During last week's FCPA hearing in the House, Representative John Conyers (D-MI) had a contentious Q&A exchange with Shana-Tara Regon (Director, White Collar Crime Policy, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). See here for the previous post regarding the hearing.
Conyers asked - "give me some examples of overcriminalization of the FCPA." He repeatedly interrupted Regon and asked "just give me some examples" "give me an instance of where one case was ever brought by the DOJ that would constitute overcriminalization." Conyers stated, "only 140 cases have been brought in 10 years -that averages 14 cases a year - is that overcriminalization to you?" Regon stated that overcriminlization occurs when a statute provides no reasonable limits and that she is concerned more about prosecutions that may occur in the future more so than prosecutions that have already occurred.
There should be plenty of concern regarding prosecutions that have already occurred, but given the glare of the cameras, the stress of testifying, and the disruption of being interrupted, it would have been difficult for any witness to retrieve from their memory bank specific FCPA enforcement actions.
This post provides a summer reading list of FCPA enforcement actions, commentary and analysis, and legal scholarship for Representative Conyers so that he can best seek answers to the question he posed to Regon.
For starters, what does overcriminalization mean?
To be sure, it can mean different things to different people in different circumstances. In "The Overcriminalization Phenomenon(here) Eric Luna provides this definition - "the overcriminalization phenomenon consists of: (1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that
overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or pretextual enforcement of petty violations. In this piece, Jeffrey Parker (while observing that "definitions of “overcriminalization” are a bit fuzzy and debatable") identifies the following as among the factors that may contribute to overcriminalization: "the vague, arcane, or trivial nature of such prohibitions, as undermining citizens ability to conform, and debasing the moral moment of the criminal sanction" and "the lack of adequate mens rea standards in criminal prohibitions."
Not all overcriminalization factors are relevant to this "new era of FCPA enforcement" (see here), but in the minds of many, several factors are.
Enforcement Actions
In the 2011 Comverse Technologies enforcement action (see here), the company paid $2.8 million in combined fines and penalties (and no doubt millions more in connection with the investigative and resolution process) to resolve a matter in which the DOJ did not allege that the company even knew about the improper payments at issue. The action was resolved via a non-prosecution agreement meaning there was no judicial scrutiny of the DOJ's enforcement theory.
In the 2010 Alliance One International enforcement action (see here), the company paid approximately $20 million in combined fines and penalties (and millions more in connection with the investigative and resolution process) to resolve a matter in which it did absolutely nothing wrong. Rather, the entire DOJ enforcement action was based on a successor liability theory. Again, the action was resolved via a non-prosecution agreement meaning there was no judicial scrutiny of the DOJ's enforcement theory.
In the 2010 Noble Corporation enforcement action (see here), the company paid approximately $8 million in combined fines and penalties (and millions more in connection with the investigative and resolution process) to resolve a matter involving the import and export of goods into Nigeria. When Congress passed the FCPA, its intent as to so-called facilitating or grease payments was clear. Senate Report No. 95-114 (May 2, 1977) states, in pertinent part, as follows. “The statute does not […] cover so-called ‘grease’ payments such as payments for expediting shipments through customs ...". The relevant House Report (No. 95-640, September 28, 1977) similarly states as follows. “The language of the bill is deliberately cast in terms which differentiate between [corrupt payments] and facilitating payments, sometimes called ‘grease payments.’ […] For example, a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the processing of a customs document would not be reached by this bill. Nor would it reach payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially ministerial or clerical nature which must of necessity be performed in any event. While payments made to assure or to speed the proper performance of a foreign official’s duties may be reprehensible in the United States, the committee recognizes that they are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate all such payments." The Noble enforcement action was resolved via a non-prosecution agreement meaning, again, there was no judicial scrutiny of the DOJ's enforcement theory.
And then of course there is the issue of "foreign official" and the fact that most FCPA enforcement actions in this new era are based on alleged improper payments to employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises ("SOEs") on the theory that such business entities are "instrumentalities" of a foreign government and thus all employees, regardless of rank or position, are "foreign officials" under the FCPA. Yet, (1) During its multi-year investigation of foreign corporate payments, Congress was aware of the existence of SOEs and that some of the questionable payments uncovered or disclosed may have involved such entities. (2) In certain of the bills introduced in Congress to address foreign corporate payments, the definition of “foreign government” expressly included SOE entities. These bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House during both the 94th and 95th Congress. (3) Despite being aware of SOEs and despite exhibiting a capability for drafting a definition that expressly included SOEs in other bills, Congress chose not to include such definitions or concepts in what ultimately become the FCPA in 1977. See here for extensive reading on this issue.
Commentary and Analysis
In 2010, Forbes ran a feature article (here) titled "The Bribery Racket" - "How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts Business And Enriches Insiders." Lucinda Low, a respected FCPA practitioner, notes in the article that "the scope of things companies have to worry about is enlarging all the time as the government asserts violations in circumstances where it's unclear if they would prevail in court" and that "you don't have the checks and balances you would normally have if you had more litigation." Commenting on the current era of FCPA enforcement, Joseph Covington (who headed the DOJ's FCPA efforts in the 1980's) said that the current era "is good business for law firms [...] good business for accounting firms, it's good business for consulting firms, the media--and Justice Department lawyers who create the marketplace and then get yourself a job."
Here, Michael Levy (a former Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Columbia and law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.) talks about what he calls prosecutorial common law. Levy states that "prosecutors don’t set out deliberately to interpret criminal statutes in ways that convict hundreds of people on the basis of a standard that not a single Supreme Court Justice finds supportable ...". Levy notes that "we have seen this before in connection with the interpretation of the honest services fraud and obstruction of justice statutes, and it is certainly happening today with the FCPA."
In this publication, an author group including Philip Urofsky (former Assistant Chief of the DOJ Fraud Section responsible for FCPA enforcement) and Danforth Newcomb (a dean of the FCPA bar) noted that in several recent FCPA enforcement actions "the theories used to hold parents accountable for the acts of subsidiaries and vice versa appear to be unclear." In other cases, the author group states that in many cases critical elements of the statute were not pleaded or were pled in a way "that is not consistent with established precedent and the language of the statute."
In a September 10, 2010 interview with the Corporate Crime Reporter, Mark Mendelsohn (the former head of DOJ FCPA enforcement during this era of resurgence who departed the DOJ for private practice in 2010) stated that "some of the factors" the DOJ uses to resolve FCPA cases are transparent, but "there are other factors less easy to see from the outside." Mendelsohn also noted, in connection with non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements (the common way FCPA enforcement actions are resolved) that the "danger" "is that it is tempting for the Department, or the SEC [to use these vehicles] to seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs that don't actually constitute violations of the law."
In this Q&A exchange, Martin Weinstein (a former DOJ FCPA attorney who prosecuted the Lockheed case in the mid-1990's and is now a prominent FCPA practitioner) stated as follows. "The last decade of FCPA enforcement has seen extraordinary evolution, and I think you have to say that when Congress passed the law in 1977, they did not envision the wide reach of enforcement today and the types of things that the government gets involved in, such as transactions, joint ventures, and successor liability."
Legal Scholarship
In "Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" (here), Amy Westbrook (Washburn University School of Law) argues that the recent "transformation of the FCPA has been brought about by ad hoc enforcement actions, rather than legislation, judicial decision, or regulation" and that "in the absence of formal process or reasoned articulation, the actual scope of the law is unclear."
In "The Facade of FCPA Enforcement" (here), I argue that "the FCPA often means what the enforcement agencies say it means" and that "even though the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve an FCPA enforcement action are not subject to judicial scrutiny and [thus] the vehicles do not necessarily reflect the triumph of the enforcement agencies’ theories, in the absence of substantive FCPA case law, these privately negotiated resolution vehicles have come to represent de facto FCPA case law" which breed "inefficient overcompliance by risk averse business actors fearful of enterprise - threatening liability because of the enforcement agencies’ untested and dubious theories."
Showing posts with label FCPA Scholarship. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FCPA Scholarship. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
Bribery And The But-For World
Settlement amounts in FCPA enforcement actions have grown over the past decade. This much you already knew.
A significant contributing factor is the increased use of disgorgement in FCPA enforcement actions. For instance, as highlighted in this prior post, 96% of SEC FCPA enforcement settlement amounts in 2010 consisted of disgorgement and prejudgment interest.
The theory seems to be this, if Company A made an improper payment in violation of the FCPA to obtain Contract A, all of the Company A's net profits associated with Contract A are subject to disgorgement.
In my opening remarks at the World Bribery and Corruption Compliance Forum in London in September 2010 (see here) I observed as follows.
"Another issue in need of deeper analysis is the commonly held enforcement view that the contract (and thus net profits of the contract) at issue was secured solely because of the alleged improper payments made by the corporate. This ignores the fact that most of the companies settling enforcement actions are otherwise viewed as industry leaders presumably because they offer the best product or service for the best price. With such companies, can it truly be said that the alleged improper payments were the sole reason the company secured the contract at issue, thus justifying the company being forced to disgorge all of its net profits associated with the contract? Does a but for analysis have a place in bribery laws – in other words should the enforcement agency have to prove that but for the improper payment, the company would not have secured the contract at issue?"
In a recent piece titled "Economic Analysis of Damages under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act," (here) Dr. Patrick Conroy (here) and Dr. Graeme Hunter (here) - both of Nera Economic Consulting - spend some time in the "but-for" world.
The authors note that "to date there has been little consideration of the true benefit of the bribe" but "with fines in the hundreds of millions of dollars and increasing enforcement, it is necessary to clearly understand what effect a bribe had on profits and to carefully establish what the but-for profits would have been without the bribe."
The authors note that "while a bribe may have led to very high gains, the but-for profits could have been high (and the gain from the bribe low) if the bribe would have little effect on the probability of winning the work or if alternative projects were similarly profitable."
The authors state as follows. "If a company pays a bribe to secure a project, what is the gain to the company from the bribe? While one answer might be the profits earned by the project, we outline [in the article] a number of considerations based on the incremental probability of winning generated by the bribe and the opportunity cost of the project won that will lead to a more realistic, and sometimes lower, calculation of the true economic profits from the bribe."
The authors conclude as follows. "International bribery has become a regulatory enforcement priority based on the FCPA in the US and the soon-to-be-implemented Anti-Bribery Act in the UK. Applying greater precision to the financial benefits of bribery is necessary given increasing enforcement."
A thought-provoking read and time well spent in the "but-for" world.
A significant contributing factor is the increased use of disgorgement in FCPA enforcement actions. For instance, as highlighted in this prior post, 96% of SEC FCPA enforcement settlement amounts in 2010 consisted of disgorgement and prejudgment interest.
The theory seems to be this, if Company A made an improper payment in violation of the FCPA to obtain Contract A, all of the Company A's net profits associated with Contract A are subject to disgorgement.
In my opening remarks at the World Bribery and Corruption Compliance Forum in London in September 2010 (see here) I observed as follows.
"Another issue in need of deeper analysis is the commonly held enforcement view that the contract (and thus net profits of the contract) at issue was secured solely because of the alleged improper payments made by the corporate. This ignores the fact that most of the companies settling enforcement actions are otherwise viewed as industry leaders presumably because they offer the best product or service for the best price. With such companies, can it truly be said that the alleged improper payments were the sole reason the company secured the contract at issue, thus justifying the company being forced to disgorge all of its net profits associated with the contract? Does a but for analysis have a place in bribery laws – in other words should the enforcement agency have to prove that but for the improper payment, the company would not have secured the contract at issue?"
In a recent piece titled "Economic Analysis of Damages under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act," (here) Dr. Patrick Conroy (here) and Dr. Graeme Hunter (here) - both of Nera Economic Consulting - spend some time in the "but-for" world.
The authors note that "to date there has been little consideration of the true benefit of the bribe" but "with fines in the hundreds of millions of dollars and increasing enforcement, it is necessary to clearly understand what effect a bribe had on profits and to carefully establish what the but-for profits would have been without the bribe."
The authors note that "while a bribe may have led to very high gains, the but-for profits could have been high (and the gain from the bribe low) if the bribe would have little effect on the probability of winning the work or if alternative projects were similarly profitable."
The authors state as follows. "If a company pays a bribe to secure a project, what is the gain to the company from the bribe? While one answer might be the profits earned by the project, we outline [in the article] a number of considerations based on the incremental probability of winning generated by the bribe and the opportunity cost of the project won that will lead to a more realistic, and sometimes lower, calculation of the true economic profits from the bribe."
The authors conclude as follows. "International bribery has become a regulatory enforcement priority based on the FCPA in the US and the soon-to-be-implemented Anti-Bribery Act in the UK. Applying greater precision to the financial benefits of bribery is necessary given increasing enforcement."
A thought-provoking read and time well spent in the "but-for" world.
Friday, May 27, 2011
Something To Think About
The holiday weekend is upon us and perhaps you have already left the office.
Here is something to think about over the long weekend.
India's Chief Economic Adviser, the economist Kaushik Basu, recently posted a paper titled "Why, for a Class of Bribes, the Act of Giving a Bribe Should be Treated as Legal" (here).
The abstract is as follows.
"The paper puts forward a small but novel idea of how we can cut down the incidence of bribery. There are different kinds of bribes and what this paper is concerned with are bribes that people often have to give to get what they are legally entitled to. I shall call these harassment bribes. Suppose an income tax refund is held back from a taxpayer till he pays some cash to the officer. Suppose government allots subsidized land to a person but when the person goes to get her paperwork done and receive documents for this land, she is asked to pay a hefty bribe. These are all illustrations of harassment bribes. Harassment bribery is widespread in India and it plays a large role in breeding inefficiency and has a corrosive effect on civil society. The central message of this paper is that we should declare the act of giving a bribe in all such cases as legitimate activity. In other words the giver of a harassment bribe should have full immunity from any punitive action by the state.
It is argued that this will cause a sharp decline in the incidence of bribery. The reasoning is that once the law is altered in this manner, after the act of bribery is committed, the interests of the bribe giver and the bribe taker will be at divergence. The bribe giver will be willing to cooperate in getting the bribe taker caught. Knowing that this will happen, the bribe taker will be deterred from taking a bribe.
It should be emphasized that what is being argued in this paper is not a retrospective pardon for bribe-giving. Retrospective pardons are like amnesties. They encourage rather than discourage corrupt behavior by rewarding the corrupt. And, in the process, they corrode society‘s morals."
See here for the recent CNN segment "What in the World" for more on Basu's proposal as well as other innovative ideas to reduce bribery and corruption.
The solution Basu addresses would seem most applicable to domestic bribery where a prosecuting agency has jurisdiction over both the bribe payor and bribe recipient. That is not the case in a typical FCPA scenario, but Basu's paper and proposal is indeed interesting, thought provoking material.
*****
Finally, a previous post (here) discussed customer rewards programs and the SEC's interest in RAE Systems.
Turns out there is an interest in this general issue on the other side of the Atlantic as well.
The office of Richard Alderman (Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office) alerted me to a recent speech he gave (here) at the 2011 International Medical Device Industry Compliance Conference. In the speech, Alderman talked about the soon-to-go live Bribery Act, self reporting, and the SFO's relationship with the DOJ.
Alderman also talked about "incentive payments" and stated as follows.
"What I am also seeing is corporates having a hard look at some of the arrangements that are in fact justifiable for commercial reasons but which have not been scrutinized before with a view to seeing whether or not there are risks of bribery. Let me give you an example. Incentive payments. These are a common feature of many industries and I suspect of your own as well. I know that a number of companies and a number of industry organisations have been looking at this issue in order to see whether there are risks when the Bribery Act comes into force. We have had a number of meetings in the SFO with corporates and industry bodies about this issue. We have been able to talk through the issues and offer reassurance.
Clearly, these incentive payments are normally designed for commercial reasons and are commercially justifiable. There are risks though. What we have been talking about with corporates is the need for transparency and, in particular, the need to know where the money goes and the fact that it is justifiable. We also talk about the need for a senior person at the corporate's head office to have visibility of what is happening and to be satisfied that what is happening is justifiable.
This may well be a feature of your own industry (and indeed I imagine that it probably is) and it may be that this is something that you want to discuss."
*****
A good weekend to all.
Here is something to think about over the long weekend.
India's Chief Economic Adviser, the economist Kaushik Basu, recently posted a paper titled "Why, for a Class of Bribes, the Act of Giving a Bribe Should be Treated as Legal" (here).
The abstract is as follows.
"The paper puts forward a small but novel idea of how we can cut down the incidence of bribery. There are different kinds of bribes and what this paper is concerned with are bribes that people often have to give to get what they are legally entitled to. I shall call these harassment bribes. Suppose an income tax refund is held back from a taxpayer till he pays some cash to the officer. Suppose government allots subsidized land to a person but when the person goes to get her paperwork done and receive documents for this land, she is asked to pay a hefty bribe. These are all illustrations of harassment bribes. Harassment bribery is widespread in India and it plays a large role in breeding inefficiency and has a corrosive effect on civil society. The central message of this paper is that we should declare the act of giving a bribe in all such cases as legitimate activity. In other words the giver of a harassment bribe should have full immunity from any punitive action by the state.
It is argued that this will cause a sharp decline in the incidence of bribery. The reasoning is that once the law is altered in this manner, after the act of bribery is committed, the interests of the bribe giver and the bribe taker will be at divergence. The bribe giver will be willing to cooperate in getting the bribe taker caught. Knowing that this will happen, the bribe taker will be deterred from taking a bribe.
It should be emphasized that what is being argued in this paper is not a retrospective pardon for bribe-giving. Retrospective pardons are like amnesties. They encourage rather than discourage corrupt behavior by rewarding the corrupt. And, in the process, they corrode society‘s morals."
See here for the recent CNN segment "What in the World" for more on Basu's proposal as well as other innovative ideas to reduce bribery and corruption.
The solution Basu addresses would seem most applicable to domestic bribery where a prosecuting agency has jurisdiction over both the bribe payor and bribe recipient. That is not the case in a typical FCPA scenario, but Basu's paper and proposal is indeed interesting, thought provoking material.
*****
Finally, a previous post (here) discussed customer rewards programs and the SEC's interest in RAE Systems.
Turns out there is an interest in this general issue on the other side of the Atlantic as well.
The office of Richard Alderman (Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office) alerted me to a recent speech he gave (here) at the 2011 International Medical Device Industry Compliance Conference. In the speech, Alderman talked about the soon-to-go live Bribery Act, self reporting, and the SFO's relationship with the DOJ.
Alderman also talked about "incentive payments" and stated as follows.
"What I am also seeing is corporates having a hard look at some of the arrangements that are in fact justifiable for commercial reasons but which have not been scrutinized before with a view to seeing whether or not there are risks of bribery. Let me give you an example. Incentive payments. These are a common feature of many industries and I suspect of your own as well. I know that a number of companies and a number of industry organisations have been looking at this issue in order to see whether there are risks when the Bribery Act comes into force. We have had a number of meetings in the SFO with corporates and industry bodies about this issue. We have been able to talk through the issues and offer reassurance.
Clearly, these incentive payments are normally designed for commercial reasons and are commercially justifiable. There are risks though. What we have been talking about with corporates is the need for transparency and, in particular, the need to know where the money goes and the fact that it is justifiable. We also talk about the need for a senior person at the corporate's head office to have visibility of what is happening and to be satisfied that what is happening is justifiable.
This may well be a feature of your own industry (and indeed I imagine that it probably is) and it may be that this is something that you want to discuss."
*****
A good weekend to all.
Monday, May 9, 2011
All About Monitors
If you ever have had a question about monitors in the FCPA enforcement context, chances are it is addressed in "Somebody's Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better." (See here).
Authored by Gibson Dunn & Crutcher attorneys Joseph Warin (here), Michael Diamant (here), and Veronica Root (here), the article was recently published in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business.
Below is an abstract.
"This article explores the rise of the corporate compliance monitor as a condition for settling violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)—a setting in which federal prosecutors routinely impose monitors. From 2004 to 2010, more than 40 percent of all companies that resolved an FCPA investigation with the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) through a settlement or plea agreement retained an independent compliance monitor as a condition of that agreement."
"If U.S. enforcement authorities maintain their current approach, the reality is that companies facing liability for violating the FCPA are likely to have a monitor imposed on them as part of a settlement agreement. From the U.S. government’s perspective, monitorships make sense for companies that violate anti-bribery laws, making it important for offending corporations to learn how to deal with monitors. Pulling from the authors’ extensive experience with three major FCPA compliance monitorships, as well as their work assisting clients operating under an FCPA monitorship, this article aids in that process. It also hopes to help monitors themselves, as well as the prosecutors who appoint them, in making the monitorship a more constructive feature of an FCPA settlement."
"Part I provides some basic background on the FCPA and discusses the use of compliance monitors as a term in settlement agreements with federal regulators. Part II examines why some companies receive a monitor as a term of an FCPA settlement, while others do not. Part III discusses what FCPA monitorships most commonly entail. Part IV identifies best practices for FCPA compliance monitors: what they should and should not do in their quest to help mold an ethical organization. Finally, Part V advises how companies can utilize their role in the selection, retention, and management of the monitor to help make the process anodyne and the results valuable for the organization."
For more on monitors, see here, here, and here (discussing a November 2009 GAO report) for certain prior posts.
Authored by Gibson Dunn & Crutcher attorneys Joseph Warin (here), Michael Diamant (here), and Veronica Root (here), the article was recently published in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business.
Below is an abstract.
"This article explores the rise of the corporate compliance monitor as a condition for settling violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)—a setting in which federal prosecutors routinely impose monitors. From 2004 to 2010, more than 40 percent of all companies that resolved an FCPA investigation with the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) through a settlement or plea agreement retained an independent compliance monitor as a condition of that agreement."
"If U.S. enforcement authorities maintain their current approach, the reality is that companies facing liability for violating the FCPA are likely to have a monitor imposed on them as part of a settlement agreement. From the U.S. government’s perspective, monitorships make sense for companies that violate anti-bribery laws, making it important for offending corporations to learn how to deal with monitors. Pulling from the authors’ extensive experience with three major FCPA compliance monitorships, as well as their work assisting clients operating under an FCPA monitorship, this article aids in that process. It also hopes to help monitors themselves, as well as the prosecutors who appoint them, in making the monitorship a more constructive feature of an FCPA settlement."
"Part I provides some basic background on the FCPA and discusses the use of compliance monitors as a term in settlement agreements with federal regulators. Part II examines why some companies receive a monitor as a term of an FCPA settlement, while others do not. Part III discusses what FCPA monitorships most commonly entail. Part IV identifies best practices for FCPA compliance monitors: what they should and should not do in their quest to help mold an ethical organization. Finally, Part V advises how companies can utilize their role in the selection, retention, and management of the monitor to help make the process anodyne and the results valuable for the organization."
For more on monitors, see here, here, and here (discussing a November 2009 GAO report) for certain prior posts.
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
"FCPA Sanctions: Too Big To Debar?"
Debarment (or lack thereof) is a periodic topic on this site.
Previously, I covered "Siemens ... The Year After" (here), a post that highlighted in the year after resolution of the Siemens record-setting December 2008 FCPA matter, the U.S. government continued to do substantial business with the company it charged with engaging in a pattern of bribery “unprecedented in scale and geographic scope.”
In September 2010, I highlighted (here) the FBI's $40 million contract with BAE - months after the FBI participated in resolution of the $400 million FCPA related enforcement action against the company.
In my November 2010 testimony (here) before the U.S. Senate, I stated as follows. "In order for the DOJ’s deterrence message to be completely heard and understood egregious instances of corporate bribery that legitimately satisfy the elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation involving high-level executives and/or board participation should be followed with debarment proceedings against the offender."
This testimony prompted then Senator Arlen Specter (who chaired the hearing) to ask me several follow-up questions for the record relating to debarment. (See here for the Q&A's). Senator Christopher Coons (who also participated in the November 2010 hearing) also asked debarment follow-up questions of the DOJ.
As highlighted last week (here), the DOJ is opposed to a "mandatory, conduct-based, debarment remedy for companies that engage in egregious bribery." As noted in the prior post, the DOJ's responses seemed anchored in self-interest in that such a remedy would lessen its FCPA caseload, would make its job more difficult, and would take away it flexibility and leverage and resolving FCPA enforcement actions.
Enter Dru Stevenson (Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law - here and a past contributor to the site) and Nick Wagoner (a law student at South Texas College of Law).
Stevenson and Wagoner recently released a yet to be published article titled "FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?" (See here).
The authors (who can be reached at dstevenson@stcl.edu and nicholas.wagoner@gmail.com) provide this article summary.
"Despite the dramatic escalation in corporate fines and imprisonment imposed under the FCPA in recent years, a particularly lethal sanction for combating foreign corruption remains unused—suspension or debarment of prosecuted entities from future contracts with the U.S. Many of the firms caught bribing foreign officials have extensive contracts with a number of domestic federal agencies; meaning debarment may be a particularly devastating penalty both for the government contractor and the agency it transacts business with.
This begs the question: are certain private contractors too big to debar? As this Article demonstrates, it appears so. Certain federal agencies have become highly dependent on a handful of private firms responsible for satisfying the vast majority of government contracts. Because of the potential “collateral consequences” that may result from the collapse of a debarred contractor, these firms have enjoyed bailouts from agency officials who refuse to sanction corrupt practices through suspension or debarment. If ridding foreign markets of corruption truly is a top priority of the U.S., it seems both unfair and imprudent for federal agencies to continue awarding lucrative, multibillion-dollar contracts to firms recently prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining such contracts overseas.
This situation leads to the jaded viewpoint that paying fines when caught bribing foreign officials has “simply become a cost of doing business.” To help illuminate these concerns and lend support to the thesis, this Article examines the third largest FCPA-related enforcement actions to date: the BAE Systems case. On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems paid approximately $400 million in fines for its corrupt practices abroad. In the 365 days that followed however, BAE was awarded U.S. contracts in excess of $58 billion dollars. The U.S.’s refusal to debar BAE because of the risk of “collateral consequences” provides a case study of the benefits and drawbacks to deterring foreign corruption through suspension and debarment. This Article concludes that the U.S. must begin to diversify its portfolio of federal contractors so that prosecutors may leverage the legitimate threat of suspension and debarment to more effectively deter foreign corruption."
Previously, I covered "Siemens ... The Year After" (here), a post that highlighted in the year after resolution of the Siemens record-setting December 2008 FCPA matter, the U.S. government continued to do substantial business with the company it charged with engaging in a pattern of bribery “unprecedented in scale and geographic scope.”
In September 2010, I highlighted (here) the FBI's $40 million contract with BAE - months after the FBI participated in resolution of the $400 million FCPA related enforcement action against the company.
In my November 2010 testimony (here) before the U.S. Senate, I stated as follows. "In order for the DOJ’s deterrence message to be completely heard and understood egregious instances of corporate bribery that legitimately satisfy the elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation involving high-level executives and/or board participation should be followed with debarment proceedings against the offender."
This testimony prompted then Senator Arlen Specter (who chaired the hearing) to ask me several follow-up questions for the record relating to debarment. (See here for the Q&A's). Senator Christopher Coons (who also participated in the November 2010 hearing) also asked debarment follow-up questions of the DOJ.
As highlighted last week (here), the DOJ is opposed to a "mandatory, conduct-based, debarment remedy for companies that engage in egregious bribery." As noted in the prior post, the DOJ's responses seemed anchored in self-interest in that such a remedy would lessen its FCPA caseload, would make its job more difficult, and would take away it flexibility and leverage and resolving FCPA enforcement actions.
Enter Dru Stevenson (Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law - here and a past contributor to the site) and Nick Wagoner (a law student at South Texas College of Law).
Stevenson and Wagoner recently released a yet to be published article titled "FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?" (See here).
The authors (who can be reached at dstevenson@stcl.edu and nicholas.wagoner@gmail.com) provide this article summary.
"Despite the dramatic escalation in corporate fines and imprisonment imposed under the FCPA in recent years, a particularly lethal sanction for combating foreign corruption remains unused—suspension or debarment of prosecuted entities from future contracts with the U.S. Many of the firms caught bribing foreign officials have extensive contracts with a number of domestic federal agencies; meaning debarment may be a particularly devastating penalty both for the government contractor and the agency it transacts business with.
This begs the question: are certain private contractors too big to debar? As this Article demonstrates, it appears so. Certain federal agencies have become highly dependent on a handful of private firms responsible for satisfying the vast majority of government contracts. Because of the potential “collateral consequences” that may result from the collapse of a debarred contractor, these firms have enjoyed bailouts from agency officials who refuse to sanction corrupt practices through suspension or debarment. If ridding foreign markets of corruption truly is a top priority of the U.S., it seems both unfair and imprudent for federal agencies to continue awarding lucrative, multibillion-dollar contracts to firms recently prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining such contracts overseas.
This situation leads to the jaded viewpoint that paying fines when caught bribing foreign officials has “simply become a cost of doing business.” To help illuminate these concerns and lend support to the thesis, this Article examines the third largest FCPA-related enforcement actions to date: the BAE Systems case. On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems paid approximately $400 million in fines for its corrupt practices abroad. In the 365 days that followed however, BAE was awarded U.S. contracts in excess of $58 billion dollars. The U.S.’s refusal to debar BAE because of the risk of “collateral consequences” provides a case study of the benefits and drawbacks to deterring foreign corruption through suspension and debarment. This Article concludes that the U.S. must begin to diversify its portfolio of federal contractors so that prosecutors may leverage the legitimate threat of suspension and debarment to more effectively deter foreign corruption."
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
A Practical Resource For Managers and Executives
Aaron Murphy (Latham & Watkins - here) has published a new book - "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Practical Resource For Managers and Executives" (here).
In this Q&A exchange, Murphy describes his book and his motivations for writing it. He also answers a few questions about FCPA reform proposals and the U.K. Bribery Act.
*****
Having spent several years at a large law firm with an FCPA practice, I know how busy the practice can be. Where did you find the time to write such an extensive book?
I spend a lot of my life on airplanes and in hotel rooms.
This book is different from the treatises and manuals that are already out there. Why did you write this book, and in particular, this kind of book?
There are some good legal treatises and manuals. But they aren’t aimed at educating the managers and employees who can be on the receiving end of an FCPA investigation. My book is written for managers and others who are on-the-ground in foreign countries. I wanted to write an engaging book that changed the kinds of internal questions that get asked about expenses, agents, state-owned entities, and other issues.
The book grew out of the fact that I was having the same conversation with clients and their managers over and over again. It occurred to me that despite sitting through a couple of PowerPoint slides about the FCPA during a compliance training, the managers did not understand how and where bribery occurs.
I’d be interviewing the manger of a company’s foreign operations in a high risk country and have a stack of documents to go through with him. I’d ask him a series of questions about some fairly run-of-the-mill issues – why certain dinners occurred with some government officials, what the thousand dollars of “miscellaneous” expenses on a hotel bill were for, whether the manager ever saw any of the holiday gifts he approved a large budget for – and it would often become clear to me that the manager had no idea that I was asking him about possible bribes. It had simply never occurred to him that there could be FCPA risks associated with any of these kinds of expenses. And those kinds of blind spots existed with managers who supposedly had received FCPA training.
Numerous times people have told me that they remember the FCPA training they had, but that they never thought the Act applied to the kinds of expenses I’m asking them about.
I tried to keep this book tethered to real-world situations. Theoretical discussions and policy debates are interesting and important – and there is some of that in the book – but it doesn’t really help a manager spot concrete issues. It doesn’t tell a manager what to watch out for. And that was the aim of this book.
I think there is plenty to debate about anticorruption enforcement generally, but whether you agree with the DOJ or the SEC’s position on something doesn’t really matter a whole lot when you’re trying to answer a question on a live issue, in real time. Can we make this payment or not? Should we use this agent, despite these rumors? Can I take this guy from a state-owned company out for a round of golf and dinner? Those are real questions. Hard, fact-specific questions that often need to be answered immediately. My goal was to make sure that managers understand that those are the questions they need to ask. Those are the questions they need to get some help answering. Theoretical debates don’t help a manager who is faced with a situation in the real world.
Do you think business personnel are surprised by the breadth of the FCPA, at least as it is interpreted and enforced by the DOJ and SEC?
Absolutely. Everyone thinks bribery is about suitcases full of money. Even though managers get trained and are told it’s much broader, they either don’t hear it, don’t believe it, or just think “Yeah, but it couldn’t happen in my organization.” They walk out of the training and it’s business as usual. Senior executives back at headquarters think everything is fine because their people have all been shown some slides with FCPA language. But there’s often a fundamental disconnect between the training and life on the ground in a company’s foreign operations.
I kept thinking there had to be a better way to help companies train their people on the front end, so I would quit having those conversations on the back end, after violations have already occurred.
I set out to write a book that was non-technical. A book that was practical. Something that takes managers – and I use that term loosely, meaning anyone who is in charge of other people – through all of the areas where FCPA issues typically come up and show them how they come up. I wanted something that gave managers a guided tour of the kinds of things FCPA practitioners see everyday.
What do you think is behind the inadequacy of much FCPA training?
I think it’s mostly a function of resources. I’m really sympathetic to in-house compliance personnel who are tasked with FCPA training. Usually, FCPA is just one of several areas they’re responsible for, and their organization is spread out over ten, twenty, fifty, or a hundred countries. It just becomes impossible for them to get out there and directly train all of their company’s employees. And, with constant turnover, acquisitions, mergers, it’s a never-ending task. New people are always joining a large organization. And FCPA training is just one of the things they have to do.
So you see the FCPA getting a few slides in a much larger PowerPoint that tries to cover insider trading, antitrust, OFAC and money laundering issues, regulatory issues, and all kinds of other stuff. Employees walk out with a glazed look on their faces and they haven’t really learned anything.
I wanted to help solve that problem. Here is something that companies can make required reading for all finance people and every manager over a certain level. Put it in their new hire package. Make them sign a certification that they’ve read and understood it, and put that in their personnel file. Then companies at least have documentation that the people charged with overseeing their business really were trained in detail. It hopefully gives companies some protection down the road if there is a problem, and, most importantly, it will educate employees about how the FCPA works and how FCPA compliance issues come up in the real world. If it does that, the book isn’t just insurance against future violations, it will actually result in compliance.
Plus, making the book required reading sets expectations and sends a serious message to management that this is an issue the company cares about.
In terms of FCPA compliance, one often hears about "tone at the top." Is this just a buzzword or do you think it has real-world application?
I think it’s extremely important with an issue like bribery. Small shifts in attitudes can have huge consequences. I think just making off-hand jokes along the lines of “we all know how it is in Country X” sends a powerful message that low-level regulatory bribery is okay. Meaning, as long as we’re not talking about suitcases full of cash, it’s no big deal, no one is really going to get upset about it.
But regulatory issues can be huge. Just look at the recent Panalpina settlements.
At the end of the day, my mantra is this: Companies don’t pay bribes. People do. The best thing a company can do is to train its people by showing them how real world situations affect them. That’s what this book is about.
There is a lot of talk these days about FCPA reform. What are your thoughts on this issue?
Well, it makes for good controversy, but I always say that no politician ever got elected by saying it was time to get soft on crime. Certainly not a pro-corruption platform. So I think there’s very little chance of any overhaul that is going to make compliance easier on companies. That said, there may well be some chance for clarifying legislation.
Everyone out there lobbying for reform needs to be very careful what they wish for. Corruption is a topic that makes for good headlines and politicians love good headlines. It’s not hard to imagine a politician who doesn’t care too much about the FCPA trying to do away with facilitating payments, or press for more severe jail time, just to make a name for themselves. So as I see it, there’s a risk that any reform process could get hijacked, and we could end up with a statute that looks more like the UK Bribery Act. Although that might not be a bad thing if US companies could get a very solid and clear adequate procedures defense out of it.
Although, as you know because you were there at the recent Senate hearings, the DOJ’s current position is that it’s not interested in what it views as a compliance amnesty program. I suspect we’re stuck where we are for the time being. Although the forthcoming enforcement of the UK Bribery Act will keep things interesting.
If the DOJ is enforcing, in many cases, a statute in a way that Congress did not intend, why is this a political issue? Can any legislative reform proposal address this structural issue?
These things are always ultimately political. There’s no question that DOJ has an aggressive interpretation of certain FCPA provisions. Whether DOJ is transcending Congressional intent or not is no different from any other problem of interpretation. The difference in the FCPA context, as you have raised in your work, is that there is only limited judicial oversight of those interpretations because so few of these matters ever get litigated. And while that point is well-taken, many courts might well interpret the FCPA the same way DOJ interprets it. So my view is that whether we take issue with DOJ’s interpretation or court interpretations, the solution always becomes a political issue. Congress is aware of the DOJ’s view and can take steps to modify or clarify the statute if it disagrees with that view, the same as it can and often does when it dislikes court interpretations of any other statute.
Now, whether any Congressional solution would result in anything better than what we currently have is anyone’s guess.
Do you think the UK Bribery Act is going to be a real game-changer? A lot of people are talking about the lack of a facilitating payments exception. Do you think the landscape is going to be very different once the Bribery Act comes into force?
I actually think that the biggest effect that it’s going to have is that it’s going to force large British companies that may not have focused on corruption issues before to finally have to focus on them. But for most multinationals – many of whom will be subject to both the FCPA and the Bribery Act – I think the landscape stays largely unchanged. The biggest deal for them is going to be getting an adequate compliance program in place.
The underlying ways in which bribery occurs inside of companies will remain the same. The controls and procedures that can address bribery will also remain the same. At the margins, there are some obvious differences between the FCPA and the Bribery Act, but the conduct they cover is mostly identical.
A lot of people have been talking about the different treatment of facilitating payments. I don’t think that’s nearly as big of a deal as the other main difference, which is the criminalization of private conduct. The UK statute explicitly looks to whether a relevant function of an employee’s job has been performed improperly as a result of a payment or gift. Who defines what the proper performance of an employee’s job is? The employer, of course.
So has the UK Bribery Act essentially transformed employee manuals and company policy manuals into de facto statutes? Improperly perform your job in violation of your company policy and you’ve committed a crime under British law? I see a potentially serious problem there. After all, many companies have policies that prohibit their employees from giving or receiving gifts from people with whom they do business. Do they need to think more carefully about what they put in those policies in light of what the UK Bribery Act does with them?
In this Q&A exchange, Murphy describes his book and his motivations for writing it. He also answers a few questions about FCPA reform proposals and the U.K. Bribery Act.
*****
Having spent several years at a large law firm with an FCPA practice, I know how busy the practice can be. Where did you find the time to write such an extensive book?
I spend a lot of my life on airplanes and in hotel rooms.
This book is different from the treatises and manuals that are already out there. Why did you write this book, and in particular, this kind of book?
There are some good legal treatises and manuals. But they aren’t aimed at educating the managers and employees who can be on the receiving end of an FCPA investigation. My book is written for managers and others who are on-the-ground in foreign countries. I wanted to write an engaging book that changed the kinds of internal questions that get asked about expenses, agents, state-owned entities, and other issues.
The book grew out of the fact that I was having the same conversation with clients and their managers over and over again. It occurred to me that despite sitting through a couple of PowerPoint slides about the FCPA during a compliance training, the managers did not understand how and where bribery occurs.
I’d be interviewing the manger of a company’s foreign operations in a high risk country and have a stack of documents to go through with him. I’d ask him a series of questions about some fairly run-of-the-mill issues – why certain dinners occurred with some government officials, what the thousand dollars of “miscellaneous” expenses on a hotel bill were for, whether the manager ever saw any of the holiday gifts he approved a large budget for – and it would often become clear to me that the manager had no idea that I was asking him about possible bribes. It had simply never occurred to him that there could be FCPA risks associated with any of these kinds of expenses. And those kinds of blind spots existed with managers who supposedly had received FCPA training.
Numerous times people have told me that they remember the FCPA training they had, but that they never thought the Act applied to the kinds of expenses I’m asking them about.
I tried to keep this book tethered to real-world situations. Theoretical discussions and policy debates are interesting and important – and there is some of that in the book – but it doesn’t really help a manager spot concrete issues. It doesn’t tell a manager what to watch out for. And that was the aim of this book.
I think there is plenty to debate about anticorruption enforcement generally, but whether you agree with the DOJ or the SEC’s position on something doesn’t really matter a whole lot when you’re trying to answer a question on a live issue, in real time. Can we make this payment or not? Should we use this agent, despite these rumors? Can I take this guy from a state-owned company out for a round of golf and dinner? Those are real questions. Hard, fact-specific questions that often need to be answered immediately. My goal was to make sure that managers understand that those are the questions they need to ask. Those are the questions they need to get some help answering. Theoretical debates don’t help a manager who is faced with a situation in the real world.
Do you think business personnel are surprised by the breadth of the FCPA, at least as it is interpreted and enforced by the DOJ and SEC?
Absolutely. Everyone thinks bribery is about suitcases full of money. Even though managers get trained and are told it’s much broader, they either don’t hear it, don’t believe it, or just think “Yeah, but it couldn’t happen in my organization.” They walk out of the training and it’s business as usual. Senior executives back at headquarters think everything is fine because their people have all been shown some slides with FCPA language. But there’s often a fundamental disconnect between the training and life on the ground in a company’s foreign operations.
I kept thinking there had to be a better way to help companies train their people on the front end, so I would quit having those conversations on the back end, after violations have already occurred.
I set out to write a book that was non-technical. A book that was practical. Something that takes managers – and I use that term loosely, meaning anyone who is in charge of other people – through all of the areas where FCPA issues typically come up and show them how they come up. I wanted something that gave managers a guided tour of the kinds of things FCPA practitioners see everyday.
What do you think is behind the inadequacy of much FCPA training?
I think it’s mostly a function of resources. I’m really sympathetic to in-house compliance personnel who are tasked with FCPA training. Usually, FCPA is just one of several areas they’re responsible for, and their organization is spread out over ten, twenty, fifty, or a hundred countries. It just becomes impossible for them to get out there and directly train all of their company’s employees. And, with constant turnover, acquisitions, mergers, it’s a never-ending task. New people are always joining a large organization. And FCPA training is just one of the things they have to do.
So you see the FCPA getting a few slides in a much larger PowerPoint that tries to cover insider trading, antitrust, OFAC and money laundering issues, regulatory issues, and all kinds of other stuff. Employees walk out with a glazed look on their faces and they haven’t really learned anything.
I wanted to help solve that problem. Here is something that companies can make required reading for all finance people and every manager over a certain level. Put it in their new hire package. Make them sign a certification that they’ve read and understood it, and put that in their personnel file. Then companies at least have documentation that the people charged with overseeing their business really were trained in detail. It hopefully gives companies some protection down the road if there is a problem, and, most importantly, it will educate employees about how the FCPA works and how FCPA compliance issues come up in the real world. If it does that, the book isn’t just insurance against future violations, it will actually result in compliance.
Plus, making the book required reading sets expectations and sends a serious message to management that this is an issue the company cares about.
In terms of FCPA compliance, one often hears about "tone at the top." Is this just a buzzword or do you think it has real-world application?
I think it’s extremely important with an issue like bribery. Small shifts in attitudes can have huge consequences. I think just making off-hand jokes along the lines of “we all know how it is in Country X” sends a powerful message that low-level regulatory bribery is okay. Meaning, as long as we’re not talking about suitcases full of cash, it’s no big deal, no one is really going to get upset about it.
But regulatory issues can be huge. Just look at the recent Panalpina settlements.
At the end of the day, my mantra is this: Companies don’t pay bribes. People do. The best thing a company can do is to train its people by showing them how real world situations affect them. That’s what this book is about.
There is a lot of talk these days about FCPA reform. What are your thoughts on this issue?
Well, it makes for good controversy, but I always say that no politician ever got elected by saying it was time to get soft on crime. Certainly not a pro-corruption platform. So I think there’s very little chance of any overhaul that is going to make compliance easier on companies. That said, there may well be some chance for clarifying legislation.
Everyone out there lobbying for reform needs to be very careful what they wish for. Corruption is a topic that makes for good headlines and politicians love good headlines. It’s not hard to imagine a politician who doesn’t care too much about the FCPA trying to do away with facilitating payments, or press for more severe jail time, just to make a name for themselves. So as I see it, there’s a risk that any reform process could get hijacked, and we could end up with a statute that looks more like the UK Bribery Act. Although that might not be a bad thing if US companies could get a very solid and clear adequate procedures defense out of it.
Although, as you know because you were there at the recent Senate hearings, the DOJ’s current position is that it’s not interested in what it views as a compliance amnesty program. I suspect we’re stuck where we are for the time being. Although the forthcoming enforcement of the UK Bribery Act will keep things interesting.
If the DOJ is enforcing, in many cases, a statute in a way that Congress did not intend, why is this a political issue? Can any legislative reform proposal address this structural issue?
These things are always ultimately political. There’s no question that DOJ has an aggressive interpretation of certain FCPA provisions. Whether DOJ is transcending Congressional intent or not is no different from any other problem of interpretation. The difference in the FCPA context, as you have raised in your work, is that there is only limited judicial oversight of those interpretations because so few of these matters ever get litigated. And while that point is well-taken, many courts might well interpret the FCPA the same way DOJ interprets it. So my view is that whether we take issue with DOJ’s interpretation or court interpretations, the solution always becomes a political issue. Congress is aware of the DOJ’s view and can take steps to modify or clarify the statute if it disagrees with that view, the same as it can and often does when it dislikes court interpretations of any other statute.
Now, whether any Congressional solution would result in anything better than what we currently have is anyone’s guess.
Do you think the UK Bribery Act is going to be a real game-changer? A lot of people are talking about the lack of a facilitating payments exception. Do you think the landscape is going to be very different once the Bribery Act comes into force?
I actually think that the biggest effect that it’s going to have is that it’s going to force large British companies that may not have focused on corruption issues before to finally have to focus on them. But for most multinationals – many of whom will be subject to both the FCPA and the Bribery Act – I think the landscape stays largely unchanged. The biggest deal for them is going to be getting an adequate compliance program in place.
The underlying ways in which bribery occurs inside of companies will remain the same. The controls and procedures that can address bribery will also remain the same. At the margins, there are some obvious differences between the FCPA and the Bribery Act, but the conduct they cover is mostly identical.
A lot of people have been talking about the different treatment of facilitating payments. I don’t think that’s nearly as big of a deal as the other main difference, which is the criminalization of private conduct. The UK statute explicitly looks to whether a relevant function of an employee’s job has been performed improperly as a result of a payment or gift. Who defines what the proper performance of an employee’s job is? The employer, of course.
So has the UK Bribery Act essentially transformed employee manuals and company policy manuals into de facto statutes? Improperly perform your job in violation of your company policy and you’ve committed a crime under British law? I see a potentially serious problem there. After all, many companies have policies that prohibit their employees from giving or receiving gifts from people with whom they do business. Do they need to think more carefully about what they put in those policies in light of what the UK Bribery Act does with them?
Thursday, November 11, 2010
The Facade of FCPA Enforcement
I am pleased to release (here) my paper, "The Facade of FCPA Enforcement," recently published by Georgetown Journal of International Law.
Below is an abstract.
*****
The rise in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) enforcement actions has been well documented. Against the backdrop of aggressive enforcement and the resulting multi-million dollar fines and penalties is the undeniable fact that, in most instances, there is no judicial scrutiny of the FCPA enforcement theories. The end result is that the FCPA often means what the enforcement agencies say it means. Because of the “carrots” and “sticks” relevant to resolving a government enforcement action, FCPA defendants are nudged to accept resolution vehicles notwithstanding the enforcement agencies’ untested and dubious enforcement theories or the existence of valid and legitimate defenses. The end result is often the facade of FCPA enforcement.
This article discusses various pillars that contribute to the facade of FCPA enforcement and highlights that the FCPA, during its decade of resurgence, is being enforced like no other law. This article does not argue, or even suggest, that every FCPA enforcement action is unwarranted or that no company or individual has ever violated the FCPA. Rather, this article demonstrates that a significant majority of recent FCPA enforcement actions are a facade—including those that allege clear instances of corporate bribery—yet are resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges.
The facade of FCPA enforcement matters. Even though the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve an FCPA enforcement action are not subject to judicial scrutiny and the vehicles do not necessarily reflect the triumph of the enforcement agencies’ theories, in the absence of substantive FCPA case law, these privately negotiated resolution vehicles have come to represent de facto FCPA case law. The facade of FCPA enforcement also breeds inefficient overcompliance by risk averse business actors fearful of enterprise–threatening liability because of the enforcement agencies’ untested and dubious theories. Because the factors that contribute to the facade are being modeled by other nations when enforcing their own bribery laws, the facade of FCPA enforcement is a global issue affecting a broad segment of the marketplace.
Identifying and acknowledging the existence of a problem is a necessary first step to crafting solutions. This article exposes the facade of FCPA enforcement, argues that addressing the facade and subjecting FCPA enforcement actions to greater judicial scrutiny is in the public interest, and encourages more FCPA defendants to challenge the enforcement agencies and further expose the facade of FCPA enforcement.
Below is an abstract.
*****
The rise in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) enforcement actions has been well documented. Against the backdrop of aggressive enforcement and the resulting multi-million dollar fines and penalties is the undeniable fact that, in most instances, there is no judicial scrutiny of the FCPA enforcement theories. The end result is that the FCPA often means what the enforcement agencies say it means. Because of the “carrots” and “sticks” relevant to resolving a government enforcement action, FCPA defendants are nudged to accept resolution vehicles notwithstanding the enforcement agencies’ untested and dubious enforcement theories or the existence of valid and legitimate defenses. The end result is often the facade of FCPA enforcement.
This article discusses various pillars that contribute to the facade of FCPA enforcement and highlights that the FCPA, during its decade of resurgence, is being enforced like no other law. This article does not argue, or even suggest, that every FCPA enforcement action is unwarranted or that no company or individual has ever violated the FCPA. Rather, this article demonstrates that a significant majority of recent FCPA enforcement actions are a facade—including those that allege clear instances of corporate bribery—yet are resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges.
The facade of FCPA enforcement matters. Even though the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve an FCPA enforcement action are not subject to judicial scrutiny and the vehicles do not necessarily reflect the triumph of the enforcement agencies’ theories, in the absence of substantive FCPA case law, these privately negotiated resolution vehicles have come to represent de facto FCPA case law. The facade of FCPA enforcement also breeds inefficient overcompliance by risk averse business actors fearful of enterprise–threatening liability because of the enforcement agencies’ untested and dubious theories. Because the factors that contribute to the facade are being modeled by other nations when enforcing their own bribery laws, the facade of FCPA enforcement is a global issue affecting a broad segment of the marketplace.
Identifying and acknowledging the existence of a problem is a necessary first step to crafting solutions. This article exposes the facade of FCPA enforcement, argues that addressing the facade and subjecting FCPA enforcement actions to greater judicial scrutiny is in the public interest, and encourages more FCPA defendants to challenge the enforcement agencies and further expose the facade of FCPA enforcement.
Thursday, September 9, 2010
My Two Cents On The FCPA's Affirmative Defenses
Students looking for scholarship ideas, should consider the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Why?
There is a good chance that publication of an article will generate coverage and discussion on the blogosphere and elsewhere.
Case in point is Kyle Sheahen's "I'm Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." (see here).
For prior coverage of Sheahen's article see here, here and here.
Sheahen's article is about the FCPA's two affirmative defenses - the so-called local law and promotional expense defenses.
Big picture, Sheahen terms these defenses as being "hollow," "illusory," and "useless in practice."
For starters, I respectfully disagree with Sheahen's statement that "business and businessmen accused of giving bribes to foreign officials have fared poorly in federal courts" as well as the implication that this somehow supports his thesis.
The three FCPA trials cited from 2009 - Frederick Bourke, William Jefferson, and Gerald and Patricia Greene were a mixed bag for the DOJ, not slam-dunk successes.
For starters, the jury found Jefferson not guilty of substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations (see here).
Sure, Bourke was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act (as well as making false statements to the FBI) (see here), yet when the DOJ alleges that one is a key participant of a "massive bribery scheme" yet secures only a 366 day sentence (see here) from a judge who remarks that “after years of supervising this case, it’s still not entirely clear to me whether Mr. Bourke is a victim or a crook or a little bit of both” - I struggle to put such a case in the decisive "win" category for the DOJ. Plus, Bourke's case is currently on appeal (see here).
The Green case (see here) would seem to represent the cleanest win for the DOJ even though the sentencing judge expressed concerns whether the Green's conduct caused any harm in sentencing the couple to six months in prison thereby rejecting the DOJ's recommended ten year sentence. (See here).
Sheahen's article was published before the Giffen Gaffe (see here). Giffen aggressively mounted a legal defense and, whether for legal, political or other reasons, the case that began with charges that Giffen made "more than $78 million in unlawful payments to two senior officials of the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with six separate oil transactions, in which the American oil companies Mobil Oil, Amoco, Texaco and Phillips Petroleum acquired valuable oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan" ended with a one-paragraph superseding information charging a misdemeanor tax violation. Further, back in 2004, Giffen was successful in having FCPA-related criminal charges dismissed when the trial court judge (see here) concluded that the DOJ offered "the slenderest of reeds" to support the collateral criminal charge.
Going back in time ...
George McLean won his FCPA case when the Fifth Circuit concluded, see 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984) that the FCPA, as it then existed because of the subsequently repealed Eckhardt Amendment, barred prosecution.
Donald Castle and Darrell Lowry (two Canadian "foreign officials") won their FCPA-related cases, see 741 F.Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990), when the court dismissed their criminal indictments. The DOJ asserted that even though the officials could not be prosecuted under the FCPA, they could be prosecuted under the general conspiracy statute (18 USC 371) for conspiring to violate the FCPA. However, the court declined DOJ's invitation to extend the reach of the FCPA through the application of the conspiracy statute to Castle and Lowry.
Richard Liebo was acquitted, following a three week jury trial, of several counts including nine counts of violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and one count of violating the FCPA's accounting and record keeping provisions. See 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991). He was found guilty of one FCPA count concerning his company's purchase of honeymoon airline tickets for the cousin and close friend of Captain Ali Tiemogo, the chief of maintenance for the Niger Air Force. In connection with this conviction, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court "clearly abused its discretion in denying Liebo's motion for a new trial" and remanded for a new trial.
Hans Bodmer didn't fare too badly either in 2004 when Judge Shira Scheindlin (the same judge in the Bourke case) held that the portion of the criminal indictment "charging Bodmer with conspiracy to violate the FCPA contravenes the constitutional fair notice requirement, and the rule of lenity demands its dismissal."
Of course, the DOJ has had its fair share of FCPA successes, but it remains a misperception that FCPA defendants have "fare[d] so badly" in FCPA trials as Sheahen, and others, have asserted.
Returning to the substance of Sheahen's article, he discusses the October 2008 Bourke decision by Judge Scheindlin (see 582 F.Supp.2d 535) - a case of first impression on the FCPA's local law defense.
Bourke argued that the FCPA's local law affirmative defense was applicable because, under Azeri law even though the payments were illegal, he was relieved from criminal responsibility when he reported the payments at issue to the President of Azerbaijan.
Judge Scheindlin disagreed, drawing a hard line between payments - the focus of the FCPA's local law affirmative defense in her mind - and the related issue of whether a person could not be prosecuted in the foreign country because a provision may relieve that person from criminal responsibility.
Judge Scheindlin concluded that "an individual may be prosecuted under the FCPA for a payment that violates foreign law even if the individual is relieved of criminal responsibility for his actions by a provision of the foreign law."
I agree with Sheahen's statement that Judge Scheindlin's decision of first impression narrowed the FCPA's local law defense "to the point of extinction."
I would go a step further and argue that Judge Scheindlin's decision would seem to violate the basic axiom that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all of its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.
In other words, courts should not suppose that Congress intended to enact unnecessary statutes and there is a presumption against interpreting a statute in a way that renders it ineffective.
The local law affirmative defense was added to the FCPA in 1988 and we must presume that Congress intended to enact the affirmative defense for some reason.
It was widely assumed by Congress in 1977 (when the FCPA was enacted), and by the Congress that amended the FCPA in 1988 to include the local law defense as well, that no nation's written law permitted bribery of its officials.
Yet, given Judge Scheindlin's narrow construction of the local law defense, the decision would appear to render the local-law defense (a statutory term that must have some meaning) inoperative, superfluous and insignificant.
As to the promotional expense defense, I would respectfully disagree with Sheahen's apparent conclusion that the defense is meaningless just because it has never been successfully invoked by an FCPA defendant at trial.
Because of the "carrots" and "sticks" the DOJ and SEC possess in an FCPA enforcement action, and because of the resolution vehicles typically offered to FCPA defendants to resolve an FCPA enforcement action (such as non and deferred prosecution agreements) there is much about the FCPA that has never been subjected to judicial scrutiny.
That does not mean however that an element or defense not successfully invoked at trial renders that element or defense meaningless or hallow.
Indeed, Sheahen discusses the FCPA Opinion Procedure Release process. Through this mechanism, those subject to the FCPA have gained degrees of comfort from DOJ "no enforcement" opinions that are based on the promotional expense defense.
Although the Opinion Procedure Releases are not precedent, countless others in the legal, business, and compliance communities find comfort in these releases, as well as the statute itself, when analyzing real-world conduct for potential FCPA exposure.
FCPA enforcement is in need of many fixes and indeed the Opinion Procedure Release process is likely not the best way for the DOJ to make its enforcement positions known.
However, these structural flaws in FCPA enforcement, coupled with the typical ways in which FCPA enforcement actions are resolved, necessarily leads to the conclusion that the FCPA's affirmative defenses are "hollow," "illusory," and "useless in practice."
*****
I provided Sheahen with my draft post so that he could respond and here is what he said.
"Professor Koehler,
Thank you for your thorough analysis. Although DOJ's trial record in FCPA prosecutions is not a clean sheet, the government has still been substantively successful in almost every FCPA case that has gone to trial. Further, the fact remains that no FCPA defendant has successfully invoked either the local law or the promotional expenses defense in an FCPA enforcement action.
Also, while I agree that the promotional expenses defense provides some guidelines for compliance with the FCPA, neither it nor the local law defense provide a meaningful defense to an enforcement action. Accordingly, Congress must take action to ensure that individual and corporate defendants have the actual ability to raise the affirmative defenses contemplated by the statutory scheme.
Thanks again and all the best,
Kyle Sheahen
sheahen2010@lawnet.ucla.edu
Why?
There is a good chance that publication of an article will generate coverage and discussion on the blogosphere and elsewhere.
Case in point is Kyle Sheahen's "I'm Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." (see here).
For prior coverage of Sheahen's article see here, here and here.
Sheahen's article is about the FCPA's two affirmative defenses - the so-called local law and promotional expense defenses.
Big picture, Sheahen terms these defenses as being "hollow," "illusory," and "useless in practice."
For starters, I respectfully disagree with Sheahen's statement that "business and businessmen accused of giving bribes to foreign officials have fared poorly in federal courts" as well as the implication that this somehow supports his thesis.
The three FCPA trials cited from 2009 - Frederick Bourke, William Jefferson, and Gerald and Patricia Greene were a mixed bag for the DOJ, not slam-dunk successes.
For starters, the jury found Jefferson not guilty of substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations (see here).
Sure, Bourke was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act (as well as making false statements to the FBI) (see here), yet when the DOJ alleges that one is a key participant of a "massive bribery scheme" yet secures only a 366 day sentence (see here) from a judge who remarks that “after years of supervising this case, it’s still not entirely clear to me whether Mr. Bourke is a victim or a crook or a little bit of both” - I struggle to put such a case in the decisive "win" category for the DOJ. Plus, Bourke's case is currently on appeal (see here).
The Green case (see here) would seem to represent the cleanest win for the DOJ even though the sentencing judge expressed concerns whether the Green's conduct caused any harm in sentencing the couple to six months in prison thereby rejecting the DOJ's recommended ten year sentence. (See here).
Sheahen's article was published before the Giffen Gaffe (see here). Giffen aggressively mounted a legal defense and, whether for legal, political or other reasons, the case that began with charges that Giffen made "more than $78 million in unlawful payments to two senior officials of the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with six separate oil transactions, in which the American oil companies Mobil Oil, Amoco, Texaco and Phillips Petroleum acquired valuable oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan" ended with a one-paragraph superseding information charging a misdemeanor tax violation. Further, back in 2004, Giffen was successful in having FCPA-related criminal charges dismissed when the trial court judge (see here) concluded that the DOJ offered "the slenderest of reeds" to support the collateral criminal charge.
Going back in time ...
George McLean won his FCPA case when the Fifth Circuit concluded, see 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984) that the FCPA, as it then existed because of the subsequently repealed Eckhardt Amendment, barred prosecution.
Donald Castle and Darrell Lowry (two Canadian "foreign officials") won their FCPA-related cases, see 741 F.Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990), when the court dismissed their criminal indictments. The DOJ asserted that even though the officials could not be prosecuted under the FCPA, they could be prosecuted under the general conspiracy statute (18 USC 371) for conspiring to violate the FCPA. However, the court declined DOJ's invitation to extend the reach of the FCPA through the application of the conspiracy statute to Castle and Lowry.
Richard Liebo was acquitted, following a three week jury trial, of several counts including nine counts of violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and one count of violating the FCPA's accounting and record keeping provisions. See 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991). He was found guilty of one FCPA count concerning his company's purchase of honeymoon airline tickets for the cousin and close friend of Captain Ali Tiemogo, the chief of maintenance for the Niger Air Force. In connection with this conviction, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court "clearly abused its discretion in denying Liebo's motion for a new trial" and remanded for a new trial.
Hans Bodmer didn't fare too badly either in 2004 when Judge Shira Scheindlin (the same judge in the Bourke case) held that the portion of the criminal indictment "charging Bodmer with conspiracy to violate the FCPA contravenes the constitutional fair notice requirement, and the rule of lenity demands its dismissal."
Of course, the DOJ has had its fair share of FCPA successes, but it remains a misperception that FCPA defendants have "fare[d] so badly" in FCPA trials as Sheahen, and others, have asserted.
Returning to the substance of Sheahen's article, he discusses the October 2008 Bourke decision by Judge Scheindlin (see 582 F.Supp.2d 535) - a case of first impression on the FCPA's local law defense.
Bourke argued that the FCPA's local law affirmative defense was applicable because, under Azeri law even though the payments were illegal, he was relieved from criminal responsibility when he reported the payments at issue to the President of Azerbaijan.
Judge Scheindlin disagreed, drawing a hard line between payments - the focus of the FCPA's local law affirmative defense in her mind - and the related issue of whether a person could not be prosecuted in the foreign country because a provision may relieve that person from criminal responsibility.
Judge Scheindlin concluded that "an individual may be prosecuted under the FCPA for a payment that violates foreign law even if the individual is relieved of criminal responsibility for his actions by a provision of the foreign law."
I agree with Sheahen's statement that Judge Scheindlin's decision of first impression narrowed the FCPA's local law defense "to the point of extinction."
I would go a step further and argue that Judge Scheindlin's decision would seem to violate the basic axiom that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all of its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.
In other words, courts should not suppose that Congress intended to enact unnecessary statutes and there is a presumption against interpreting a statute in a way that renders it ineffective.
The local law affirmative defense was added to the FCPA in 1988 and we must presume that Congress intended to enact the affirmative defense for some reason.
It was widely assumed by Congress in 1977 (when the FCPA was enacted), and by the Congress that amended the FCPA in 1988 to include the local law defense as well, that no nation's written law permitted bribery of its officials.
Yet, given Judge Scheindlin's narrow construction of the local law defense, the decision would appear to render the local-law defense (a statutory term that must have some meaning) inoperative, superfluous and insignificant.
As to the promotional expense defense, I would respectfully disagree with Sheahen's apparent conclusion that the defense is meaningless just because it has never been successfully invoked by an FCPA defendant at trial.
Because of the "carrots" and "sticks" the DOJ and SEC possess in an FCPA enforcement action, and because of the resolution vehicles typically offered to FCPA defendants to resolve an FCPA enforcement action (such as non and deferred prosecution agreements) there is much about the FCPA that has never been subjected to judicial scrutiny.
That does not mean however that an element or defense not successfully invoked at trial renders that element or defense meaningless or hallow.
Indeed, Sheahen discusses the FCPA Opinion Procedure Release process. Through this mechanism, those subject to the FCPA have gained degrees of comfort from DOJ "no enforcement" opinions that are based on the promotional expense defense.
Although the Opinion Procedure Releases are not precedent, countless others in the legal, business, and compliance communities find comfort in these releases, as well as the statute itself, when analyzing real-world conduct for potential FCPA exposure.
FCPA enforcement is in need of many fixes and indeed the Opinion Procedure Release process is likely not the best way for the DOJ to make its enforcement positions known.
However, these structural flaws in FCPA enforcement, coupled with the typical ways in which FCPA enforcement actions are resolved, necessarily leads to the conclusion that the FCPA's affirmative defenses are "hollow," "illusory," and "useless in practice."
*****
I provided Sheahen with my draft post so that he could respond and here is what he said.
"Professor Koehler,
Thank you for your thorough analysis. Although DOJ's trial record in FCPA prosecutions is not a clean sheet, the government has still been substantively successful in almost every FCPA case that has gone to trial. Further, the fact remains that no FCPA defendant has successfully invoked either the local law or the promotional expenses defense in an FCPA enforcement action.
Also, while I agree that the promotional expenses defense provides some guidelines for compliance with the FCPA, neither it nor the local law defense provide a meaningful defense to an enforcement action. Accordingly, Congress must take action to ensure that individual and corporate defendants have the actual ability to raise the affirmative defenses contemplated by the statutory scheme.
Thanks again and all the best,
Kyle Sheahen
sheahen2010@lawnet.ucla.edu
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