settlement offer did not sit well with the DOJ and on July 30, 2009, Maxwell issued this strange press release.
As set forth more fully below, the alleged recipients of the bribe payments at issue were all employees of alleged Chinese state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Also of note, the SEC's charges include disclosure violations not often seen in FCPA enforcement actions, based on allegation that Maxwell's bribe payments allowed the company to offset losses and fund product expansions that are now a source of revenue for the company.
DOJ
The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against Maxwell resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (here).
Criminal Information
The criminal information, a short eight pages, alleges that "from at least July 2002 through in or about May 2009, Maxwell and its subsidiaries paid approximately $2,789,131 to Agent 1 [a Chinese national, third-party agent responsible for Maxwell S.A.'s (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Maxwell) high voltage capacitor sales to Chinese customers] to be distributed to Chinese foreign officials, in return for securing contracts that profited Maxwell."
The Chinese foreign officials?
You guessed it, employees of alleged state-owned entities such as:
"Pinggao Group Co. Ltd. [formerly Pingdingshan High Voltage Switchgear Works) ... a state owned manufacturer of electric-utility infrastructure in Henan Province, China" (see here for the company's website)
"New Northeast Electric Shenyang HV Switchgear Co., Ltd. ... a state-owned manufacturer of electric-utility infrastructure in Liaoning Province, China" (see here for company information) and
"Xi-an XD High Voltage Apparatus Co., Ltd., ... a state-owned manufacturer of electric-utility infrastructure in Shaanxi Province, China" (see here for the company's website).
According to the information, "Maxwell and its subsidiaries accomplished [the bribe] payments by using Agent 1 to market and sell Maxwell's high voltage capacitors to Chinese consumers ... substantially all of which were Chinese state-owned entities." The information alleges that Agent 1 "requested quotes from Maxwell S.A. on behalf of prospective Chinese state-owned entities" and that "upon Agent 1's instruction, Maxwell S.A. added an extra 20 percent to the quoted amounts to arrive at a higher price for Maxwell S.A.'s high-voltage equipment." The information alleges that Agent 1 then distributed the extra amount "to officials at the Chinese state-owned entities" including employees of the above referenced companies.
Under the heading, "Knowledge Within Maxwell's U.S. Management," the information alleges that "Maxwell's management within the United States discovered, tactitly approved, concealed and caused to be concealed the bribery scheme." According to the information, following discovery of the payments by Maxwell senior management in the U.S. including by Executive A, Executive B, and Executive C (all U.S. citizens), under Executive E's (a Swiss citizen and Maxwell S.A's Vice President and General Manager) oversight and supervision, the payments at issue to Agent 1 actually increased from approximately $165,000 in 2002 to nearly $1.1 million in 2008.
According to the information, Maxwell's financial statements and reports described the bribe payments as "sales-commission expenses."
Based on the above allegations, the information charges Maxwell with FCPA anti-bribery violations and knowingly violating the FCPA's books and records provisions.
DPA
The DOJ's charges against Maxwell were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement.
Pursuant to the DPA, Maxwell admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was responsible for the acts of its officers, employees, subsidiaries, and agents as set forth above.
The term of the DPA is three years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement "based on the individual facts and circumstances" of the case and Maxwell.
Among the factors stated are the following.
(a) Maxwell voluntarily disclosed its FCPA violations to both the DOJ and the SEC;
(b) Maxwell cooperated with the Department's investigation of Maxwell and others;
(c) Maxwell undertook remedial measures, including the implementation of an enhanced compliance program, and agreed to undertake further remedial measures ...;
(d) Maxwell agreed to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of Maxwell and its employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, subsidiaries, and others relating to violations of the FCPA; and
(e) the impact on Maxwell, including collateral consequences, of a guilty plea or criminal conviction.
As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above described conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $10.5 million to $21 million. Pursuant to the DPA, Maxwell agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $8 million (25% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines).
Pursuant to the DPA, Maxwell agreed to self-report to the DOJ "periodically, at no less than 12-month intervals" during the term of the DPA "regarding remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies, and procedures" described in the DPA.
As is standard in FCPA DPAs, Maxwell agreed not to make any public statement "contradicting the acceptance of responsibility" by Maxwell as set forth in the DPA and Maxwell further agreed to only issue a press release in connection with the DPA if the DOJ does not object to the release.
As to debarment issues, paragraph 22 of the DPA states as follows:
"The Department agrees to bring to the attention of governmental and other debarment authorities the facts and circumstances relating to the nature of the conduct underlying this Agreement, including the nature and quality of Maxwell's cooperation and remediation. By agreeing to provide this information to debarment authorities, the Department is not agreeing to advocate on Maxwell's behalf, but rather is providing facts to be evaluated independently by the debarment authorities."
See here for the DOJ release.
SEC
The SEC's civil complaint (here) alleges, in summary, as follows.
"From 2002 through May 2009, Maxwell violated the anti-bribery, books and records and internal control provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") when it repeatedly paid bribes to Chinese officials in order to obtain and retain sales contracts for high voltage capacitors from several Chinese state-owned entities. Maxwell engaged in bribery to maintain its high-voltage capacitor business in China, which accounted for material revenue and profits during the relevant time period."
According to the complaint, "the illicit payments were made with the knowledge and tacit approval of certain former Maxwell officers and Maxwell failed to accurately record these payments on its books and records, and failed to implement or maintain a system of effective internal accounting controls to detect or prevent the payments."
The complaint alleges that "the improper payments generated nearly $15.4 million in sales contracts, from which Maxwell realized profits ofover $5.6 million."
According to the SEC:
"Maxwell violated [the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions] by engaging in widespread bribery of government officials in China in order to sell its high-voltage capacitors to several Chinese state-owned enterprises. Maxwell violated Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-l, and 13a13 thereunder by failing to disclose in its annual and periodic filings that the material revenues and profits associated with its long-standing bribery scheme enabled Maxwell to better financially position itself until new products could be commercially developed and sold. Maxwell violated [the FCPA's internal control provisions] by failing to maintain internal controls to prevent or detect the bribes paid to officials at Chinese state owned-entities. Finally, Maxwell violated [the FCPA's books and records provisions] by failing to accurately reflect the nature of the improper payments in Maxwell's books, records, and accounts."
The SEC's complaint contains an allegation not often seen in FCPA enforcement actions about how the company's alleged bribery scheme helped offset losses in other areas and helped fund future product development.
According to the SEC:
"Maxwell greatly depended on the revenue from Maxwell SA's high-voltage capacitor sales to China in order to help fund Maxwell's expansion into new product lines that are now expected to become Maxwell's future source of revenue. Maxwell engaged in the bribery scheme because it enabled the company to obtain material revenue needed to financially position itself to help fund the very products that today are sustaining Maxwell's future growth."
As to "Discovery of the Illicit Payments" the complaint states as follows.
"Potential FCPA and accounting concerns came to the attention of Maxwell's finance department in September 2008, during an internal review of Maxwell SA's commission expenses involving the Chinese Agent. Maxwell's management team asked about these commission payments after learning of the unusually high Chinese Agent commissions, which included the Extra Amounts. During this review, Executive A informed Maxwell's finance department that the payments made to the Chinese Agent were recorded as sales commissions. Maxwell's finance department then sought and obtained a signed FCPA certificate from the Chinese Agent in which he represented that he was familiar with the U.S. FCPA and local laws and regulations regarding corrupt payments" and that he had not in the past and will not in the future make any improper payments.
However, according to the SEC, "after obtaining the representations, Maxwell's finance department took no further corrective action regarding the commissions and Extra Amounts paid to the Chinese Agent ...".
In February 2009, Maxwell's new CEO, became aware of the issues with the Chinese Agent and he "immediately notified Maxwell's audit committee and outside counsel."
According to the SEC:
"During the relevant period, Maxwell's controls designed to prevent illicit payments to foreign officials were wholly inadequate. At the time, Maxwell's Code of Conduct contained a brief section on FCPA issues, but there is no evidence that employees received any FCPA training prior to the company's remedial steps."
As to Maxwell's internal controls failures, the complaint states as follows:
"Maxwell (1) failed to question why the contract prices were artificially inflated by 20% above the bid prices; (2) did not request supporting documentation for the invoices or track where the commission payments ultimately were distributed; (3) performed no due diligence on the agent; (4) did not require FCPA training for all relevant employees; and (5) failed to take any action even though it appears that certain former officers and senior managers of Maxwell had knowledge of the bribes paid by Maxwell SA and its agent since at least November 2002."
Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, Maxwell agreed to an injunction prohibiting future FCPA violations and agreed to $5,654,576 in disgorgement and $696,314 in prejudgment interest.
In the SEC release (here) Cheryl Scarboro (Chief of the SEC's FCPA Unit) stated as follows: "Maxwell's bribery allowed the company to obtain revenue and better financially position itself until new products were commercially developed and sold. This enforcement action shows that corruption can constitute disclosure violations as well as violations of other securities laws."
Jeffrey Higgins (here) of Gunderson Dettmer Stough Villeneuve Franklin & Hachigian LLP and Jerome Roth (here) of Munger Tolles & Olson LLP represented Maxwell.
Since announcement of the January 31st enforcement action, Maxwell's shares are up approximately 6%.
As I explored in this recent post, 60% of 2010 corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved (in whole or in part) employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises ("SOE"). In these cases, the enforcement agencies generally allege that such enterprises are "instrumentalities" of a foreign government and that such employees are therefore "foreign officials" under the FCPA.
So far in 2011, it's 100%.
On January 31st, Maxwell became the first company in 2011 to settle an FCPA enforcement action.
The Maxwell enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was approximately $14.4 million ($8 million criminal fine via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement; $6.4 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest via a SEC settled complaint).
Maxwell previously disclosed (see here) that "discussions with the SEC and DOJ have resulted in an estimate of potential settlement of up to $20.0 million – representing the combined first offer of settlement put forth by the SEC and DOJ." Presumably, the company's disclosure of the government's settlement offer did not sit well with the DOJ and on July 30, 2009, Maxwell issued this strange press release.
As set forth more fully below, the alleged recipients of the bribe payments at issue were all employees of alleged Chinese state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Also of note, the SEC's charges include disclosure violations not often seen in FCPA enforcement actions, based on allegation that Maxwell's bribe payments allowed the company to offset losses and fund product expansions that are now a source of revenue for the company.
DOJ
The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against Maxwell resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (here).
Criminal Information
The criminal information, a short eight pages, alleges that "from at least July 2002 through in or about May 2009, Maxwell and its subsidiaries paid approximately $2,789,131 to Agent 1 [a Chinese national, third-party agent responsible for Maxwell S.A.'s (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Maxwell) high voltage capacitor sales to Chinese customers] to be distributed to Chinese foreign officials, in return for securing contracts that profited Maxwell."
The Chinese foreign officials?
You guessed it, employees of alleged state-owned entities such as:
"Pinggao Group Co. Ltd. [formerly Pingdingshan High Voltage Switchgear Works) ... a state owned manufacturer of electric-utility infrastructure in Henan Province, China" (see here for the company's website)
"New Northeast Electric Shenyang HV Switchgear Co., Ltd. ... a state-owned manufacturer of electric-utility infrastructure in Liaoning Province, China" (see here for company information) and
"Xi-an XD High Voltage Apparatus Co., Ltd., ... a state-owned manufacturer of electric-utility infrastructure in Shaanxi Province, China" (see here for the company's website).
According to the information, "Maxwell and its subsidiaries accomplished [the bribe] payments by using Agent 1 to market and sell Maxwell's high voltage capacitors to Chinese consumers ... substantially all of which were Chinese state-owned entities." The information alleges that Agent 1 "requested quotes from Maxwell S.A. on behalf of prospective Chinese state-owned entities" and that "upon Agent 1's instruction, Maxwell S.A. added an extra 20 percent to the quoted amounts to arrive at a higher price for Maxwell S.A.'s high-voltage equipment." The information alleges that Agent 1 then distributed the extra amount "to officials at the Chinese state-owned entities" including employees of the above referenced companies.
Under the heading, "Knowledge Within Maxwell's U.S. Management," the information alleges that "Maxwell's management within the United States discovered, tactitly approved, concealed and caused to be concealed the bribery scheme." According to the information, following discovery of the payments by Maxwell senior management in the U.S. including by Executive A, Executive B, and Executive C (all U.S. citizens), under Executive E's (a Swiss citizen and Maxwell S.A's Vice President and General Manager) oversight and supervision, the payments at issue to Agent 1 actually increased from approximately $165,000 in 2002 to nearly $1.1 million in 2008.
According to the information, Maxwell's financial statements and reports described the bribe payments as "sales-commission expenses."
Based on the above allegations, the information charges Maxwell with FCPA anti-bribery violations and knowingly violating the FCPA's books and records provisions.
DPA
The DOJ's charges against Maxwell were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement.
Pursuant to the DPA, Maxwell admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was responsible for the acts of its officers, employees, subsidiaries, and agents as set forth above.
The term of the DPA is three years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement "based on the individual facts and circumstances" of the case and Maxwell.
Among the factors stated are the following.
(a) Maxwell voluntarily disclosed its FCPA violations to both the DOJ and the SEC;
(b) Maxwell cooperated with the Department's investigation of Maxwell and others;
(c) Maxwell undertook remedial measures, including the implementation of an enhanced compliance program, and agreed to undertake further remedial measures ...;
(d) Maxwell agreed to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of Maxwell and its employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, subsidiaries, and others relating to violations of the FCPA; and
(e) the impact on Maxwell, including collateral consequences, of a guilty plea or criminal conviction.
As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above described conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $10.5 million to $21 million. Pursuant to the DPA, Maxwell agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $8 million (25% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines).
Pursuant to the DPA, Maxwell agreed to self-report to the DOJ "periodically, at no less than 12-month intervals" during the term of the DPA "regarding remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies, and procedures" described in the DPA.
As is standard in FCPA DPAs, Maxwell agreed not to make any public statement "contradicting the acceptance of responsibility" by Maxwell as set forth in the DPA and Maxwell further agreed to only issue a press release in connection with the DPA if the DOJ does not object to the release.
As to debarment issues, paragraph 22 of the DPA states as follows:
"The Department agrees to bring to the attention of governmental and other debarment authorities the facts and circumstances relating to the nature of the conduct underlying this Agreement, including the nature and quality of Maxwell's cooperation and remediation. By agreeing to provide this information to debarment authorities, the Department is not agreeing to advocate on Maxwell's behalf, but rather is providing facts to be evaluated independently by the debarment authorities."
See here for the DOJ release.
SEC
The SEC's civil complaint (here) alleges, in summary, as follows.
"From 2002 through May 2009, Maxwell violated the anti-bribery, books and records and internal control provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") when it repeatedly paid bribes to Chinese officials in order to obtain and retain sales contracts for high voltage capacitors from several Chinese state-owned entities. Maxwell engaged in bribery to maintain its high-voltage capacitor business in China, which accounted for material revenue and profits during the relevant time period."
According to the complaint, "the illicit payments were made with the knowledge and tacit approval of certain former Maxwell officers and Maxwell failed to accurately record these payments on its books and records, and failed to implement or maintain a system of effective internal accounting controls to detect or prevent the payments."
The complaint alleges that "the improper payments generated nearly $15.4 million in sales contracts, from which Maxwell realized profits ofover $5.6 million."
According to the SEC:
"Maxwell violated [the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions] by engaging in widespread bribery of government officials in China in order to sell its high-voltage capacitors to several Chinese state-owned enterprises. Maxwell violated Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-l, and 13a13 thereunder by failing to disclose in its annual and periodic filings that the material revenues and profits associated with its long-standing bribery scheme enabled Maxwell to better financially position itself until new products could be commercially developed and sold. Maxwell violated [the FCPA's internal control provisions] by failing to maintain internal controls to prevent or detect the bribes paid to officials at Chinese state owned-entities. Finally, Maxwell violated [the FCPA's books and records provisions] by failing to accurately reflect the nature of the improper payments in Maxwell's books, records, and accounts."
The SEC's complaint contains an allegation not often seen in FCPA enforcement actions about how the company's alleged bribery scheme helped offset losses in other areas and helped fund future product development.
According to the SEC:
"Maxwell greatly depended on the revenue from Maxwell SA's high-voltage capacitor sales to China in order to help fund Maxwell's expansion into new product lines that are now expected to become Maxwell's future source of revenue. Maxwell engaged in the bribery scheme because it enabled the company to obtain material revenue needed to financially position itself to help fund the very products that today are sustaining Maxwell's future growth."
As to "Discovery of the Illicit Payments" the complaint states as follows.
"Potential FCPA and accounting concerns came to the attention of Maxwell's finance department in September 2008, during an internal review of Maxwell SA's commission expenses involving the Chinese Agent. Maxwell's management team asked about these commission payments after learning of the unusually high Chinese Agent commissions, which included the Extra Amounts. During this review, Executive A informed Maxwell's finance department that the payments made to the Chinese Agent were recorded as sales commissions. Maxwell's finance department then sought and obtained a signed FCPA certificate from the Chinese Agent in which he represented that he was familiar with the U.S. FCPA and local laws and regulations regarding corrupt payments" and that he had not in the past and will not in the future make any improper payments.
However, according to the SEC, "after obtaining the representations, Maxwell's finance department took no further corrective action regarding the commissions and Extra Amounts paid to the Chinese Agent ...".
In February 2009, Maxwell's new CEO, became aware of the issues with the Chinese Agent and he "immediately notified Maxwell's audit committee and outside counsel."
According to the SEC:
"During the relevant period, Maxwell's controls designed to prevent illicit payments to foreign officials were wholly inadequate. At the time, Maxwell's Code of Conduct contained a brief section on FCPA issues, but there is no evidence that employees received any FCPA training prior to the company's remedial steps."
As to Maxwell's internal controls failures, the complaint states as follows:
"Maxwell (1) failed to question why the contract prices were artificially inflated by 20% above the bid prices; (2) did not request supporting documentation for the invoices or track where the commission payments ultimately were distributed; (3) performed no due diligence on the agent; (4) did not require FCPA training for all relevant employees; and (5) failed to take any action even though it appears that certain former officers and senior managers of Maxwell had knowledge of the bribes paid by Maxwell SA and its agent since at least November 2002."
Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, Maxwell agreed to an injunction prohibiting future FCPA violations and agreed to $5,654,576 in disgorgement and $696,314 in prejudgment interest.
In the SEC release (here) Cheryl Scarboro (Chief of the SEC's FCPA Unit) stated as follows: "Maxwell's bribery allowed the company to obtain revenue and better financially position itself until new products were commercially developed and sold. This enforcement action shows that corruption can constitute disclosure violations as well as violations of other securities laws."
Jeffrey Higgins (here) of Gunderson Dettmer Stough Villeneuve Franklin & Hachigian LLP and Jerome Roth (here) of Munger Tolles & Olson LLP represented Maxwell.
Since announcement of the January 31st enforcement action, Maxwell's shares are up approximately 6%.
As I explored in this recent post, 60% of 2010 corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved (in whole or in part) employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises ("SOE"). In these cases, the enforcement agencies generally allege that such enterprises are "instrumentalities" of a foreign government and that such employees are therefore "foreign officials" under the FCPA.
So far in 2011, it's 100%.
Monday, December 27, 2010
Faro's Monitor - Late and Expensive
In June 2008, Faro Technologies, Inc. (here) agreed to settle an FCPA enforcement action relating to conduct in China. The company paid a $1.1 criminal penalty via a DOJ non-prosecution agreement (see here and here). In a related SEC enforcement action, the company agreed to pay $1.85 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest via an administrative order (here).
The June 2008 non-prosecution agreement (appendix c) stated that within 60 calendar days of the execution of the agreement, "Faro Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiaries and affiliates agree to engage an independent corporate monitor for a period of two years to monitor the company's compliance with respect to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other relevant anti-corruption laws."
It took nearly two years for Faro and the DOJ to agree on a monitor.
Faro's November 4th 10-Q filing (here), states as follows:
"During the second quarter of 2010, the Company, in conjunction with the SEC and the DOJ, completed the selection of the FCPA monitor. The Company is cooperating with the monitor as the monitor implements a work plan to assess the Company’s compliance with the requirements for the settlement agreements."
How much has the monitor cost Faro thus far?
Approximately $1 million.
During a November 4th earnings conference call, Faro President and CEO Jay Freeland stated as follows:
"During the third quarter, we had the first review by the monitor that was assigned to us in connection with our settlement with the SEC and DOJ over the FCPA matter from 2006. The cost to FARO in the third quarter was approximately $1 million, which obviously had a substantial impact on the bottom line. The monitor and her team visited several of our remote offices as well as our regional and global headquarters, conducting interviews and reviewing, policies, procedures and adherence to them. Overall, we believe the review went well and look forward to reviewing the monitor's report. The monitor will return one more time next year, probably in the third quarter again. We don't expect that review to be as costly as the one we just finished. And, assuming things go well, that will complete the process."
The June 2008 non-prosecution agreement (appendix c) stated that within 60 calendar days of the execution of the agreement, "Faro Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiaries and affiliates agree to engage an independent corporate monitor for a period of two years to monitor the company's compliance with respect to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other relevant anti-corruption laws."
It took nearly two years for Faro and the DOJ to agree on a monitor.
Faro's November 4th 10-Q filing (here), states as follows:
"During the second quarter of 2010, the Company, in conjunction with the SEC and the DOJ, completed the selection of the FCPA monitor. The Company is cooperating with the monitor as the monitor implements a work plan to assess the Company’s compliance with the requirements for the settlement agreements."
How much has the monitor cost Faro thus far?
Approximately $1 million.
During a November 4th earnings conference call, Faro President and CEO Jay Freeland stated as follows:
"During the third quarter, we had the first review by the monitor that was assigned to us in connection with our settlement with the SEC and DOJ over the FCPA matter from 2006. The cost to FARO in the third quarter was approximately $1 million, which obviously had a substantial impact on the bottom line. The monitor and her team visited several of our remote offices as well as our regional and global headquarters, conducting interviews and reviewing, policies, procedures and adherence to them. Overall, we believe the review went well and look forward to reviewing the monitor's report. The monitor will return one more time next year, probably in the third quarter again. We don't expect that review to be as costly as the one we just finished. And, assuming things go well, that will complete the process."
Thursday, December 23, 2010
Still Yet Another Noisy Exit
Perhaps it is a new trend.
Perhaps it is because the media now covers anything and everything FCPA related.
In any event, it is noticeable.
There has been still yet another "noisy exist."
Including the below example, I count five in the last few months. See here, here and here for the prior posts.
In October 2009, Stephen Lowe was hired by Allison Transmission ("Allison") as its Managing Director, China, Japan & Korea Operations. [Allison (here) is an Indiana based designer, manufacturer and supplier of automatic transmissions for medium- and heavy-duty commercial vehicles and military vehicles. In 2007 (see here) The Carlyle Group and Onex Corporation acquired Allison Transmission from General Motors Corporation for US$5.575 billion.]
Lowe alleges in this complaint recently filed in Marion County (Indiana) Superior Court that Allison fired him in July 2010 because he "refused to engage in violations of the FCPA." Lowe's complaint implicates both Allison's Vice President of International Sales and Marketing ("Vice President") and Allison's Commercial Director of Asia Strategy ("Commercial Director").
Among other things, Lowe alleges that: (i) he witnessed the Commercial Director deliver a cash filled envelope to Beijing City Bus officials during dinner; (ii) he heard the Commercial Director describe how he purchased silver jewelry for Chinese government officials "in order to please the officials" (iii) the Commercial Director bragged about winning a Beijing City Bus Olympics contract by doing "whatever it took to please the officials" "including giving gifts, money and prostitutes" and (iv) the Commercial Director "deliberately lost" high-stakes card games to "key Beijing City Bus officials." [Brain teaser of the day - is deliberately losing a high-stakes card game to a "foreign official" providing the official with a "thing of value"?]
According to the complaint, Allison's Vice President knew, and approved of, certain of the Commercial Director's conduct. According to the complaint, "a month before Allison fired him" Lowe disclosed his concerns about the Commercial Director and the Vice President to Allison's Marketing Manager.
Lowe's complaint, filed by The Employment Law Group law firm, alleges various Indiana state law causes of action including retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
For additional coverage of Lowe's complaint, see here from the Indiana Business Journal.
Perhaps it is because the media now covers anything and everything FCPA related.
In any event, it is noticeable.
There has been still yet another "noisy exist."
Including the below example, I count five in the last few months. See here, here and here for the prior posts.
In October 2009, Stephen Lowe was hired by Allison Transmission ("Allison") as its Managing Director, China, Japan & Korea Operations. [Allison (here) is an Indiana based designer, manufacturer and supplier of automatic transmissions for medium- and heavy-duty commercial vehicles and military vehicles. In 2007 (see here) The Carlyle Group and Onex Corporation acquired Allison Transmission from General Motors Corporation for US$5.575 billion.]
Lowe alleges in this complaint recently filed in Marion County (Indiana) Superior Court that Allison fired him in July 2010 because he "refused to engage in violations of the FCPA." Lowe's complaint implicates both Allison's Vice President of International Sales and Marketing ("Vice President") and Allison's Commercial Director of Asia Strategy ("Commercial Director").
Among other things, Lowe alleges that: (i) he witnessed the Commercial Director deliver a cash filled envelope to Beijing City Bus officials during dinner; (ii) he heard the Commercial Director describe how he purchased silver jewelry for Chinese government officials "in order to please the officials" (iii) the Commercial Director bragged about winning a Beijing City Bus Olympics contract by doing "whatever it took to please the officials" "including giving gifts, money and prostitutes" and (iv) the Commercial Director "deliberately lost" high-stakes card games to "key Beijing City Bus officials." [Brain teaser of the day - is deliberately losing a high-stakes card game to a "foreign official" providing the official with a "thing of value"?]
According to the complaint, Allison's Vice President knew, and approved of, certain of the Commercial Director's conduct. According to the complaint, "a month before Allison fired him" Lowe disclosed his concerns about the Commercial Director and the Vice President to Allison's Marketing Manager.
Lowe's complaint, filed by The Employment Law Group law firm, alleges various Indiana state law causes of action including retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
For additional coverage of Lowe's complaint, see here from the Indiana Business Journal.
Monday, December 13, 2010
RAE Systems Held Liable For The Acts Of Its Subsidiaries' Joint Venture Partners
If every company voluntarily disclosed that its distant subsidiaries and/or its distant subsidiaries' joint venture partners provided minor things of value (such as a notebook computer, kitchen appliances, and business suits) to someone deemed a "foreign official" by the enforcement agencies, then instead of 15 to 20 core FCPA enforcement actions per year, there would probably be something like 150 to 200 FCPA enforcement actions per year.
If every issuer voluntarily disclosed that its internal controls were imperfect as to distant subsidiaries or its distant subsidiaries' joint venture partners, and that such distant entities failed to follow issuer instructions or issuer provided training and guidance, then instead of 15 to 20 core FCPA enforcement actions per year, there would probably be something like 1,500 to 2,000 FCPA enforcement actions per year (recognizing that the FCPA's books and records and internal control provisions equally apply to domestic operations).
So why did RAE Systems voluntarily disclose such conduct to the DOJ and the SEC? Would it not have been more efficient and cost-effective for the company to effectively remedy these issues internally?
Do the high professional expenses connected with voluntary disclosures (compared to effectively remedying issues internally) have anything to do with the increase in voluntary disclosures? (See here for a prior post on the issue). In RAE Systems annual report for the year ended December 31, 2009 (see here), filed in March 2010, the company disclosed that it had (at that point) incurred $4 million in professional fees in connection with the FCPA investigation.
From an enforcement standpoint, is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act becoming an all-purpose corporate governance instrument? Should it?
These are some of the questions raised by the odd RAE Systems enforcement action.
Last Friday, the DOJ and SEC announced (see here and here) a joint enforcement against RAE System (a San-Jose, California based company with shares on the New York Stock Exchange) "a leading global provider of rapidly deployable connected, intelligent gas detection systems that enable real-time safety and security threat detection." (See here for the company website). In September, RAE Systems signed a definitive agreement to be acquired by Battery Ventures. The transaction is expected to close by the end of the first quarter of 2011.
This post summarizes the DOJ and SEC enforcement actions in which RAE Systems agreed to pay approximately $2.95 million in fines and disgorgement.
DOJ
Pursuant to a three-year non-prosecution agreement, RAE Systems acknowledged its "knowing violations of the internal controls and books and records provisions" of the FCPA "arising from and related to improper benefits corruptly paid by employees of two joint ventures majority owned and controlled by RAE Systems to foreign officials of departments, agencies, and instrumentalities" of the Chinese government." Pursuant to the NPA, RAE Systems agreed to pay a $1.7 million penalty.
According to the NPA, RAE Systems "had significant operations" in China organized "under a holding company called RAE Asia, headquartered in Hong Kong." RAE Systems "sold products and services in mainland [China] primarily through second-tier subsidiaries organized as joint ventures with local Chinese entities.
One of the joint ventures is RAE-KLH (Beijing) Co., Limited ("RAE-KLH"). RAE Systems acquired a 64% stake in RAE-KLH in 2004 and upped the stake to approximately 96% in 2006. The other joint venture is RAE Coal Mine Safety Instruments (Fushun) Co., Ltd. ("RAE-Fushun"). In 2006, RAE Systems acquired a 70% interest in RAE Fushan.
Both RAE-KLH's and RAE Fushun's financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements that RAE Systems filed with the SEC.
According to the NPA, "a significant number of RAE-KLH's and RAE Fushun's customers" in China were "government departments and bureaus and large state-owned agencies and instrumentalties." The NPA states as follows. "The Lanzhous City Honggu Mining Safety Bureau, for example, was a government customer. Other government clients included regional fire departments, emergency response departments, and entities under the supervision of the provincial environmental agency, among others. Accordingly, officers and employees of a significant number of RAE-KLH's and RAE Fushun's customers were 'foreign officials' within the meaning of the FCPA ...".
The NPA then contains a heading that states, "RAE System's Knowing Failure to Implement Systems of Effective Internal Controls at RAE-KLH and RAE Fushun Post Closing."
The NPA then cites various company documents that suggest RAE was aware that KLH sales personnel were making kickbacks or otherwise engaging in questionable sales tactics with its customers. The NPA cites a document from a RAE Systems employee from the United States who met with KLH personnel that stated "we knew this risk all along and have accepted it upon entering the JV deal."
Following the acquisition, the NPA states that "RAE Systems did provide some FCPA training to RAE-KLH personnel and did tell RAE-KLH personnel to stop paying bribes and providing other improper benefits, but such steps were half-measures." The NPA states that "RAE Systems did not impose sufficient internal controls or make sufficient changes to high-risk practices."
As to RAE-Fushun, the NPA states that "RAE Systems did not conduct pre-acquisition corruption due diligence of RAE Fushun" but that "given RAE's System's experience with KLH described above, the high-risk nature of the location, and the existence of numerous government customers, pre-acquisition corruption-focused due diligence was merited. The NPA further states "as was later confirmed, improper business practices had occurred at RAE Fushun before the acquisition and continued post-acquisition, as RAE Systems failed to implement an effective system of internal controls at RAE Fushun."
Based on the above facts, the NPA states that "RAE Systems knowingly failed to implement a system of effective internal accounting controls at RAE-KLH and RAE Fushun...".
According to the NPA, the "lack of effective internal accounting controls permitted improper payments to continue at RAE-KLH and RAE-Fushun after acquisition."
As to RAE-KLH, the NPA states that certain sales representatives at RAE-KLH "used cash advances and reimbursements for improper purposes, including the corrupt giving of gifts and paying for entertainment, as well as direct or indirect payments to customers." According to the NPA, "the gifts included, among other things, a notebook computer for the son of the deputy director of a state-owned chemical plant as part of efforts to obtain business from that entity." The NPA also states that RAE-KLH made payments under contracts with a purported consultant and that some or all of the payments were funneled to officials of a state-owned enterprise and government departments.
As to RAE Fushun, the NPA likewise statements that certain sales representatives at RAE Fushun "used cash advances and reimbursements for improper purposes including the corrupt giving of gifts and paying for entertainment, as well as making direct or indirect payments, to officers and employees of customers." According to the NPA, "these gifts to certain officials of state-owned enterprises and government departments included, among other things, a variety of luxury items, such as jade, fur coats, kitchen appliances, business suits, and high-priced liquor."
The NPA then states that the "lack of effective internal controls and continued improper payments led to inaccurate books and records."
During the three-year term of the NPA, RAE Systems agreed to undertake a host of compliance reforms and to report to the DOJ on an annual basis.
The DOJ agreed to enter into the NPA "based in part, on the following factors: (a) RAE System's timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure ...; (b) RAE System's thorough, real-time cooperation with the DOJ and SEC; (c) the extensive remedial efforts already undertaken and to be undertaken by RAE Systems; and (d) RAE System's commitment to submit periodic monitoring reports to the DOJ."
SEC
The SEC's complaint (here) is based on the same core set of facts described above. It charges RAE Systems, not only with FCPA books and records and internal control violations, but anti-bribery violations as well.
The complaint begins by alleging that "from 2004 through 2008" RAE Systems violated the FCPA "by paying, through two of its joint venture entities in China, approximately $400,000 to third party agents and government officials in China to influence acts or decisions by foreign officials to obtain or retain business for RAE Systems." According to the complaint, the payments "were made primarily by the direct sales force utilized by RAE Systems" at its two Chinese joint-venture entities: RAE-KLH and RAE-Fushun.
According to the SEC, RAE System's "illicit payments to government officials and third-party agents generated revenues worth over $3 million and gross margin of $1,147,800."
The complaint states: "While the payments were made exclusively in China and were conducted by Chinese employees of RAE-KLH and RAE-Fushun, RAE Systems was aware of significant indications of ongoing bribery at RAE-KLH. At the time, RAE Systems failed to effectively investigate these indications, or red flags, and to stop the bribery from continuing. RAE System's failure to act on these significant red flags allowed, at least in part, bribery to continue at RAE-KLH."
RAE Systems was held liable for RAE-KLH's improper payments even though the SEC complaint states that "RAE Systems Instruct[ed] KLH Personnel to Stop Bribery Practices." According to the SEC, "while RAE Systems communicated these instructions to RAE-KLH personnel, RAE Systems did not impose sufficient internal controls or make any changes to the practice of sales personnel obtaining cash advances." According to the SEC, RAE System's CFO visited RAE-KLH's Chinese facilities and observed that certain cash advances may be used for "grease payments, to supplement sales employees' incomes and as bribes." In response, RAE Systems, "implemented FCPA compliance training and required each RAE-KLH employee to certify that he or she did not engage in bribery practices." However, the SEC alleged "again, however, [RAE Systems] did not impose sufficient internal controls or make changes to the practice of sales personnel obtaining cash advances."
Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, RAE Systems agreed to pay $1,147,800 in disgorgement (plus $109,212 in prejudgment interest) and to undertake a host of FCPA compliance measures.
Cheryl Scarboro (Chief of the SEC's FCPA Unit) stated as follows. "RAE Systems develops products to detect harmful emissions, yet it did not have adequate measures in place to detect and root out internal wrongdoing. Companies that fail to respond to red flags can be held liable for the acts of their joint venture partners."
Carlos Ortiz (a former DOJ attorney now at LeClair Ryan - here) and Roy McDonald (DLA Piper - here) represented RAE Systems.
If every issuer voluntarily disclosed that its internal controls were imperfect as to distant subsidiaries or its distant subsidiaries' joint venture partners, and that such distant entities failed to follow issuer instructions or issuer provided training and guidance, then instead of 15 to 20 core FCPA enforcement actions per year, there would probably be something like 1,500 to 2,000 FCPA enforcement actions per year (recognizing that the FCPA's books and records and internal control provisions equally apply to domestic operations).
So why did RAE Systems voluntarily disclose such conduct to the DOJ and the SEC? Would it not have been more efficient and cost-effective for the company to effectively remedy these issues internally?
Do the high professional expenses connected with voluntary disclosures (compared to effectively remedying issues internally) have anything to do with the increase in voluntary disclosures? (See here for a prior post on the issue). In RAE Systems annual report for the year ended December 31, 2009 (see here), filed in March 2010, the company disclosed that it had (at that point) incurred $4 million in professional fees in connection with the FCPA investigation.
From an enforcement standpoint, is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act becoming an all-purpose corporate governance instrument? Should it?
These are some of the questions raised by the odd RAE Systems enforcement action.
Last Friday, the DOJ and SEC announced (see here and here) a joint enforcement against RAE System (a San-Jose, California based company with shares on the New York Stock Exchange) "a leading global provider of rapidly deployable connected, intelligent gas detection systems that enable real-time safety and security threat detection." (See here for the company website). In September, RAE Systems signed a definitive agreement to be acquired by Battery Ventures. The transaction is expected to close by the end of the first quarter of 2011.
This post summarizes the DOJ and SEC enforcement actions in which RAE Systems agreed to pay approximately $2.95 million in fines and disgorgement.
DOJ
Pursuant to a three-year non-prosecution agreement, RAE Systems acknowledged its "knowing violations of the internal controls and books and records provisions" of the FCPA "arising from and related to improper benefits corruptly paid by employees of two joint ventures majority owned and controlled by RAE Systems to foreign officials of departments, agencies, and instrumentalities" of the Chinese government." Pursuant to the NPA, RAE Systems agreed to pay a $1.7 million penalty.
According to the NPA, RAE Systems "had significant operations" in China organized "under a holding company called RAE Asia, headquartered in Hong Kong." RAE Systems "sold products and services in mainland [China] primarily through second-tier subsidiaries organized as joint ventures with local Chinese entities.
One of the joint ventures is RAE-KLH (Beijing) Co., Limited ("RAE-KLH"). RAE Systems acquired a 64% stake in RAE-KLH in 2004 and upped the stake to approximately 96% in 2006. The other joint venture is RAE Coal Mine Safety Instruments (Fushun) Co., Ltd. ("RAE-Fushun"). In 2006, RAE Systems acquired a 70% interest in RAE Fushan.
Both RAE-KLH's and RAE Fushun's financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements that RAE Systems filed with the SEC.
According to the NPA, "a significant number of RAE-KLH's and RAE Fushun's customers" in China were "government departments and bureaus and large state-owned agencies and instrumentalties." The NPA states as follows. "The Lanzhous City Honggu Mining Safety Bureau, for example, was a government customer. Other government clients included regional fire departments, emergency response departments, and entities under the supervision of the provincial environmental agency, among others. Accordingly, officers and employees of a significant number of RAE-KLH's and RAE Fushun's customers were 'foreign officials' within the meaning of the FCPA ...".
The NPA then contains a heading that states, "RAE System's Knowing Failure to Implement Systems of Effective Internal Controls at RAE-KLH and RAE Fushun Post Closing."
The NPA then cites various company documents that suggest RAE was aware that KLH sales personnel were making kickbacks or otherwise engaging in questionable sales tactics with its customers. The NPA cites a document from a RAE Systems employee from the United States who met with KLH personnel that stated "we knew this risk all along and have accepted it upon entering the JV deal."
Following the acquisition, the NPA states that "RAE Systems did provide some FCPA training to RAE-KLH personnel and did tell RAE-KLH personnel to stop paying bribes and providing other improper benefits, but such steps were half-measures." The NPA states that "RAE Systems did not impose sufficient internal controls or make sufficient changes to high-risk practices."
As to RAE-Fushun, the NPA states that "RAE Systems did not conduct pre-acquisition corruption due diligence of RAE Fushun" but that "given RAE's System's experience with KLH described above, the high-risk nature of the location, and the existence of numerous government customers, pre-acquisition corruption-focused due diligence was merited. The NPA further states "as was later confirmed, improper business practices had occurred at RAE Fushun before the acquisition and continued post-acquisition, as RAE Systems failed to implement an effective system of internal controls at RAE Fushun."
Based on the above facts, the NPA states that "RAE Systems knowingly failed to implement a system of effective internal accounting controls at RAE-KLH and RAE Fushun...".
According to the NPA, the "lack of effective internal accounting controls permitted improper payments to continue at RAE-KLH and RAE-Fushun after acquisition."
As to RAE-KLH, the NPA states that certain sales representatives at RAE-KLH "used cash advances and reimbursements for improper purposes, including the corrupt giving of gifts and paying for entertainment, as well as direct or indirect payments to customers." According to the NPA, "the gifts included, among other things, a notebook computer for the son of the deputy director of a state-owned chemical plant as part of efforts to obtain business from that entity." The NPA also states that RAE-KLH made payments under contracts with a purported consultant and that some or all of the payments were funneled to officials of a state-owned enterprise and government departments.
As to RAE Fushun, the NPA likewise statements that certain sales representatives at RAE Fushun "used cash advances and reimbursements for improper purposes including the corrupt giving of gifts and paying for entertainment, as well as making direct or indirect payments, to officers and employees of customers." According to the NPA, "these gifts to certain officials of state-owned enterprises and government departments included, among other things, a variety of luxury items, such as jade, fur coats, kitchen appliances, business suits, and high-priced liquor."
The NPA then states that the "lack of effective internal controls and continued improper payments led to inaccurate books and records."
During the three-year term of the NPA, RAE Systems agreed to undertake a host of compliance reforms and to report to the DOJ on an annual basis.
The DOJ agreed to enter into the NPA "based in part, on the following factors: (a) RAE System's timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure ...; (b) RAE System's thorough, real-time cooperation with the DOJ and SEC; (c) the extensive remedial efforts already undertaken and to be undertaken by RAE Systems; and (d) RAE System's commitment to submit periodic monitoring reports to the DOJ."
SEC
The SEC's complaint (here) is based on the same core set of facts described above. It charges RAE Systems, not only with FCPA books and records and internal control violations, but anti-bribery violations as well.
The complaint begins by alleging that "from 2004 through 2008" RAE Systems violated the FCPA "by paying, through two of its joint venture entities in China, approximately $400,000 to third party agents and government officials in China to influence acts or decisions by foreign officials to obtain or retain business for RAE Systems." According to the complaint, the payments "were made primarily by the direct sales force utilized by RAE Systems" at its two Chinese joint-venture entities: RAE-KLH and RAE-Fushun.
According to the SEC, RAE System's "illicit payments to government officials and third-party agents generated revenues worth over $3 million and gross margin of $1,147,800."
The complaint states: "While the payments were made exclusively in China and were conducted by Chinese employees of RAE-KLH and RAE-Fushun, RAE Systems was aware of significant indications of ongoing bribery at RAE-KLH. At the time, RAE Systems failed to effectively investigate these indications, or red flags, and to stop the bribery from continuing. RAE System's failure to act on these significant red flags allowed, at least in part, bribery to continue at RAE-KLH."
RAE Systems was held liable for RAE-KLH's improper payments even though the SEC complaint states that "RAE Systems Instruct[ed] KLH Personnel to Stop Bribery Practices." According to the SEC, "while RAE Systems communicated these instructions to RAE-KLH personnel, RAE Systems did not impose sufficient internal controls or make any changes to the practice of sales personnel obtaining cash advances." According to the SEC, RAE System's CFO visited RAE-KLH's Chinese facilities and observed that certain cash advances may be used for "grease payments, to supplement sales employees' incomes and as bribes." In response, RAE Systems, "implemented FCPA compliance training and required each RAE-KLH employee to certify that he or she did not engage in bribery practices." However, the SEC alleged "again, however, [RAE Systems] did not impose sufficient internal controls or make changes to the practice of sales personnel obtaining cash advances."
Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, RAE Systems agreed to pay $1,147,800 in disgorgement (plus $109,212 in prejudgment interest) and to undertake a host of FCPA compliance measures.
Cheryl Scarboro (Chief of the SEC's FCPA Unit) stated as follows. "RAE Systems develops products to detect harmful emissions, yet it did not have adequate measures in place to detect and root out internal wrongdoing. Companies that fail to respond to red flags can be held liable for the acts of their joint venture partners."
Carlos Ortiz (a former DOJ attorney now at LeClair Ryan - here) and Roy McDonald (DLA Piper - here) represented RAE Systems.
Monday, December 6, 2010
The FCPA's New Frontier
China-based entities have previously been involved in FCPA enforcement actions.
For example, in March 2010, DaimlerChrysler China Ltd. was charged in connection with the Daimler enforcement action and agreed to a deferred prosecution agreement. (See here). In May 2005, DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd., a Chinese subsidiary of U.S. based Diagnostic Products Corporation ("DPC"), was charged in connection with the DPC enforcement action. (See here).
However, to my knowledge, a China-based issuer has never been the focus of an FCPA inquiry.
I've noted for a few years now that it is only a matter of time. See here - "Why Compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Matters in China" and here "Welcome to the Club".
The time has come.
Last week, as first reported by Joe Palazzolo (Wall Street Journal - Corruption Currents), Rino International Corp., a Dalian, China-based issuer (here), disclosed in an SEC filing (here) as follows:
"The Company has been notified by the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) that it is conducting a formal investigation relating to the Company’s financial reporting and compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for the period January 1, 2008 through the present. The Company is cooperating with the SEC’s investigation. It is not possible to predict the outcome of the investigation, including whether or when any proceedings might be initiated, when these matters may be resolved or what if any penalties or other remedies may be imposed."
The same day, Rino announced (here) that its shares have been delisted from the NASDAQ exchange.
The SEC's inquiry and Rino's delisting appear to be a result of a scathing November research report by Muddy Waters LLC Research Report on the company (see here).
Whether the SEC's FCPA inquiry is focused on books and records and internal controls issues, or anti-bribery issues as well, with more China-based companies listing shares on U.S. exchanges, and thus becoming subject to the FCPA, the Rino inquiry may represent a new frontier of FCPA enforcement.
For example, in March 2010, DaimlerChrysler China Ltd. was charged in connection with the Daimler enforcement action and agreed to a deferred prosecution agreement. (See here). In May 2005, DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd., a Chinese subsidiary of U.S. based Diagnostic Products Corporation ("DPC"), was charged in connection with the DPC enforcement action. (See here).
However, to my knowledge, a China-based issuer has never been the focus of an FCPA inquiry.
I've noted for a few years now that it is only a matter of time. See here - "Why Compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Matters in China" and here "Welcome to the Club".
The time has come.
Last week, as first reported by Joe Palazzolo (Wall Street Journal - Corruption Currents), Rino International Corp., a Dalian, China-based issuer (here), disclosed in an SEC filing (here) as follows:
"The Company has been notified by the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) that it is conducting a formal investigation relating to the Company’s financial reporting and compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for the period January 1, 2008 through the present. The Company is cooperating with the SEC’s investigation. It is not possible to predict the outcome of the investigation, including whether or when any proceedings might be initiated, when these matters may be resolved or what if any penalties or other remedies may be imposed."
The same day, Rino announced (here) that its shares have been delisted from the NASDAQ exchange.
The SEC's inquiry and Rino's delisting appear to be a result of a scathing November research report by Muddy Waters LLC Research Report on the company (see here).
Whether the SEC's FCPA inquiry is focused on books and records and internal controls issues, or anti-bribery issues as well, with more China-based companies listing shares on U.S. exchanges, and thus becoming subject to the FCPA, the Rino inquiry may represent a new frontier of FCPA enforcement.
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
Another Noisy Exit
Steven Jacobs was the President of Macau Operations for Las Vegas Sands Corp. ("LVSC"), a company with shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange (see here).
That is, until his termination on July 23, 2010.
In an October 20th complaint filed against LVSC in District Court, Clark County, Nevada (see here) alleging breach of contract and tort-based causes of action, Jacobs alleges, among other things, that LVSC's "notoriously bellicose" Chief Executive Officer and majority shareholder made several "outrageous demands" upon him including, but not limited to the following:
"demands that Jacobs use improper 'leverage' against senior government officials of Macau in order to obtain Strata-Title for the Four Seasons Apartments in Macau;"
"demands that Jacobs threaten to withhold Sands China business from prominent Chinese banks unless they agreed to use influence with newly-elected senior government officials of Macau in order to obtain Strata-Title for the Four Seasons Apartments and favorable treatment with regards to labor quotas and table limits;"
"demands that secret investigations be performed regarding the business and financial affairs of various high-ranking members of the Macau government so that any negative information obtained could be used to exert 'leverage' in order to thwart government regulations/initiatives viewed as adverse to LVSC's interests;" and
"demands that Sands China continue to use the legal services of a Macau attorney [...][an individual media is reporting as a member of a Chinese local government executive council] despite concerns that [the individual's] retention posed serious risks under the criminal provisions of the United States code commonly known as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ('FCPA')."
A LVSC spokesperson has been quoted as saying "While Las Vegas Sands normally does not comment on legal matters, we categorically deny these baseless and inflammatory allegations."
For other examples of recent noisy exists that may implicate the FCPA see this prior post.
That is, until his termination on July 23, 2010.
In an October 20th complaint filed against LVSC in District Court, Clark County, Nevada (see here) alleging breach of contract and tort-based causes of action, Jacobs alleges, among other things, that LVSC's "notoriously bellicose" Chief Executive Officer and majority shareholder made several "outrageous demands" upon him including, but not limited to the following:
"demands that Jacobs use improper 'leverage' against senior government officials of Macau in order to obtain Strata-Title for the Four Seasons Apartments in Macau;"
"demands that Jacobs threaten to withhold Sands China business from prominent Chinese banks unless they agreed to use influence with newly-elected senior government officials of Macau in order to obtain Strata-Title for the Four Seasons Apartments and favorable treatment with regards to labor quotas and table limits;"
"demands that secret investigations be performed regarding the business and financial affairs of various high-ranking members of the Macau government so that any negative information obtained could be used to exert 'leverage' in order to thwart government regulations/initiatives viewed as adverse to LVSC's interests;" and
"demands that Sands China continue to use the legal services of a Macau attorney [...][an individual media is reporting as a member of a Chinese local government executive council] despite concerns that [the individual's] retention posed serious risks under the criminal provisions of the United States code commonly known as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ('FCPA')."
A LVSC spokesperson has been quoted as saying "While Las Vegas Sands normally does not comment on legal matters, we categorically deny these baseless and inflammatory allegations."
For other examples of recent noisy exists that may implicate the FCPA see this prior post.
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
SciClone - An FCPA Feeding Frenzy
On August 9, 2010 SciClone Pharmaceuticals made an FCPA-related disclosure.
This post discusses what has happened since.
August 10th
Shares of SciClone plunged, at one point down 40% from the previous day's close, closing down 31.9%. (This is clearly in stark contrast to the recent situation involving Schlumberger discussed in yesterday's post - here).
Levi & Korsinsky LLP announce that it is investigating SciClone on behalf of shareholders for possible violations of state and federal securities laws.
The Law Offices of Howard G. Smith announce that it is investigation SciClone on behalf of shareholders for possible violations of federal securities laws.
The law firm of Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC announces the commencement of an investigation into SciClone to determine whether it has violated federal securities laws.
Roy Jacobs & Associates announce that it is investigating SciClone for potentially violating the federal securities laws.
August 11
Pomerantz Haudek Grossman & Gross LLP announce that it is investigating claims on behalf of investors of SciClone to determine whether it has violated federal securities laws.
The law firm of Statman, Harris & Eyrich, LLC announce that it is investigating SciClone for potential violations of state and federal law.
Goldfarb Branham, LLP announce that it is investigating SciClone for shareholders who purchased stock of the company and preparing a possible derivative lawsuit against company executives.
Finkelstein Thompson LLP announce that it is investigating potential shareholder claims concerning SciClone.
August 12
Robbins Umeda LLP announce that it commenced an investigation into possible breaches of fiduciary duty and other violations of the law by certain officers and directors at SciClone.
August 13
The law firm of Kahn Swick & Foti announce that the firm has filed the first securities fraud class action lawsuit against SciClone in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of the Company between May 11, 2009 and August 10, 2010.
August 19
Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check, LLP announce that a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of purchasers of the securities of SciClone.
Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation, announce that a class action lawsuit has been commenced in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of SciClone.
August 20
Kendall Law Group announce an investigating of SciClone for shareholders.
Ryan & Maniskas, LLP announce that a class action lawsuit has been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of purchasers of SciClone.
August 28
Roy Jacobs & Associates (again) announce that it is investigating SciClone for potentially violating the federal securities laws.
September 7
The Shuman Law Firm announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of anyone who purchased or otherwise acquired SciClone common stock between May 11, 2009and August 10, 2010.
September 8
Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP announce that it has filed a class action suit against SciClone alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of purchasers of SciClone's common stock during the period May 11, 2009 and August 9, 2010.
September 16
The law firm of Strauss & Troy announce that a class action lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against SciClone for potential violations of state and federal law.
September 23
The law firm of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP announce that class action lawsuits have been brought on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of SciClone.
Given the above, you are probably wondering, geez, what did SciClone disclose - how extensive were the disclosed FCPA violations? Did the company's CEO or CFO resign? Is the company still in business?
Well, not exactly.
On August 9th, SciClone disclosed (see here) as follows:
"On August 5, 2010 SciClone was contacted by the SEC and advised that the SEC has initiated a formal, non-public investigation of SciClone. In connection with this investigation, the SEC issued a subpoena to SciClone requesting a variety of documents and other information. The subpoena requests documents relating to a range of matters including interactions with regulators and government-owned entities in China, activities relating to sales in China and documents relating to certain company financial and other disclosures. On August 6, 2010, the Company received a letter from the DOJ indicating that the DOJ was investigating Foreign Corrupt Practices Act issues in the pharmaceutical industry generally, and had received information about the Company’s practices suggesting possible violations."
During SciClone's August 9th earnings conference call Friedhelm Blobel (President and CEO) stated that SciClone "intends to cooperate fully with the SEC and DOJ in the conduct of their investigations, and has appointed a special committee of independent directors to oversee the Company's efforts." Blobel noted that "as far as timing is concerned, the lawyers tell us that these investigations typically are long lasting." In response to the question - is the investigation disrupting day-to-day operations or ongoing sales, Gary Titus (CFO) said that "it is business as usual for SciClone, and we continue to focus on all of the priorities that we have set for the Company ..."
That's right.
All of the above occured because the SEC initiated a formal investigation of SciClone and issued a subpoena to the company and because SciClone received a letter from the DOJ as to an industry-wide investigation suggesting possible improper conduct by the company.
You be the judge.
Are the above referenced investigations and lawsuits a rational and value added exercise for shareholders of SciClone or rather indicative of an FCPA feeding frenzy where everyone, it seems, is trying to get a slice of the pie?
Has this all gotten a bit out-of-hand?
*****
Yesterday, SciClone (see here) announced "continued topline growth and strong cash position in the Third Quarter of 2010."
This post discusses what has happened since.
August 10th
Shares of SciClone plunged, at one point down 40% from the previous day's close, closing down 31.9%. (This is clearly in stark contrast to the recent situation involving Schlumberger discussed in yesterday's post - here).
Levi & Korsinsky LLP announce that it is investigating SciClone on behalf of shareholders for possible violations of state and federal securities laws.
The Law Offices of Howard G. Smith announce that it is investigation SciClone on behalf of shareholders for possible violations of federal securities laws.
The law firm of Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC announces the commencement of an investigation into SciClone to determine whether it has violated federal securities laws.
Roy Jacobs & Associates announce that it is investigating SciClone for potentially violating the federal securities laws.
August 11
Pomerantz Haudek Grossman & Gross LLP announce that it is investigating claims on behalf of investors of SciClone to determine whether it has violated federal securities laws.
The law firm of Statman, Harris & Eyrich, LLC announce that it is investigating SciClone for potential violations of state and federal law.
Goldfarb Branham, LLP announce that it is investigating SciClone for shareholders who purchased stock of the company and preparing a possible derivative lawsuit against company executives.
Finkelstein Thompson LLP announce that it is investigating potential shareholder claims concerning SciClone.
August 12
Robbins Umeda LLP announce that it commenced an investigation into possible breaches of fiduciary duty and other violations of the law by certain officers and directors at SciClone.
August 13
The law firm of Kahn Swick & Foti announce that the firm has filed the first securities fraud class action lawsuit against SciClone in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of the Company between May 11, 2009 and August 10, 2010.
August 19
Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check, LLP announce that a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of purchasers of the securities of SciClone.
Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation, announce that a class action lawsuit has been commenced in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of SciClone.
August 20
Kendall Law Group announce an investigating of SciClone for shareholders.
Ryan & Maniskas, LLP announce that a class action lawsuit has been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of purchasers of SciClone.
August 28
Roy Jacobs & Associates (again) announce that it is investigating SciClone for potentially violating the federal securities laws.
September 7
The Shuman Law Firm announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of anyone who purchased or otherwise acquired SciClone common stock between May 11, 2009and August 10, 2010.
September 8
Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP announce that it has filed a class action suit against SciClone alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of purchasers of SciClone's common stock during the period May 11, 2009 and August 9, 2010.
September 16
The law firm of Strauss & Troy announce that a class action lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against SciClone for potential violations of state and federal law.
September 23
The law firm of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP announce that class action lawsuits have been brought on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of SciClone.
Given the above, you are probably wondering, geez, what did SciClone disclose - how extensive were the disclosed FCPA violations? Did the company's CEO or CFO resign? Is the company still in business?
Well, not exactly.
On August 9th, SciClone disclosed (see here) as follows:
"On August 5, 2010 SciClone was contacted by the SEC and advised that the SEC has initiated a formal, non-public investigation of SciClone. In connection with this investigation, the SEC issued a subpoena to SciClone requesting a variety of documents and other information. The subpoena requests documents relating to a range of matters including interactions with regulators and government-owned entities in China, activities relating to sales in China and documents relating to certain company financial and other disclosures. On August 6, 2010, the Company received a letter from the DOJ indicating that the DOJ was investigating Foreign Corrupt Practices Act issues in the pharmaceutical industry generally, and had received information about the Company’s practices suggesting possible violations."
During SciClone's August 9th earnings conference call Friedhelm Blobel (President and CEO) stated that SciClone "intends to cooperate fully with the SEC and DOJ in the conduct of their investigations, and has appointed a special committee of independent directors to oversee the Company's efforts." Blobel noted that "as far as timing is concerned, the lawyers tell us that these investigations typically are long lasting." In response to the question - is the investigation disrupting day-to-day operations or ongoing sales, Gary Titus (CFO) said that "it is business as usual for SciClone, and we continue to focus on all of the priorities that we have set for the Company ..."
That's right.
All of the above occured because the SEC initiated a formal investigation of SciClone and issued a subpoena to the company and because SciClone received a letter from the DOJ as to an industry-wide investigation suggesting possible improper conduct by the company.
You be the judge.
Are the above referenced investigations and lawsuits a rational and value added exercise for shareholders of SciClone or rather indicative of an FCPA feeding frenzy where everyone, it seems, is trying to get a slice of the pie?
Has this all gotten a bit out-of-hand?
*****
Yesterday, SciClone (see here) announced "continued topline growth and strong cash position in the Third Quarter of 2010."
Friday, October 8, 2010
Save The Date .... and ... The Friday Roundup
Save The Date
Deferred prosecution agreements, affirmative defenses, companies x, y, and z.
On a daily basis this site and - those who follow it - are, to use the analogy, generally focused on the trees. However, the trees are part of a vast forest.
Against the backdrop of aggressive enforcement of bribery and corruption laws worldwide, several basic questions remain unanswered, or at least subject to dispute.
It is these big-picture questions that will be the focus of an upcoming roundtable discussion ("Bribery - What is It, What Can Be Done, What Should Be Done, and How to Comply?") at International Law Weekend, an event presented by the American Branch of the International Law Association and the International Law Students Association. The roundtable will take place on Saturday, October 23 at 10:45 at Fordham University School of Law.
I am pleased to co-chair the panel along with Corinne Lammers (Paul, Hastings - see here). Other participants include: Bruce Bean (Michigan State College of Law - here), Daniel Chow (The Ohio State University College of Law - here), Elizabeth Spahn (New England College of Law - Boston - here), and Andy Spalding (Chicago-Kent College of Law - here).
See here for the full event schedule.
Friday Roundup
An FCPA investigation in the midst of a merger, a voluntary disclosure involving "minor" entertainment and gifts relating to a few "discrete transactions involving immaterial revenue," World Bank debarment, and the blogging life ... it's all here in the Friday roundup.
FCPA Investigation in the Midst of a Merger
In June, Spain-based Grifols, S.A. (a global healthcare company and leading producer of plasma protein therapies) and Talecris (a U.S.-based biotherapeutics products company) announced that they signed a definitive agreement by which Grifols will acquire Talecris. See here and here.
In the meantime, Talecris is conducting a mammoth FCPA internal investigation. Here is the lastest from the recent Form F-4 Registration Statement of Grifols.
"Talecris is conducting an internal investigation into potential violations of the FCPA that it became aware of during the conduct of an unrelated review. The FCPA investigation is being conducted by outside counsel under the direction of a special committee of the Talecris Board of Directors. The investigation into certain possibly improper payments to individuals and entities made after Talecris’ formation initially focused on payments made in connection with sales in certain Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries, primarily Belarus, Russia and Iran, but Talecris is also reviewing sales practices in Brazil, China, Georgia, Turkey and other countries as deemed appropriate."
"In July 2009, Talecris voluntarily contacted the U.S. Department of Justice, which is referred to as the DOJ, to advise them of the investigation and to offer its cooperation in any investigation that they want to conduct or they want Talecris to conduct. The DOJ has not indicated what action it may take, if any, against Talecris or any individual, or the extent to which it may conduct its own investigation. The DOJ or other federal agencies may seek to impose sanctions on Talecris that may include, among other things, injunctive relief, disgorgement, fines, penalties, appointment of a monitor, appointment of new control staff, or enhancement of existing compliance and training programs. Other countries in which Talecris does business may initiate their own investigations and impose similar penalties. As a result of this investigation, Talecris suspended shipments to some countries while it put additional safeguards in place. In some cases, safeguards involved terminating consultants and suspending relations with or terminating distributors in countries under investigation as circumstances warranted. These actions unfavorably affected revenue from these countries in 2009 and have an ongoing unfavorable impact on revenue in 2010. Talecris has resumed sales in countries where it has appropriate safeguards in place and is reallocating product to other countries as necessary. To the extent that Talecris concludes, or the DOJ concludes, that Talecris cannot implement adequate safeguards or otherwise need to change its business practices, distributors, or consultants in affected countries or other countries, this may result in a permanent loss of business from those countries. These sanctions or the loss of business, if any, could have a material adverse effect on Talecris or its results of operations."
What has the internal investigation cost thus far?
According to the same filing, approximately $12.9 million (see pg. 303).
The above was not the only FCPA disclosure news this week.
The Voluntary Disclosure Involving "Minor" Entertainment and Gifts Relating to a Few "Discrete Transactions Involving Immaterial Revenues"
Real estate is not generally thought of as an FCPA high-risk industry.
Yet, earlier this week CB Richard Ellis, a "global leader in real estate services" (see here), disclosed as follows in its 8-K:
"As a result of an internal investigation that began in the first quarter of 2010, the Company determined that some of its employees in certain of its offices in China made payments in violation of Company policy to local governmental officials, including payments for non−business entertainment and in the form of gifts. The payments the Company discovered are minor in amount and the Company believes relate to only a few discrete transactions involving immaterial revenues. Nonetheless, the Company believes that the payments may have been in violation of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or other applicable laws. Consequently, the Company voluntarily disclosed these events to the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on February 27, 2010 and has continued to cooperate with both the DOJ and the SEC in connection with this
investigation. The Company engaged outside counsel to investigate these events and has implemented thorough remedial measures.
In addition, in the third quarter of 2010, the Company began another internal investigation, with the assistance of outside counsel, involving the use of a third party agent in connection with a purchase in 2008 of an investment property in China for one of the funds the Company manages through its Global Investment Management business. This investigation is ongoing and at this point the Company is unable to predict the duration, scope or results thereof. In light of the Company’s cooperation with the DOJ and the SEC as described above, the Company voluntarily notified both agencies of this separate internal investigation and will report back to them when the Company has more information."
One can perhaps understand a voluntary disclosure when the payments at issue involve suitcases full of cash to government officials to obtain or retain government contracts.
But a voluntary disclosure based on "minor" entertainment and gifts involving a "few discrete transactions involving immaterial revenues?"
Has it truly come to this rather than the company internally handling such "minor" "discrete transactions involving immaterial revenue" in an effective manner?
Did FCPA counsel advise the company that voluntary disclosure was necessary in this instance? Perhaps not necessary, but preferable? How would you handle this issue if you were the company's in-house counsel or on the company's board?
Interesting questions indeed.
For more on voluntary disclosure and the role of FCPA counsel see this prior post.
World Bank Debarment
The EU and US debarment directives and regulations may be "toothless," but the World Bank is in charge of its own debarment decisions when it comes to World Bank financed or executed projects.
A prior post (here) discussed the World Bank's debarment of Macmillan Limited and recently the World Bank announced (see here) that its Sanctions Board debarred "four companies and two individuals for fraudulent practices in projects in India and Afghanistan" following "inquiries by the World Bank's Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), which is responsible for investigating fraud and corruption in World Bank-financed projects."
According to the release:
"In India, the World Bank Group debarred Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Limited (ASE) and Chemito Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Chemito) for having engaged in fraudulent practices relating to the Food and Drugs Capacity Building project. Both ASE and Chemito are ineligible to be awarded contracts under any Bank Group-financed or Bank Group-executed project or otherwise participate in the preparation or implementation of such projects for three years. The debarment may be reduced to two years if the companies put in place and implement effective corporate compliance programs."
"The third decision relates to fraudulent practices by Global Spin Weave Limited (GSW) and its Director Sudhir Agrawal. The company’s misconduct was substantiated in relation to three Bank-financed projects in India; namely: First Reproductive and Child Health Project, Second National HIV/AIDS Control Project and the Malaria Control Project. According to the Sanctions Board decision, GSW is ineligible to be awarded contracts under any Bank Group-financed or Bank Group-executed project or otherwise participate in the preparation or implementation of such projects for five years. The debarment may be reduced to four years if GSW puts in place and implements an effective corporate compliance program. Mr. Agrawal’s period of ineligibility is three years."
"In relation to the Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project in Afghanistan, the Sanctions Board debarred Ronberg Gruppe LLC, AG (Ronberg) and its Director Nikolay V. Vakorin for having engaged in fraudulent practices. Ronberg and Mr. Vakorin are ineligible to be awarded contracts under any Bank Group-financed or Bank Group-executed project or otherwise participate in the preparation or implementation of such projects for three years."
The World Bank release notes that the above "cases are eligible for cross debarment under the April 2010 Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions entered into by the African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank Group and the Inter-American Development Bank Group." For more on that Agreement see here.
The Blogging Life
Interested in blogging?
See here for my recent interview with Jerod Morris of Corporate Compliance Insights. We also talk a bit about the FCPA!
A good weekend to all.
Deferred prosecution agreements, affirmative defenses, companies x, y, and z.
On a daily basis this site and - those who follow it - are, to use the analogy, generally focused on the trees. However, the trees are part of a vast forest.
Against the backdrop of aggressive enforcement of bribery and corruption laws worldwide, several basic questions remain unanswered, or at least subject to dispute.
It is these big-picture questions that will be the focus of an upcoming roundtable discussion ("Bribery - What is It, What Can Be Done, What Should Be Done, and How to Comply?") at International Law Weekend, an event presented by the American Branch of the International Law Association and the International Law Students Association. The roundtable will take place on Saturday, October 23 at 10:45 at Fordham University School of Law.
I am pleased to co-chair the panel along with Corinne Lammers (Paul, Hastings - see here). Other participants include: Bruce Bean (Michigan State College of Law - here), Daniel Chow (The Ohio State University College of Law - here), Elizabeth Spahn (New England College of Law - Boston - here), and Andy Spalding (Chicago-Kent College of Law - here).
See here for the full event schedule.
Friday Roundup
An FCPA investigation in the midst of a merger, a voluntary disclosure involving "minor" entertainment and gifts relating to a few "discrete transactions involving immaterial revenue," World Bank debarment, and the blogging life ... it's all here in the Friday roundup.
FCPA Investigation in the Midst of a Merger
In June, Spain-based Grifols, S.A. (a global healthcare company and leading producer of plasma protein therapies) and Talecris (a U.S.-based biotherapeutics products company) announced that they signed a definitive agreement by which Grifols will acquire Talecris. See here and here.
In the meantime, Talecris is conducting a mammoth FCPA internal investigation. Here is the lastest from the recent Form F-4 Registration Statement of Grifols.
"Talecris is conducting an internal investigation into potential violations of the FCPA that it became aware of during the conduct of an unrelated review. The FCPA investigation is being conducted by outside counsel under the direction of a special committee of the Talecris Board of Directors. The investigation into certain possibly improper payments to individuals and entities made after Talecris’ formation initially focused on payments made in connection with sales in certain Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries, primarily Belarus, Russia and Iran, but Talecris is also reviewing sales practices in Brazil, China, Georgia, Turkey and other countries as deemed appropriate."
"In July 2009, Talecris voluntarily contacted the U.S. Department of Justice, which is referred to as the DOJ, to advise them of the investigation and to offer its cooperation in any investigation that they want to conduct or they want Talecris to conduct. The DOJ has not indicated what action it may take, if any, against Talecris or any individual, or the extent to which it may conduct its own investigation. The DOJ or other federal agencies may seek to impose sanctions on Talecris that may include, among other things, injunctive relief, disgorgement, fines, penalties, appointment of a monitor, appointment of new control staff, or enhancement of existing compliance and training programs. Other countries in which Talecris does business may initiate their own investigations and impose similar penalties. As a result of this investigation, Talecris suspended shipments to some countries while it put additional safeguards in place. In some cases, safeguards involved terminating consultants and suspending relations with or terminating distributors in countries under investigation as circumstances warranted. These actions unfavorably affected revenue from these countries in 2009 and have an ongoing unfavorable impact on revenue in 2010. Talecris has resumed sales in countries where it has appropriate safeguards in place and is reallocating product to other countries as necessary. To the extent that Talecris concludes, or the DOJ concludes, that Talecris cannot implement adequate safeguards or otherwise need to change its business practices, distributors, or consultants in affected countries or other countries, this may result in a permanent loss of business from those countries. These sanctions or the loss of business, if any, could have a material adverse effect on Talecris or its results of operations."
What has the internal investigation cost thus far?
According to the same filing, approximately $12.9 million (see pg. 303).
The above was not the only FCPA disclosure news this week.
The Voluntary Disclosure Involving "Minor" Entertainment and Gifts Relating to a Few "Discrete Transactions Involving Immaterial Revenues"
Real estate is not generally thought of as an FCPA high-risk industry.
Yet, earlier this week CB Richard Ellis, a "global leader in real estate services" (see here), disclosed as follows in its 8-K:
"As a result of an internal investigation that began in the first quarter of 2010, the Company determined that some of its employees in certain of its offices in China made payments in violation of Company policy to local governmental officials, including payments for non−business entertainment and in the form of gifts. The payments the Company discovered are minor in amount and the Company believes relate to only a few discrete transactions involving immaterial revenues. Nonetheless, the Company believes that the payments may have been in violation of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or other applicable laws. Consequently, the Company voluntarily disclosed these events to the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on February 27, 2010 and has continued to cooperate with both the DOJ and the SEC in connection with this
investigation. The Company engaged outside counsel to investigate these events and has implemented thorough remedial measures.
In addition, in the third quarter of 2010, the Company began another internal investigation, with the assistance of outside counsel, involving the use of a third party agent in connection with a purchase in 2008 of an investment property in China for one of the funds the Company manages through its Global Investment Management business. This investigation is ongoing and at this point the Company is unable to predict the duration, scope or results thereof. In light of the Company’s cooperation with the DOJ and the SEC as described above, the Company voluntarily notified both agencies of this separate internal investigation and will report back to them when the Company has more information."
One can perhaps understand a voluntary disclosure when the payments at issue involve suitcases full of cash to government officials to obtain or retain government contracts.
But a voluntary disclosure based on "minor" entertainment and gifts involving a "few discrete transactions involving immaterial revenues?"
Has it truly come to this rather than the company internally handling such "minor" "discrete transactions involving immaterial revenue" in an effective manner?
Did FCPA counsel advise the company that voluntary disclosure was necessary in this instance? Perhaps not necessary, but preferable? How would you handle this issue if you were the company's in-house counsel or on the company's board?
Interesting questions indeed.
For more on voluntary disclosure and the role of FCPA counsel see this prior post.
World Bank Debarment
The EU and US debarment directives and regulations may be "toothless," but the World Bank is in charge of its own debarment decisions when it comes to World Bank financed or executed projects.
A prior post (here) discussed the World Bank's debarment of Macmillan Limited and recently the World Bank announced (see here) that its Sanctions Board debarred "four companies and two individuals for fraudulent practices in projects in India and Afghanistan" following "inquiries by the World Bank's Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), which is responsible for investigating fraud and corruption in World Bank-financed projects."
According to the release:
"In India, the World Bank Group debarred Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Limited (ASE) and Chemito Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Chemito) for having engaged in fraudulent practices relating to the Food and Drugs Capacity Building project. Both ASE and Chemito are ineligible to be awarded contracts under any Bank Group-financed or Bank Group-executed project or otherwise participate in the preparation or implementation of such projects for three years. The debarment may be reduced to two years if the companies put in place and implement effective corporate compliance programs."
"The third decision relates to fraudulent practices by Global Spin Weave Limited (GSW) and its Director Sudhir Agrawal. The company’s misconduct was substantiated in relation to three Bank-financed projects in India; namely: First Reproductive and Child Health Project, Second National HIV/AIDS Control Project and the Malaria Control Project. According to the Sanctions Board decision, GSW is ineligible to be awarded contracts under any Bank Group-financed or Bank Group-executed project or otherwise participate in the preparation or implementation of such projects for five years. The debarment may be reduced to four years if GSW puts in place and implements an effective corporate compliance program. Mr. Agrawal’s period of ineligibility is three years."
"In relation to the Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project in Afghanistan, the Sanctions Board debarred Ronberg Gruppe LLC, AG (Ronberg) and its Director Nikolay V. Vakorin for having engaged in fraudulent practices. Ronberg and Mr. Vakorin are ineligible to be awarded contracts under any Bank Group-financed or Bank Group-executed project or otherwise participate in the preparation or implementation of such projects for three years."
The World Bank release notes that the above "cases are eligible for cross debarment under the April 2010 Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions entered into by the African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank Group and the Inter-American Development Bank Group." For more on that Agreement see here.
The Blogging Life
Interested in blogging?
See here for my recent interview with Jerod Morris of Corporate Compliance Insights. We also talk a bit about the FCPA!
A good weekend to all.
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