All About Panalpina

Last but certainly not least in the analysis of CustomsGate enforcement actions is Panalpina.

See here for the prior post on the Pride International enforcement action, here for the prior post on the Shell enforcement action, here for the prior post on the Transocean enforcement action, here for the prior post on the Tidewater enforcement action here for the prior post on the Noble enforcement action and here for the prior post on the GlobalSantaFe enforcement action.

The Panalpina enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was approximately $81.9 million ($70.6 million criminal fine via a DOJ plea agreement and deferred prosecution agreement; $11.3 million in disgorgement via a SEC settled complaint).

This is a long post, but the enforcement action takes up 230 pages.

What you will find in these pages is that Panalpina paid millions of dollars of alleged bribes on behalf of certain of its customers (and in some instances for its own benefit as well), that a majority of the improper payments relate to Nigeria, and that a majority of Nigerian payments relate to temporary importation permits in connection with importing rigs and other vessels into Nigerian waters.

As to a U.S. nexus of these payments (a nexus necessary to find Panalpina, a foreign based non-issuer company, liable under the FCPA) you will find that the information alleges one e-mail and one conference call in which a certain Nigerian payment was discussed.

You will find that Panalpina also engaged in alleged improper conduct in numerous other countries besides Nigeria, but because of how the deferred prosecution agreement is structured, Panalpina ended up paying $0 for this non-Nigeria improper conduct.

You will find how Panalpina, despite an alleged corporate culture of bribery, including at the most senior levels of the company, was offered a deferred prosecution agreement even though it did not disclose the conduct at issue, even though it did not cooperate at all times in the DOJ's investigation, and even though certain improper payments continued while the company was engaged in discussions with the DOJ.

You will also find how the SEC asserted a rather unique jurisdictional basis against Panalpina. That is Panalpina acted as an agent for certain of its issuer-customers and violated the FCPA by masking the true nature of bribe payments in invoices submitted to its issuer customers that allowed the customers to then violate the FCPA.

DOJ

The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information against Panalpina World Transport (Holdings) Ltd. ("PWT") resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement and a criminal information against Panalpina Inc. resolved through a plea agreement.

PWT Criminal Information

Basel, Switzerland based PWT (here) "is one of the world's leading suppliers of forwarding and logistics services, specializing in global supply chain management solutions and intercontinental air freight and ocean freight shipments and associated supply chain management solutions." It operates "a close-knit network with some 500 branches in over 80 countries," does business in a further 80 countries with partner companies, and employs approximately 15,000 individuals.

The criminal information (here) focuses on a "network of local subsidiaries ... each of which was responsible for providing the freight forwarding and logistics services to customers and for coordinating with other Panalpina-affiliated companies with respect to the transportation and shipment of cargo from abroad." In addition, PWT and its subsidiaries "provided customers with importation, customs clearance and ground shipment services once the shipped goods reached their destination jurisdiction."

The subsidiaries are:

Panalpina Inc. ("Panalpina U.S"), a wholly-owned subsidiary and agent of PWT located in New Jersey with 38 branches in the U.S. ,including Houston - the office that had the "primary relationship for [Panalpina's] oil and gas industry customers";

Panalpina World Transports (Nigeria) Limited ("Panalpina Nigeria), a majority-owned subsidiary and agent of PWT until 2008 located in Lagos, Nigeria that was an "affiliate of Panalpina U.S. and provided a wide variety of services for Panalpina U.S.'s customers";

Panalpina Transportes Mundiasis, Navegacao e Transitos, SARL ("Panalpina Angola"), a wholly-owned subsidiary and agent of PWT located in Luanda, Angola;

Panalpina Limitada ("Panalpina Brazil"), a wholly-owned subsidiary and agent of PWT located in Sao Paulo, Brazil;

Panalpina Azerbaijan LLC ("Panalpina Azerbaijan"), a wholly-owned subsidiary and agent of PWT located in Baku, Azerbaijan;

Panalpina Kazakhstan LLP ("Panalpina Kazakhstan"), a wholly-owned subsidiary and agent of PWT located in Almaty, Kazakhstan;

Panalpina World Transport Limited (Russia) ("Panalpina Russia"), a wholly-owned subsidiary and agent of PWT located in Moscow, Russia; and

Panalpina World Transport Limited (Turkmenistan) ("Panalpina Turkmenistan"), a wholly-owned subsidiary and agent of PWT located in Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan.

The information refers to PWT and the above subsidiaries collectively as "Panalpina."

The criminal information begins with a heading titled "Panalpina's Culture of Corruption." This section states as follows.

"Prior to 2007, dozens of employees throughout the Panalpina organization were involved in paying bribes to foreign offcials. Panalpina generally made payments on behalf of customers in order to circumvent the customs process for imports and exports of goods and items. Panalpina paid these bribes for various reasons, such as to cause officials to overlook insufficient, incorrect, or false documentation and to circumvent the local laws and inspections so as to allow the shipment of contraband (mainly unauthorized food and clothing). Panalpina also on occasion paid bribes to secure foreign government contracts for itself or to obtain favorable tax treatment by foreign governments."

According to the information, "the highest levels of PWT's leadership, including a former member of PWT's Board of Directors ("Board Member A"), knew of and tolerated Panalpina's payments of bribes."

The information states as follows:

"Panalpina's longstanding practice of making bribe payments in violation of the FCPA resulted from a variety of factors, including: (1) pressure from Panalpina's customers to have services performed as quickly as possible, or to receive preferential treatment in obtaining services; (2) an inadequate compliance structure; (3) a corporate culture that tolerated and/or encouraged bribery prior to 2007 as customary and necessary in various markets; (4) the involvement of management in PWT's Swiss headquarters that tolerated the improper payments prior to 2007; and (5) the involvement of Panalpina management in the U.S. and in other countries that encouraged the improper payments prior to 2007."

According to the information, between 2002 and 2007 "Panalpina paid bribes to foreign officials valued at approximately $49 million" and "payments paid on behalf of Panalpina's U.S. customers and their foreign subsidiaries accounted for approximately $27 million of these bribes payments."

The criminal information (here) alleges bribery schemes in Nigeria, Angola, Brazil, Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkenistan.

Nigeria

According to the information:

"Panalpina had a substantial number of oil and gas customers that shipped items into Nigeria, including customers in the United States. The goods shipped by Panalpina into Nigeria could only be imported into the jurisdiction if they satisfied the local statutory and regulatory requirements, which required product inspection, submission of satisfactory paperwork, and payment of customs duties and other taxes. Furthermore, once the items had been imported, they remained subject to local laws or regulations. Some of Panalpina's customers, including its U.S. customers, sought to avoid local customs and import laws and processes by seeking to import goods without sufficient documentation, without being inspected, or without paying the required taxes, duties or fees. Panalpina used a portion of the revenue earned from its customers to make bribe payments to local customs officials in exchange for their cooperation in assisting Panalpina in circumventing these local legal or regulatory requirements on behalf of Panalpina's customers. Panalpina sought reimbursement for these bribe payments through invoices that used false terms to characterize the bribe payments."

According to the information, Panalpina used "approximately 160 different terms [internally and externally to invoice customers] to falsely describe the bribes it paid in Nigeria relating to the customs process."

The information alleges that "the bribes paid by Panalpina relating to the customs process were paid to officials in the Nigerian Customer Service ("NCS"), a Nigerian government agency" responsible for "assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on goods imported into Nigeria."

According to the information, between 2002 and 2007, "Panalpina paid over $30 million in bribes to Nigerian government officials" and "payments made on behalf of Panalpina's U.S. customers and their foreign subsidiaries accounted for at least $19 million of these bribe payments."

The information describes four types of "bribery payments" in Nigeria - (1) Pancourier; (2) Temporary Import Permits payments; (3) "special" and other bribe payments; and (4) "recurring payments to government officials." According to the DPA statement of facts "the overall largest category of payments, accounting for the largest amount of bribes, related to securing Temporary Importation Permits on behalf of its customers" and "those bribes ranged in value from $5,000 to over $75,000 per transaction."

Pancourier

"Pancourier" was Panalpina's "express courier service" that certain Panalpina customers used instead of "the normal shipping process" to "import goods or contraband into Nigeria without complying with Nigerian customs law." According to the information, "Panalpina charged its customers a premium for this service and explained that no government receipt or paperwork would be available from NCS for the goods that were imported." The information alleges that "Panalpina typically billed its customers for two separate charges" (1) a charge based on the weight of the shipment; and (2) a "special fee" that was a "bribe paid to the NCS officials for the purpose of securing an improper advantage for the customer."

According to the information, between 2002 and 2007 "Panalpina, through Panalpina Nigeria, paid hundreds of bribes to NCS officials in relation to the Pancourier service."

Special and Other Improper Payments

The information states as follows:

"In addition to the Pancourier service, Panalpina also offered standard freight forwarding and shipping services. For standard Panalpina freight forwarding and shipping, once the goods arrived at their destination, a Panalpina Nigeria employee would ensure that the goods cleared customs. The clearance process typically required the submission of documents, an inspection of the product being shipped, and the payment of any customs and other fees associated with the importation of that product. The goods shipped by Panalpina frequently encountered delays in clearng customs for various reasons, including insufficient or missing documentation or delays due to the legally-required inspection process. Panalpina customers often sought to avoid local customs and import laws and processes to expedite their shipments into Nigeria. Panalpina made cash bribe payments, through Panalpina Nigeria, to local government officials, including NCS employees, to expedite customs clearance, avoid the required cargo inspections, avoid fines, duty payments, and tax payments, and to circumvent permit requirements and other legal requirements."

According to the information, between 2002 and 2007, "Panalpina, through Panalpina, Nigeria, paid thousands of bribes on behalf of its customers to Nigerian government officials to resolve these types of customs and immigration matters."

Temporary Import Permits Payments

The information states as follows:

"Another service offered by Panalpina involved obtaining Temporary Import Permits ("TIPs") required under Nigerian law to import high-value special equipment, such as rigs and other large vessels, into Nigerian water. A TIP could be extended through two six-month extensions (known as "TIP extensions"). Vessels imported under a TIP (and TIP extensions) could not remain in Nigeria longer than the period allowed for by the TIP and/or TIP extensions. Upon expiration, the vessel was required to be exported from Nigeria and, if appropriate, the customer could re-apply for a new TIP. Panalpina, through Panalpina Nigeria, made improper payments to Nigerian government officials to assist some of its customers to circumvent TIP regulations. Specifically, Panalpina Nigeria made payments to NCS officials, on behalf of customers, to extend TIPs without complying with Nigerian TIP regulations. As a result, the customers avoided the time and cost of removing vessels upon the expiration of the TIP, as was otherwise required by Nigerian law."

According to the information, between 2002 and 2007, "Panalpina, through Panalpina Nigeria, paid over a hundred bribes to Nigerian government officials on behalf of Panalpina's customers to improperly secure TIPs and TIP extensions."

Payment of Bribes to Secure a Contract

The information alleges that between November 2003 and August 2005, "Panalpina promised to pay $50,000 to a National Petroleum Investment Management Services official (the "NAPIMS Official) in exchange for the official's assistance in securing the award by NAPIMS of a logistics contract to Panalpina." According to the information, "Panalpina was awarded a global framework logistics contract in or around November 2003" and "in or around November 2005, PWT directed the $50,000 bribe payment to be made to the NAPIMS Official in cash."

The information states that NAPIMS supervised and managed Nigeria's investment in the oil and gas industry and NAPIMS officials had the authority to approve or disapprove logistics contracts awarded for certain projects.

Recurring Payments to Government Officials

Although referenced in the information, the information does not contain any detail about such payments.

However, the DPA's statement of facts states as follows.

"Panalpina Nigeria made improper payments to a wide variety of Nigerian officials, including, but not limited to, NCS offcials, Port Authority offcials, Maritime Authority officials, Police officials, Deparment of Petroleum officials, Immigration Authority officials, and National Authority for Food and Drug Control officials. Most of these improper payments were tied to specific transactions, however, Panalpina Nigeria also provided certain officials weekly or monthly allowances to ensure the officials would provide preferential treatment to Panalpina and its customers. Between in or around 2002 and in or around 2007, Panalpina made hundreds of improper weekly and monthly payments to Nigerian government officials."

Angola

The information charges that between 2002 and 2008 "Panalpina Angola paid approximately $4.5 million in bribes to Angolan government officials." Two types of payments are described: "Customs and Immigration Payments" and "Payments to Secure Contracts."

Customs and Immigration Payments

According to the information, the payments were made to "Angolan government officials responsible for customs and immigration matters" and the purpose of the payments was to "cause such officials to: overlook incomplete or inaccurate documentation; avoid levying proper customs duties; or avoid imposition of fines relating to the failure of Panalpina Angola, or its customer, to comply with legal requirements." According to the information, Panalpina Angola paid "hundreds of bribes" ranging from "de minimus amounts to $25,000 per transaction."

Payments to Secure Contracts

The information charges that between December 2006 and March 2008, "Panalpina Angola paid over $300,000 to two Angolan government officials responsible for Angolan oil and gas operations to secure two separate logistics contracts." According to the information, the officials "had the authority to approve or disapprove the retention of logistics companies to provide services for projects that Panalpina sought to secure." According to the information, in connection with certain of these payments, Panalpina Angola "invoiced an Angolan government-controlled entity for a non-existent employee (referred to as the 'ghost employee') who was allegedly dedicated to the Angolan entity to work on the logistics for the particular project."

Azerbaijan

The information states as follows.

"Between in or around 2002 and in or around 2007, Panalpina Azerbaijan paid approximately $900,000 in bribes to Azeri government officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on imported goods. [...] The purpose of many of the bribes paid to the Azeri government officials was to cause these officials to overlook incomplete or inaccurate documentation; avoid levying proper customs duties; or avoid imposition of fines relating to the failure of Panalpina, or its customer, to comply with legal requirements. In addition, Panalpina also made bribe payments to Azeri tax officials to secure preferential treatment for Panalpina Azerbaijan."

Brazil

The information states as follows.

"Between in or around 2002 and in or around 2007, Panalpina Brazil paid over $1 millon in bribes to Brazilian govermnent officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on imported goods on behalf of its customers. [...] The purpose of many of these bribes was to expedite the customs clearance process; to avoid the imposition of fines and penalties; to circumvent Brazilian law requirements for customs declaration of courier shipments; to permit shipments to be imported in Brazil without an import license; and to allow exports from Brazil of goods originally imported without accurate and complete documentation. Many of the bribe payments made by Panalpina Brazil on behalf of its customers were in connection with shipments to Brazil originating with Panalpina U.S. from the United States."

Kazakhstan

The information states as follows.

"Between in or around 2002 and in or around 2007, Panalpina Kazakhstan paid over $4 milion in bribes to Kazakh governent officials, including, for example, payments to Kazakh government officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on imported goods and officials responsible for administering and enforcing Kazakhstan tax policy. [...] The purpose of many of the bribes paid to the Kazakh government officials was to cause officials to overlook incomplete or inaccurate documentation; avoid levying proper customs duties; and avoid imposition of fines relating to the failure of Panalpina, or its customer, to comply with legal requirements."

According to the information, the payments "ranged from several hundred dollars to $50,000 per transaction."

The information further states that "Panalpina Kazakhstan paid bribes to Kazakhstan officials responsible for administering Kazkhstan tax policy in conjunction with its annual tax audits to minimize the duration and depth of the audits as well as to reduce proposed fines."

Russia

The information states as follows.

"Between in or around 2002 and in or around 2007, Panalpina Russia paid over $7 milion in bribes to Russian government officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties on imported goods. [...] The purpose of many of the bribes paid to the Russian government officials was to avoid delays, administrative fines, and other legal action as a result of missing, incomplete or erroneous documentation; to avoid problems arising out of the improper use of a TIP; and to bypass the customs process in total."

Turkmenistan

The information states as follows.

"Between in or around 2002 and in or around 2009, Panalpina Turkmenistan paid over $500,000 in cash bribes to: (i) Turkmen government officials responsible for assessing and collecting duties and tariffs on imported goods in order to expedite the release of shipments and undocumented shipments and to circumvent the official Turkmen customs and immigration regulations; (ii) Turkmen government officials responsible for auditing, assessing, and collecting taxes on economic activity in Turkmenistan to minimize the duration of audits and investigations and to reduce proposed fines; and (iii) Turkmen govermnent officials responsible for enforcing Turkmenistan labor, health, and safcty laws, including through the use of audits and inspections, to minimize the duration of audits and investigations and to reduce the proposed fines."

Based on all of the above conduct, the information charges conspiracy to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. In addition, as to the Nigeria conduct, the information charges FCPA anti-bribery violations.

As to a U.S. nexus (a requirement for an entity such as PWT to be in violation of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions under 78dd-3), the information merely alleges that in November 2003 "a Panalpina U.S. employee located in Houston, Texas, sent an e-mail to a Panalpina employee based in Switzerland advising that the NAPIMS Official would award a logistics contract with the Nigerian government to Panalpina in exchange for a bribe of $50,000" and that in November 2003 "Panalpina employees based in Switzerland, Panalpina U.S. employees located in Houston, Texas, and others participated in a conference call to discuss the $50,000 payment to the NAPIMS Official."

PWT DPA

The DOJ's charges against PWT were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement (see here).

Pursuant to the DPA, PWT admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was responsible for the acts of its directors, officers, employees, subsidiaries, agents and consultants as set forth above.

The DPA's statement of facts contains a separate section titled "Panalpina U.S.'s Assistance to its Issuer-Customers in Circumventing Books and Records Controls." This section states that between 2002 and 2007 "Panalpina U.S. provided services to over 40 customers that were issuers" and that "in total, Panalpina paid approximately $27 million in bribes to foreign officials on behalf of these issuer-customers."

In pertinent part, the statement of facts state as follows.

"Many of Panalpina U.S.'s issuer-customers knew, or were aware of facts indicating a high probability, that Panalpina was paying bribes on their behalf. Further, those issuer-customers with knowledge of the bribe payments failed to properly record the payments in their books and records."

"Many of Panalpina's issuer-customers were aware of the bribes paid by Panalpina. Importantly, those issuer-customers with strong compliance programs or rigorous audit standards were either not offered services such as Pancourier, which included improper payments to governent officials, or Panalpina paid bribes on the issuer-customer's behalf but would not invoice the issuer-customer for the payment."

"Panalpina US., through the local Panalpina affiiates, knowingly and substantially assisted the issuer-customers in violating the FCPA's books and records provisions by masking the true nature of the bribe payments in the invoices submitted to the issuer-customers. By providing an invoice to the issuer-customer for what appeared to be a legitimate payment, the customer could use that invoice as support for recording a particular charge as a legitimate service in its corporate books and records when, in fact, the invoice was for a bribe."

The statement of facts then describe how Panalpina Nigeria specifically assisted Customer A (Shell) and Customer B (Tidwater) in making bribe payments for Pancourier services and TIP payments.

The DPA's statement of facts provides further information about "Panalpina's Corporate Culture and Senior Management Knowledge." According to the statement of facts: "Prior to 2007 a culture of corruption within Panalpina emanated from senior level management in Switzerland who tolerated bribery as business as usual in various markets. This trickled down to other Panalpina employees who accepted bribery as a part of Panalpina's standard business practice." According to the statement of facts: "Many employees openly used the terms 'apples,' 'interventions,' 'special handling,' and 'evacuations' on a daily basis in conversations, written correspondence, and e-mail exchanges" even though "most employees understood that these terms referred to cash payments provided to government officials in exchange for preferential treatment."

The term of the DPA is three years and seven months and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement "based on the individual facts and circumstances" of the case and PWT. Among the factors stated are the following.

(a) PWT conducted comprehensive anti-bribery compliance investigations of operations of PWT's subsidiaries in seven countries, as well as separate investigations related to U.S. and Swiss operations;

(b) PWT conducted a review of certain transactions and operations conducted by its subsidiaries or agents in another 36 countries;

(c) PWT promptly and voluntarily reported its findings from all investigations to the Department, including arranging to provide information from foreign jurisdictions which significantly facilitated the Department's access to such information;

(d) PWT mandated employee cooperation from the top down and ensured the availabilty of more than 300 employees and former employees for interviews during and following the investigations;

(e) PWT instituted a limited employee amnesty program to encourage employee cooperation with the investigations;

(f) PWT expanded the scope of the investigations where necessary to ensure thorough and effective review of potentially improper practices, and promptly and voluntarily reported any improper payments identified after internal and Department investigations had begun;

(g) After initially not cooperating with the investigation for several months, PWT fully cooperated with the Department's investigation of this matter, as well as the SEC's investigation, and on the whole exhibited exemplary
cooperation with the Departent's investigation;

(h) PWT provided substantial assistance to the Department and the SEC in its investigation of its directors, officers, employees, agents, lawyers, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, subsidiaries and customers relating to violations of the FCPA;

(i) PWT undertook substantial remedial measures [the DPA then lists 10 such measures including "of its own initiative and at a substantial cost, PWT closed down its operations and withdrew from Nigeria to avoid potential ongoing improper conduct"]; and

(j) PWT agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of PWT and its directors, officers, employees, agents, lawyers, consultants, subcontractors, subsidiaries, and customers relating to violations of the FCPA.

As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above described conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $72.8 million to $145.6. Pursuant to the DPA, PWT agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $70.56 million. However, the DOJ and PWT agreed "that any criminal penalty that is imposed by the Court and paid by Panalpina U.S., in connection with its guilty plea and plea agreement entered into simultaneously herewith will be deducted from the $70,560,000 criminal penalty required by this Agreement." Because the Panalpina Inc. plea agreement (which relates only to Nigeria conduct) contemplates a payment of $70,560,000, the effect of the above clause is that PWT will end up paying $0 for the non-Nigeria conduct described in the DPA.

Also of note, even though the DPA states that PWT did not initially cooperate with the DOJ's investigation for several months, PWT nevertheless received sentencing credit for "fully cooperating" in the DOJ's investigation.

Pursuant to the DPA, PWT agreed to a host of compliance undertakings and to report to the DOJ (during the term of the DPA) "on its progress and experience in implementing and, as appropriate, enhancing its compliance policies and procedures."

The DPA references three tolling agreements agreed to between January 2008 and October 2010.

As is standard in FCPA DPAs, PWT agreed not to make any public statement "contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by PWT as set forth" in the DPA and PWT further agreed to only issue a press release in connection with the DPA if the DOJ does not object to the release.

Panalpina U.S. Criminal Information

The criminal information (here) describes "Panalpina U.S.'s Actions to Conceal Bribes on Behalf of Its Issuer-Customers in Nigeria." Separate sections concern "Pancourier Express Courier Payments" and "Temporary Importation Payments."

Count One of the information charges Panalpina U.S., a non-issuer, with conspiring and agreeing with Customer A [Shell] and Customer B [Tidewater] "to knowingly falsify and cause to be falsified books, records, and accounts which were required, in reasonable detail, to accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of Customer A, Customer B, and other issuers" in violation of the FCPA's books and records provisions.

Count Two of the information charges Panalpina U.S. with aiding and abetting FCPA books and records violations by aiding, abetting, and assisting Customer A [Shell] "in mischaracterizing payments for freight forwarding costs as 'administration/transport charges' in Customer A's books and records when, in truth and in fact, Customer A knew that these payments were bribes, paid through Panalpina Nigeria, intended to be transferred to NCS officials."

Panalpina U.S. Plea Agreement

The above criminal charges against Panalpina U.S. were resolved via a plea agreement (see here).

As stated in the plea agreement, the fine range for Panalpina U.S.'s conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $72.8 million to $145.6. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Panalpina U.S. agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $70.56 million.

In an "Agreed Motion to Waive the Presentence Report" (here) the DOJ states as follows.

"...Panalpina's cooperation and remediation in this matter has been exemplary. Panalpina provided substantial assistance to the Deparment in its investigations relating to these matters. In addition, where Panalpina encountered evidence of new violations in the course of its internal investigation, it expanded the scope of the investigation accordingly and reported the new findings to the Department. Panalpina acknowledged and accepted responsibility for misconduct, investigated and identified the nature and extent of the misconduct, and undertook comprehensive global remediation and training during the course of the investigation. Panalpina's remediation was global and included a dramatic change in its busincss model, paricularly in higher risk countries."

As to how the DOJ's investigation of PWT and its related entities began, the Report states as follows. "In approximately 2006, the Department opened an investigation into Panalpina's business practices based on evidence obtained through several Panalpina customers indicating Panalpina had paid bribes to foreign government officials on behalf of its customers."

The Report continues as follows. "In total, between in or around 2002 and in or around 2007, Panalpina paid bribes to offcials in at least seven countries, including Angola, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Approximately $27,000,000 of that total related directly to, and was paid on behalf of, customers that were US. issuers or "domestic concerns" within the meaning of the FCPA.

The Report contains a footnote that states "a small number of improper payments continued into 2008 and 2009." As to these payments, the Report notes elsewhere as follows. "Despite PWT's and Panalpina U.S.'s extensive efforts to transform its compliance program, during the course of the investigation, PWT uncovered a few instances in which employees were continuing to pay bribes to foreign officials. This improper conduct, although limited, continued to occur into 2008 and early 2009. Upon discovery, PWT took swift action to stop the payments, to disclose the conduct to the Department, to terminate and/or reprimand the employees implicated in the conduct, and to retrain employees in the relevant countries regarding the importance of adhering to PWT's compliance rules and regulations."

As to Panalpina's "Cooperation and Assistance" the Report states as follows.

"The Department initiated its investigation of Panalpina in or around mid-2006 based on conduct disclosed by Panalpina customers. Panalpina learned of the
investigation in or around late-2006 from its customers. Despite knowledge of the investigation, Panalpina did not voluntarily disclose the conduct to the Department and did not stop the illegal payment of bribes that was occurring on multiple continents. In or about early-2007, the Department requested documents and information from Panalpina; however, at that time, Panalpina exhibited a reluctance to cooperate with the investigation. Thereafter, Panalpina engaged and instructed its legal counsel ("Counsel") to conduct a comprehensive internal investigation, and ultimately authorized Counsel to report the findings to the Department and SEC. Thereafter, Panalpina exhibited exemplary cooperation with the Department and SEC, and conducted a comprehensive internal investigation that fully supported and paralleled the Department's investigation. Specifically, Panalpina engaged Counsel to lead investigations encompassing 46 jurisdictions and hired an outside audit firm to perform forensic analysis and other support tasks. Panalpina's internal investigation included a comprehensive review of operations in nine countries - the United States, Switzerland, Nigeria, Brazil, Angola, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan - and a detailed review of 102 additional issues in another 36 countries. Panalpina expanded the scope of its internal investigation where necessary, and promptly and voluntarly reported its findings from all investigations to the Department and SEC in over 60 meetings and calls. When potential issues were identified in countries not subject to a full investigation, Panalpina thoroughly investigated and remediated those issues. Panalpina voluntarily supplied to the Department and the SEC information from interviews and documentary evidence regarding potential violations by Panalpina customers and third parties used as conduits for improper payments and for facilitating improper transactions. Panalpina provided substantial assistance to the Department and SEC in the investigation of its own directors, officers, and employees, mandated employee cooperation from the top down, and made over 300 current and former employees available for interviews to Counsel, the Department, and the SEC during and after the internal investigation. Panalpina also adopted a limited employee amnesty program to encourage employee cooperation with the internal investigation."

The Report further notes as follows. "On September 30, 2010, in an unelated matter, PWT was charged in a three-count criminal information with fixing prices on surcharges added to air cargo shipments in certain trade lanes, in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 1. See United States v. Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., 10270-RJ (D.D.C.). The Company has agreed to plead guilty and to pay a fine of $11,947,845. No date has yet been set for entry of
the plea or sentencing."

SEC

The SEC's civil complaint (here) alleges, in summary, as follows.

"Between 2002 and continuing until 2007, Panalpina, Inc. engaged in a series of transactions whereby it directed business to affiliated companies within the Panalpina Group, which then used part of the revenues generated from this business to pay a significant number of bribes to government officials in countries including Nigeria, Angola, Brazil, Russia, and Kazakhstan. These bribes were paid by the Panalpina Group companies in order to assist Panalpina, Inc.' s issuer customers in obtaining preferential customs, duties, and import treatment in connection with international freight shipments. The practice of Panalpina Group companies making these payments was known to certain Panalpina, Inc. employees, including some
members of Panalpina, Inc.'s management. Although the reasons for the bribes, and the payment schemes themselves, differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and transaction by transaction, most shared several similarities. The issuer customers often used Panalpina, Inc. or other Panalpina Group companies to ship goods from the United States, or elsewhere, to another jurisdiction or sought Panalpina, Inc.'s assistance in obtaining customs or logistics services in the country to which the goods were shipped. However, for various reasons including delayed departures, insufficient or incorrect documentation, the nature of the goods being shipped and imported, or the refusal of local government officials to provide services without unofficial payments, Panalpina, Inc.' s issuer customers sometimes faced delays in importing the goods. In other cases, Panalpina, Inc.'s issuer customers sought to avoid local customs duties or inspection requirements or otherwise sought to import goods in circumvention of local law. In order to secure the importation of goods under these circumstances, Panalpina, Inc.' s issuer customers often authorized Panalpina, Inc. and the local affiliated Panalpina Group companies (e.g., Panalpina Nigeria) to bribe local government offcials. These cash payments to government officials were typically made by employees of the local affiliated Panalpina Group companies. The affiliated Panalpina Group companies generally invoiced the issuer customers for the bribes, along with other legitimate fees, either directly or through an affiliated billing entity ("Affiliated Billing Entity"). These invoices, which contained both legitimate and illegitimate costs incurred by the Panalpina Group companies, inaccurately referred to the payments as 'local processing,' 'special intervention,' 'special handling,' and other seemingly legitimate fees. In reality, these payments were bribes to local government officials in order to secure improper benefits for the issuer customers."

By engaging in this conduct, the SEC alleged that Panalpina, "while acting as an agent of its issuer customers" violated the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and aided and abetted its issuer customers' violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and books and records and internal control provisions. The SEC complaint specifically states that "neither Panalpina, Inc. nor PWT is an issuer for purposes of the FCPA."

As to Pancourier payments, the complaint alleges that in order to assist its issuer customers avoid certain Nigerian legal requirements, "Panalpina Inc. would ship the product to Nigeria wrapped in a distinctive manner so that customs officials would recognize it as a Pancourier shipment and not inspect it, require a Form M, or otherwise subject it to normal customs procedures. In order to secure its preferential treatement, Panalpina Nigeria made regular improper cash payments to Nigerian customs officials."

The SEC complaint also describes "additional bribes paid on behalf of issuer customers in Nigeria, Angola, and Brazil" including temporary importation payments described as "the largest category of customs-related payments made by Panalpina Nigeria on behalf of the issuer customers." The complaint also describes "pre-release, intervention, evacuation, and special payments" made by Panalpina Nigeria to "Nigerian government officials on behalf of the issuer customers to secure the release of goods from customs prior to the completion of the inspection process" and to "secure improper benefits for the issuer customers."

The Angola payments related to immigration matters "in order to obtain visas for the issuer customers on an emergency basis, often requesting that the visa be issued same-day, in contravention of Angolan law;" and customs matters "in order to assist the issuer customers to import goods into Angola without complying with Angolan law." The complaint also describes "other payments" in Angola including "unofficial payments to Angolan military officials on behalf of the issuer customers in order to permit them to use military cargo aircraft to transport their commercial goods."

The Brazil payments related to "improper payments to Brazilian government officials on behalf of its issuer customers in order to expedite the customs clearance process, and where necessary, to resolve customs and import-related issues."

The complaint also alleges that between 2002 and 2007 "Panalpina Kazakhstan and Panalpina Russia made or authorized the making of several types of improper payments on behalf of issuer customers to government officials in Russia, Kazakhstan, and other parts of Central Asia, in order to assist the issuer customers improperly import goods into these jurisdictions or to obtain other types of improper benefits."

According to the SEC, "Panalpina Inc. obtained improper benefits totatling at least $11,329,369 from the illegal conduct" described in the complaint.

Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, Panalpina agreed to an injunction prohibiting future FCPA violations and agreed to pay disgorgement of $11,329,369.

In a press release (here), Panalpina CEO, Monika Ribar stated as follows. “The settlement of these claims marks the closing of an extremely burdensome chapter in Panalpina’s history and the end of a very demanding three-year effort to address and eliminate serious concerns. Now it is time for us to look to the future and to build on the strong and sustainable compliance culture we have put in place. We are also looking forward to strengthened relationships with our customers who have ceased or reduced business activities with Panalpina due to the investigation. Based on new leadership and significant enhancements of our compliance systems we are a much stronger company today.”

Richard Dean (here) and Douglas Tween (here) both of Baker & McKenzie represented the Panalpina entities.

Baker Hughes - Behind the Scenes

In April, 2007, Baker Hughes entities settled related DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions principally related to conduct in Kazakhstan. (See here, here, and here).

As noted in the DOJ release (here), Baker Hughes Services International Inc. ("BHSI") - a wholly owned subsidiary of Baker Hughes Incorporated - pleaded guilty to violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, conspiracy to violate the FCPA, and aiding and abetting the falsification of books and records of its parent company Baker Hughes. The conduct at issue involved "approximately $4.1 million in bribes over approximately a two-year period to an intermediary whom the company understood and believed would transfer all or part of the corrupt payments to an official of Kazakoil, the state-owned oil company." BHSI agreed to pay a $11 million criminal fine. Baker Hughes entered into a deferred prosecution agreement regarding the same underlying conduct and accepted responsibility for conduct of its employees. As noted in the SEC release (here), Baker Hughes also agreed to pay more than $23 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and to pay a civil penalty of $10 million for violating a 2001 Commission cease-and-desist Order prohibiting violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA.

The combined $44 million in fines and penalties was (at the time) the largest monetary sanction ever imposed in an FCPA case.

An April 11, 2007 diplomatic dispatch released by WikiLeaks and published by the U.K. Guardian (here) provides some interesting behind the scenes action that took place prior to the public announcement of the enforcement action.

The cable states, other other things, as follows.

"A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act case involving malfeasance by U.S. oil technology and services firm Baker Hughes in Kazakhstan will soon be settled, revealing details of bribes paid by the firm's local representatives. Baker Hughes representatives are in Astana to brief Prime Minister Masimov on the case before it becomes public, in hopes of limiting the negative impact on the firm's ability to work in Kazakhstan. In order to minimize the damage from the case to U.S. investors and the bilateral relationship, post believes it would be helpful to inform the Kazakhstani government that the U.S. government authorized Baker Hughes' representatives to brief them in advance of the settlement, and to share the text of the decision once it is issued."

"The Ambassador met with Alan R. Crain, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Baker Hughes Incorporated, and Amb. Beth Jones, Executive Vice President of APCO Worldwide, on April 10 in Astana to discuss a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) case involving Baker Hughes' work in Kazakhstan. Crain and Jones informed the Ambassador that they would meet with Prime Minister Masimov later that day to brief him on the upcoming U.S. court decision in the case. They had met with Masimov on January 9 to inform him that legal proceedings were underway in the U.S., and now planned to share the details. They stated that the Department of Justice and the SEC had authorized both meetings."

"Jones and Crain said that their goal in briefing PM Masimov was to demonstrate the respect that Baker Hughes as an investor has for Kazakhstan and its laws, and thereby ensure that the firm will still be able to operate here and that its employees will not face harassment. They will also emphasize the fact that the investigation centered on commercial malfeasance and did not reveal the involvement of any high-ranking Kazakhstani government officials. After the Masimov meeting took place, Jones contacted the Ambassador to relay Masimov's request that the Embassy convey the court decision as soon as it is released."

The cable also states as follows.

"Crain told the Ambassador that a former employee of Baker Hughes filed a report with the SEC in August 2003 detailing alleged malfeasance in several overseas subsidiaries, including Kazakhstan." "Four separate incidents were discovered during the internal investigation, the second of which is the basis of the legal proceedings currently underway in the U.S."

The DOJ enforcement action relates only to Kazakhstan. The SEC's enforcement action also relates to conduct in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Angola as well.

As to the agent at the center of the Kazakhstan payments, see this related story from the U.K. Guardian.

The Giffen Gaffe - The Final Chapter

The original 2003 indictment (here) charged James Giffen with "making more than $78 million in unlawful payments to two senior officials of the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with six separate oil transactions, in which the American oil companies Mobil Oil, Amoco, Texaco and Phillips Petroleum acquired valuable oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan."

Giffen's defense?

Partly that his actions were taken with the knowledge and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Department of State and the White House. The DOJ did not dispute the fact that Giffen had frequent contacts with senior U.S. intelligence officials or that he used his ties within the Kazakh government to assist the United States. With the court's approval, Giffen sought discovery from the government to support such a public authority defense and much of the delay in the case was due to the government's resistance to such discovery and who was entitled to see such discovery.

In August, the case took a mysterious turn when Giffen agreed to plead guilty (here) to a one-paragraph superseding indictment charging a misdemeanor tax violation.

The case ended Friday in a Manhattan court room.

U.S. District Court Judge William Pauley called Giffen a Cold War hero, imposed no jail time, and stated that the case should never had been brought in the first place.

It's the Giffen Gaffe, the biggest blunder in the history of the FCPA.

Today's post is from Steve LeVine who was present in Judge Pauley's courtroom on Friday. LeVine writes "The Oil and The Glory" For Foreign Policy (here) and the below is reprinted with his permission.

*****

James Giffen, the oil dealmaker at the center of what was once the largest foreign bribery case in U.S. history, is officially a free man.

The 69-year-old former oil adviser to Kazakhstan's president, accused of diverting $78 million from oil companies to the Kazakh government, waited out more than a dozen federal prosecutors and sat through some two dozen court appearances and five trial dates over the course of seven years. Today, the effort paid off. Three months after prosecutors announced a stunning capitulation, dropping all foreign bribery, money laundering, and fraud charges against Giffen in exchange for a guilty plea on a misdemeanor tax charge, U.S. District Judge William Pauley ordered no prison time and no fines in sentencing proceedings at a Manhattan courthouse.

In handing down the non-sentence, Pauley seemingly validated the argument to which Giffen's lawyers had clung since 2003: that whatever crimes Giffen had allegedly committed occurred while he was a highly valued foreign asset of the American intelligence. "Suffice it to say, Mr. Giffen was a significant source of information to the U.S. government and a conduit of secret information from the Soviet Union during the Cold War," Pauley said today.

Giffen may have been lesser-known than the other businessmen-cum-criminal-defendants of recent decades, but he was equally colorful, a swaggering, coarse-talking, heavy-drinking womanizer and a charismatic fixture on the Caspian Sea. He arrived in Kazakhstan in 1992, but the trajectory that ultimately landed him there began in 1969, when he started traveling to Moscow as an aide to a Connecticut metals trader. Giffen worked his way up to become a major player in a U.S-Soviet business association with top-level political ties in both Washington and Moscow. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, business in Russia dried up, and Giffen moved on to Kazakhstan, which was quickly becoming one of the hottest oil plays on the planet.

Giffen managed to ingratiate himself with a man he called The Boss: Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. He became Nazarbayev's chief oil negotiator and, prosecutors alleged, his personal banker. While honchoing some of the era's biggest oil deals, he also diverted some $78 million in payments made to Kazakhstan by now-dead companies like Mobil, Amoco, and Texaco into Swiss and other bank accounts that he set up in the name of Nazarbayev, other senior Kazakh officials, and their relatives, prosecutors alleged. (U.S. diplomats said that Nazarbayev, an unindicted co-conspirator in the case, so dreaded being tarnished by a Giffen conviction that both he and his envoys pleaded repeatedly for the George W. Bush Administration to order the case dropped.)

The case seemed open and shut, since the prosecutors presented a detailed paper trail -- provided by a Swiss magistrate -- of Giffen slicing payments into tiny discrete pieces for transfer into secret Swiss bank accounts, rather than shifting them as a whole, a classic method of money laundering. Even at their most voluble and expansive in court, Giffen's lawyers made no attempt openly to dispute the prosecution's facts. They simply kept repeating that, whatever Giffen may have done, he was taking orders from the Kazakh government -- a sovereign state entitled to its own ideas of legality -- and otherwise serving the patriotic interests of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It was an audacious defense that many thought verged on the preposterous. For one thing, CIA officers of the era deny that Giffen was anything of the sort -- he walked into CIA headquarters on his own volition and talked to agency officers about Kazakhstan, they said, but that was very different from being a trusted asset on an informal assignment. In short, they asserted, Giffen was simply another dude talking.

The CIA, however, appears to have refused to hand over many -- if any -- documents sought by the defense. Judge Pauley had ruled that such documents were obligatory if Giffen were to have access to his rights to adequately defend himself. So the prosecution was left with having to drop the charges.

In his sentencing remarks, Pauley said that he had had access to classified documents that no one else in the courtroom had seen, and that they largely validated Giffen's claims. "He was one of the only Americans with sustained access to" high levels of government in the region, Pauley said. "These relationships, built up over a lifetime, were lost the day of his arrest. This ordeal must end. How does Mr. Giffen reclaim his reputation? This court begins by acknowledging his service."

*****

For additional coverage see here (David Glovin - Bloomberg) and here (Larry Neumeister - AP).

For Giffen's contribution to FCPA case law (see here).

"We May Not Have Conducted Our Business In Compliance With The FCPA"

Those are the words used by Dutch-based Lyondellbasell Industries N.V. (see here) in its August 25th SEC filing (see here).

Lyondellbasell's disclosure is not exactly "new" news as it was first disclosed in a March 2010 court filing in connection with the company's bankruptcy proceeding, but the news is new to me, and perhaps to you as well.

The FCPA disclosure reads as follows:

"We have identified an agreement related to a project in Kazakhstan under which a payment was made in late 2008 that raises compliance concerns under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”). We have engaged outside counsel to investigate these activities, under the oversight of a special committee established by the Supervisory Board, and to evaluate internal controls and compliance policies and procedures. We made a voluntary disclosure of these matters to the U.S. Department of Justice in late 2009 and are cooperating fully with that agency. We cannot predict the ultimate outcome of this matter at this time or whether we will discover other matters raising compliance issues, including under other statutes. In this respect, we may not have conducted our business in compliance with the FCPA and may not have had policies and procedures in place adequate to ensure compliance. We cannot reasonably estimate any potential penalty that may arise from these matters. We are in the process of adopting and implementing more stringent policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance. We cannot predict the ultimate outcome of this matter at this time since our investigations are ongoing. Violations of these laws could result in criminal and civil liabilities and other forms of relief that could be material to us."

According to this Bloomberg report, "a review of international holdings by a management team installed after the bankruptcy triggered the disclosure."

Citing a company spokesperson and unnamed sources, the Bloomberg article states that "the company’s review involves a petrochemical complex in western Kazakhstan where LyondellBasell was a partner until earlier this year" and that "a LyondellBasell payment of $7 million made about two years ago to an individual affiliated with a Kazakh company, SAT & Co., is at the center of the internal investigation" which is being conducted by Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP .

According to a company spokesperson, "the characterization of the $7 million payment was not accurate."

As noted in the SEC filing, since emerging from bankruptcy on April 30, 2010, there has been a limited market for the company's securities. "LyondellBasell Industries N.V.’s class A ordinary shares and class B ordinary shares have been quoted on Pink OTC Market’s electronic quotation and trading system under the symbols “LALLF” and “LALBF,” respectively, since emergence. We have applied for listing of our class A ordinary shares and our class B ordinary shares on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)."

The Giffen Gaffe

Perhaps one day the true story will be told about the DOJ's prosecution of James Giffen.

I don't pretend to know what happened behind the scene other than to know that something significant occurred behind the scene.

That conclusion is compelled when an original indictment (see here) charging "Giffen with making more than $78 million in unlawful payments to two senior officials of the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with six separate oil transactions, in which the American oil companies Mobil Oil, Amoco, Texaco and Phillips Petroleum acquired valuable oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan" is resolved via a one-paragraph superseding information (see here) charging a misdemeanor tax violation.

Sure, DOJ can say that it prosecuted a functionally defunct entity, The Mercator Corporation - in which Giffen was the principal shareholder, board chairman, and chief executive officer - with violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. Yet that criminal information (see here) merely alleges that "Mercator caused the purchase of two snowmobiles that were shipped to Kazakhstan for delivery to KO-2" (a senior official of the Kazakh Government).

You read that correctly.

From an FCPA perspective this entire, nearly decade-long prosecution, was reduced to allegations about two snowmobiles for a Kazakh official.

So what was that something significant that occurred behind the scene?

I don't know.

But I do know this.

Part of Giffen's defense was that his actions were taken with the knowledge and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Department of State and the White House. The DOJ did not dispute the fact that Giffen had frequent contacts with senior U.S. intelligence officials or that he used his ties within the Kazakh government to assist the United States. With the court's approval, Giffen sought discovery from the government to support such a public authority defense and much of the delay in the case was due to the government's resistance to such discovery and who was entitled to see such discovery.

Perhaps it was that public airing of the information in these documents would be embarrassing to the U.S. government or impact U.S. foreign relations with a key oil and gas producing country.

If so, it is troubling to think that our government condones bribery, when done with the approval or the wink and nod of government officials, while aggressively prosecuting commercial actors - often times based on untested and dubious legal theories.

For the record, Giffen pleaded guilty (see here) last Friday to a one-count criminal information charging him with willfully failing to supply information on tax returns regarding foreign bank accounts in violation of 26 USC 7203. The information charges, and Giffen pleaded guilty to, filing a U.S. individual income tax return which failed to report that he maintained an interest in, and signature and other authority over, a bank account in Switzerland in the name of Condor Capital Management, a British Virgin Islands corporation he controlled. In pleading guilty, Giffen also relinquished right, title and interest he may have had, directly or indirectly, in several named Swiss bank accounts.

Pursuant to the plea agreement, Giffen's sentencing range will be 0 to 6 months and the applicable fine range will be $250 to $5,000.

For the record, Mercator also pleaded guilty (see here) last Friday to a one-count criminal information charging it with violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. According to the information, Mercator "advised Kazakhstan in connection with various transactions related to the sale by Kazakhstan of portions of its oil and gas wealth." The information alleges that between 1995 and 2000 Mercator was paid approximately $67 million in success fees for its work in assisting the Kazakh Ministry of Oil and Gas Industries develop a strategy for foreign investment in the oil and gas sector and coordinating the negotiation of numerous oil and gas transactions. The information charges that certain senior officials of the Kazakh government (including KO-2) had the authority to hire and pay Mercator and that Mercator was therefore "dependant upon the goodwill" of the officials. The one-paragraph statutory allegation merely states that Mercator "caused the purchase of two snowmobiles that were shipped to Kazakhstan for delivery to KO-2."

As indicated in the plea agreement, the DOJ and Mercator could not agree on whether the 1998 Sentencing Guidelines or the 2009 Sentencing Guidelines apply - an issue that will be left for the court to decide. If the 2009 guidelines apply, the plea agreement sets forth a fine range of $650,000 to $1.3 million. If the 1998 guidelines apply, the plea agreement sets forth a fine range of $30,000 to $60,000.

Whether Mercator's and/or Giffen's actions were indeed taken with the knowledge and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Department of State and the White House, the following paragraph from the Mercator plea agreement would seem relevant:

"Because the offense involved an elected official or a public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position, the offense level is increased 4 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(3)."

That provision (see here) defines "public official" to include, among other categories, an individual "in a position of public trust with official responsibility for carrying out a government program or policy; acts under color of law or official right; or participates so substantially in government operations as to possess de facto authority to make governmental decisions."

DOJ releases in FCPA enforcement actions are typically peppered with get-tough, this sends a message type of language. The release (see here) in the Giffen / Mercator enforcement action does not contain any quotes from DOJ officials.

William Schwartz of Cooley Godward Kronish LLP (here), a former Assistant United States Attorney in the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York where he was Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division, represented both Giffen and Mercator.

So, what to make of the Giffen Gaffe.

It seems that Giffen prevailed not because of the facts or the law, but because he possessed significant leverage over the government in that he asserted his actions were taken with the knowledge and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the State Department and the White House.

Few FCPA defendants can make a similar claim. Thus, resolution of the Giffen case would seem to have little or no effect on the nuts and bolts of future FCPA enforcement actions.

Yet, resolution of the Giffen case does raise some troubling issues as to the DOJ's enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

For starters, the Giffen case and the Frederick Bourke case (see here for prior posts) generally marked the beginning of the FCPA's resurgence. Regardless of the outcome of Bourke's Second Circuit appeal, the trial phase ended with the sentencing judge saying:

“After years of supervising this case, it’s still not entirely clear to me whether Mr. Bourke is a victim or a crook or a little bit of both.”

In both the Giffen and Bourke cases, the DOJ made spectacular allegations only to see these enforcement actions end with a whimper.

The Giffen resolution would also seem embarrassing for the Justice Department which actively preaches the transparency and anti-corruption gospel message around the world while calling on other countries to increase enforcement of their own bribery laws.

However, what does it say about transparency in our country when a case that begins with criminal allegations of more than $78 million in unlawful payments to senior Kazakh officials ends with a misdemeanor tax violation and a largely meaningless FCPA enforcement action against a functionally defunct entity focused merely on two snowmobiles?

The Giffen resolution should further enrage segments of the business community that justifiably see a double standard in that certain business practices seem tolerated when done in connection with government business or policy, yet aggressively prosecuted, often times based on untested and dubious legal theories, when done in connection with a purely commercial transaction.

The Giffen Gaffe is troubling enough in isolation.

Coupled with another bribery blunder from approximately six months ago, it is an open question whether the government's enforcement of the FCPA, to borrow a parliamentary phrase, would survive a no-confidence vote.

In February, the DOJ alleged (see here) that BAE, the largest defense contractor in Europe and the fifth largest in the U.S. as measured by sales, "provided substantial benefits" "through various payment mechanisms both in the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. and elsewhere" to a Saudi official "in a position of influence" to award fighter jet deals. The DOJ stated that BAE "provided support services to the [Saudi official] while in the territory of the U.S.” and that these benefits “included the purchase of travel and accommodations, security services, real estate, automobiles and personal items.” The DOJ alleged that over $5 million in invoices for benefits provided to the Saudi official were submitted by just one BAE employee during a one year period. Yet resolution of the BAE enforcement action contained no FCPA charges.

Sure the U.S. may prosecute the most bribery cases in terms of shear numbers compared to other countries.

Yet, as is becoming increasingly obvious, many of those cases are settled via privately negotiated resolution vehicles that are not subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny and are based on dubious and untested legal theories.

On the flip side, when allegations of egregious or widespread bribery are alleged, the charges are not even FCPA anti-bribery violations.

Before another U.S. government official goes abroad to spread the anti-corruption gospel, preach transparency, and question other countries commitment to prosecuting bribery, it would seem that our government and Justice Department first need to examine its own enforcement of the FCPA.

Giffen Update

When your case has slogged along for over seven years, a two week delay is a minor occurence.

In any event, James Giffen's court hearing scheduled for last week has been delayed until July 29th reports Bloomberg's David Glovin in this interesting piece. For more on the Giffen case (see here).

As Glovin notes, the long delay in the Giffen case has spawned "conspiracy theories" and open guessing "whether the U.S. remains committed" to this case.

For starters, Giffen is accused of funneling payments to foreign officials in Kazahstan, including its current President Nursultan Nazarbayev, a U.S. ally who met with President Bush in 2006 "to discuss ways to expand U.S. access to Kazakh oil," according to Glovin.

Adding to the intrigue, Giffen has claimed, as Glovin notes, that "U.S. intelligence services, including the Central Intelligence Agency, authorized him to pay off Kazakh leaders." Giffen's public authority defense has caused most of the delays in the trial as the government has fought to withhold or redact many classified documents.

Over at Harper's Magazine (see here) Scott Horton asks the question - "why is this case languishing?"

Horton states:

"Over the past decade, I discussed the case many times with Kazakhstani officials and businessmen. They were uniformly intrigued by it and keen to learn the details of their government’s darker practices—details that have steadily emerged from the case. They were also all of the same view: this case would ultimately go nowhere because it was not in the interest of the United States to expose damaging information about President Nazarbayev. Moreover, several offered that the Kazakhstani government fully understood how to 'spin' the American system by hiring prominent lobbyists and consultants and engaging the right political figures. It would be able to forestall the case, they assured me. I would reply that the American system didn’t work that way—that our Justice Department was independent and that prosecutorial decisions were insulated from such lobbying. Truth is, I was never myself absolutely convinced of that, and I always felt a bit naïve saying it."

Horton concludes with this statement:

"Today, Justice Department spokesmen tell Congress that battling corruption in foreign business dealings is a high priority. They argue that corruption is undermining the war on terror, costing taxpayers billions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the handling of the Giffen case provides skeptics with plenty of reason to doubt the sincerity of the Justice Department’s claims. Within the government there are no shortage of career personnel who believe that a properly delivered bribe to a foreign government official is a necessary sort of compromise. A government that winks at corruption in the supposed name of national security may have a hard time prosecuting it in a commercial setting."

James Giffen Update

The FCPA enforcement action against James Giffen goes back a long way.

April 2003 to be precise (see here).

The case concerns allegations that Giffen made approximately $80 million in payments to senior Kazakhstan officials in connection with numerous deals in which American companies acquired oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan. In defense, Giffen has implicated the CIA and much of the delay in prosecuting this case revolves around access to classified documents.

The case is still active as documented in this recent Main Justice piece by Lisa Brennan.

Few have been following the Giffen case closer than Steve LeVine (see here). LeVine is author of The Oil and the Glory (see here).

A key figure in LeVine's book is James Giffen.

In this guest post, LeVine profiles next Monday's hearing in the Giffen case.

*****

Next week, James Giffen -- the former chief oil adviser to Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev -- returns to court in New York for the longest-running U.S. foreign bribery case in history. His strategy -- to gum up the works in the hope of getting all or most of the charges dropped -- has thus far appeared ingenious: Seven years after being led away in handcuffs from JFK Airport, Giffen appears none-too-close to trial. But will it ultimately pay off?

If the strategy does prevail, the Giffen case could send an important signal to bribers with financial wherewithal -- you can wait out the Department of Justice.

A key question at the moment is whether Giffen's lawyers -- in the vein of their already-bold, go-for-broke approach -- can plausibly, and as early as next Monday, successfully motion for dismissal of the charges on the basis of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

William Schwartz, Giffen's chief lawyer and a former assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District where Giffen's case is being heard, declined to comment on the question of a Sixth Amendment motion when I emailed him. But I rang up lawyers specializing in the Foreign Corrrupt Practices Act -- the law applied to foreign bribery cases -- and they made the across-the-board observation that Giffen's strategy may not be strong enough to achieve such a straight-forward victory.

In his defense, Giffen asserts that the Central Intelligence Agency either knew or should have known all along that he was diverting millions of dollars from U.S. oil companies -- a total of some $80 million -- to Nazarbayev and other powerful Kazakhs. When he advanced the strategy, it was exquisitely timed -- in among the strongest periods of the George W. Bush Administration, with its hyper-sensitivity about the release of even unclassified documents -- under the premise that the CIA was unlikely to disgorge cables and what-not that would validate Giffen's claims. And if the CIA did refuse to so cooperate, Giffen could claim compellingly that he couldn't receive a fair trial.

Up to this point, Giffen has proven correct -- the CIA has been as slow as molassas, and has consequently tested the patience of federal Judge William Pauley. Yet, that doesn't necessarily add up to a successful Sixth Amendment motion, experts tell me. To win, Giffen would have to show an outside reason why the long delay has occurred, and that he is being harmed by it. But as a former U.S. prosecutor who didn't want to be identified told me, "When much of the litigation is instigated by the defendant, the defense would be hard-pressed to claim that it's been denied a speedy trial." As for hardship or harm, Giffen hasn't been sitting in jail, but rather whiling away his time at home in Westchester County near the Winged Foot Golf Club.

Even so, said Richard N. Dean, a Washington-based FCPA lawyer with long experience in the former Soviet Union, that doesn't mean that Giffen won't prevail. He sees a more fundamental issue at stake -- "I just don't know if [the prosecution] has a case or not," says Dean, who is a partner at Baker & McKenzie.

That is, it's true that the CIA has dragged its heels, but so has the prosecution itself -- it hasn't seemed at all in a rush to bring the case to trial. That makes Dean wonder "how strong they think their case is, whether they believe they can overcome the defense's assertion" of the CIA defense.

Schwartz, in other words, probably can't abbreviate the current snail's-pace pre-trial process: Judge Pauley is unlikely to grant a Sixth Amendment motion.

There's always the chance that government prosecutors will demonstrate renewed spine in Monday's hearing, and make it plain that they intend to go to trial soon -- the Justice Department certainly doesn't wish to give bribe-givers or their lawyers the idea that they can use delaying tactics to wiggle out of an FCPA case. In that event, Schwartz would need to prepare for a knock-down, drag-out jury trial that would reveal embarrassing details about his client's luxurious, heavy-partying life abroad.

Yet, given the case thus far, one gets the impression that one or both sides wish the case would simply go away. If this is in Schwartz's thinking, he must patiently hope that the prosecution elects to save face by dropping at least some of the more onerous charges, and perhaps then persuade Giffen to plead to lesser violations of the law.

Ready, Set, Go ...

The 2010 FCPA enforcement year has begun.

Yesterday, the SEC announced (here) resolution of an FCPA books and records and internal controls action against NATCO Group Inc. - a Houston based "worldwide leader in design, manufacture, and service" of oil and gas process equipment (see here).

The SEC complaint (here) alleges that TEST Automation & Controls, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of NATCO Group, "created and accepted false documents while paying extorted immigration fines and obtaining immigration visas in the Republic of Kazakhstan." According to the complaint, "NATCO's system of internal accounting controls failed to ensure that TEST recorded the true purpose of the payments, and NATCO's consolidated books and records did not accurately reflect these payments."

According to the complaint, TEST maintained a branch office in Kazakhstan and in June 2005 it won a contract which required it to hire both expatriates and local Kazakh workers. Pursuant to Kazakh law, TEST needed to obtain immigration documentation before an expatriate worker could enter the country. Thereafter, Kazakh immigration authorities claimed that TEST's expatriate workers were working without proper documentation and the authorities threatened to fine, jail, or deport the workers if TEST did not pay cash fines.

According to the complaint, TEST employees believed the threats to be genuine and, after consulting with U.S. TEST management who authorized the payments, paid the officials approximately $45,0000 using their personal funds for which the employees were reimbursed by TEST.

The complaint alleges that when reimbursing the employees for these payments, TEST inaccurately described the money as: (i) being an advance on a bonus; and (ii) visa fines.

The complaint further alleges that TEST used consultants in Kazakhstan to assist in obtaining immigration documentation for its expatriate employees and that "one of these consultants did not have a license to perform visa services, but maintained close ties to an employee working at the Kazakh Ministry of Labor, the entity issuing the visas." According to the complaint, the consultant twice requested cash from TEST to help him obtain the visas and the complaint alleges that the consultant provided TEST with bogus invoices to support the payments.

Based on the above allegations, the SEC charged NATCO with FCPA books and records and internal control violations even though the complaint is completely silent as to any involvement or knowledge by NATCO in the conduct at issue. This action is thus the latest example of an issuer being strictly liable for a subsidiary's books and records violations (see here for a prior post).

Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, NATCO agreed to pay a $65,000 civil penalty. According to the SEC's findings in a related cease and desist order (here), during a routine internal audit review, NATCO discovered potential issues involving payments at TEST, conducted an internal investigation, and voluntarily disclosed the results to the SEC. The order also lists several other remedial measures NATCO implemented.

I've noted in prior posts that one of the effects of voluntary disclosure is that it sets into motion a whole series of events including, in many cases, a much broader review of the company's operations so that the company can answer the enforcement agencies' "where else may this have occurred" question.

On this issue, the SEC order states that NATCO "expanded its investigation to examine TEST's other worldwide operations, including Nigeria, Angola, and China, geographic locations with historic FCPA concerns." However, the SEC order notes that "NATCO's expanded internal investigation of TEST uncovered no wrongdoing."

According to the complaint, at all times relevant to the complaint, NATCO's stock was listed on the NYSE, but in November 2009 NATCO became a subsidiary of Cameron International Corporation (here) (an NYSE listed company) and NATCO's NYSE listing ended.

The NATCO enforcement action is "as garden variety" of an FCPA enforcement action as perhaps one will find. Not only does moving product into and out of a country expose a company to FCPA risk, but so too does moving employees into and out of a country.

The NATCO civil penalty also demonstrates that in certain cases, the smallest "cost" of an alleged FCPA violation are the fines or penalties, figures which are so dwarfed by investigative, remedial and resolution costs.

Baker Hughes - BJ Services Merger

The press (see here among other places) is reporting that Baker Hughes has agreed to buy BJ Services in a $5.5 billion cash and stock deal.

Both companies should be familiar to FCPA followers and there are many FCPA issues present in this announced merger.

For starters, a bit of background.

In 2007, Baker Hughes settled parallel DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions concerning business conduct in Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia, Russia, and Uzbekistan. (See here for the DOJ release and related materials, see here for the SEC release and related materials). Combined fines and penalties were a then FCPA-record $44 million.

In 2004, BJ Services consented to entry of an SEC cease-and-desist order finding that it violated the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal control provisions in connection with the business conduct of its wholly-owned Argentinean subsidiary. (See here for the SEC order).

In addition, in its 2008 Annual Report (filed in November 2008 see here) BJ Services indicated (at pgs. 69-70) that it voluntarily disclosed to the DOJ/SEC the results of an internal investigation concerning problematic business conduct in the Asia-Pacific region that could implicate the FCPA. To my knowledge, no enforcement action has yet resulted from this disclosure.

At a minimum, the following FCPA issues are present in the Baker Hughes / BJ Services announced merger.

Baker Hughes settled the 2007 FCPA enforcement action by agreeing to a deferred prosecution agreement (see here). Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the DPA, Baker Hughes agreed to engage an independent monitor to review the company's compliance with the FCPA for a period of three years. Thus, per the DPA, Baker Hughes is still under an FCPA monitor - an individual who no doubt has been busy or soon will be busy in ensuring that Baker Hughes properly integrates BJ Services into Baker Hughes' existing FCPA compliance policies and procedures.

What about the issue of Baker Hughes purchasing a company with disclosed, yet apparently unresolved, FCPA issues? This is one area where the DOJ has offered up substantive guidance to acquiring companies and the following DOJ Opinion Procedure Releases are relevant (in whole or in part): 08-02 (see here), 08-01 (see here), 04-02 (see here), and 03-01 (see here). For additional reading (see here).

I like to tell my students that the business law issues we cover in class are not merely historical, but rather are issues that companies deal with on a daily basis. For all you FCPA students out there, the Baker Hughes - BJ Services merger announcement provides a good real-world "issue-spotting" exam.